After dismissal of suit (default), writ will not lie

P.R. Murlidharan v. Swami Dharmananda Theertha Padar, (2006) 4 SCC 501 at page 504, para 12.

Two inconsistent sections in the same Act

Govt. of T.N. v. Park View Enterprises, (2001) 1 SCC 742 at page 746

8. The intent of the legislature in the matter of placement of sections also needs to be gone into since a later section will carry its effectiveness in the event of contraintention expressed in an earlier provision of the statute. The law is well settled on this score and we need not dilate thereon any further but the factum of the refusal to register by reason of undervaluation in terms of Section 47-A cannot stand scrutiny of acceptance having regard to the language used therein. The legislative intent as expressed in Section 35 stands clear to the fact that refusal to register is not permissible in terms therewith. Section 35 is a provision to cater for the instruments not being properly stamped and as such being inadmissible in evidence. It is not that the legislature was not aware of the stamp duty but a special power has been conferred on the Registrar in that regard and the Collector has been empowered to impose appropriate fees and stamp duty in terms of provision of Section 38 read with Sections 39 and 40 of the Act. The powers of the Collector as specified therein, stand in an unambiguous situation as the final authority in the matter of assessment of the duty leviable thereon, and that is precisely the reason as to why the State Legislature engrafted Section 47-A and specifically records in the statute that steps are to be taken only after registration of such an instrument. It can thus conclusively be said that there is existing a categorical expression of legislative intent in regard to the registration of the document — the registration is effected subject to the condition as provided in the statute itself with proper safeguard being taken note of by the legislature and contraexpression of opinion would run counter to the legislative intent which is otherwise not permissible in law.

 

Second SLP

In Vinod Kapoor v. State of Goa [(2012) 12 SCC 378 : AIR 2012 SC 3722] , has categorically observed that once the special leave petition is dismissed as withdrawn without obtaining appropriate permission to file a special leave petition once over again after exhausting the remedy of review petition before the High Court, the same is not maintainable.

Thayer Doctrine -

ultra vires : A rule must be within the statutory provision (either same Act or any other Act)

Meaning of "any"

1. Shri Balaganesan Metals v. M.N. Shanmugham Chetty, (1987) 2 SCC 707 at page 718

18. In construing Section 10(3)(c) it is pertinent to note that the words used are “any tenant” and not “a tenant” who can be called upon to vacate the portion in his occupation. The word “any” has the following meaning:

“some; one of many; an indefinite number. One indiscriminately or whatever kind or quantity.

Word ‘any’ has a diversity of meaning and may be employed to indicate ‘all’ or ‘every’ as well as ‘some’ or ‘one’ and its meaning in a given statute depends upon the context and the subject-matter of the statute.

It is often synonymous with ‘either’, ‘every’ or ‘all’. Its generality may be restricted by the context;” (Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edn.)

19. Unless the legislature had intended that both classes of tenants can be asked to vacate by the Rent Controller for providing the landlord additional accommodation, be it for residential or non-residential purposes, it would not have used the word “any” instead of using the letter “a” to denote a tenant.

2. LDA v. M.K. Gupta, (1994) 1 SCC 243 at page 254

4.   …The words ‘any’ and ‘potential’ are significant. Both are of wide amplitude. The word ‘any’ dictionarily means ‘one or some or all’. In Black's Law Dictionary it is explained thus, “word ‘any’ has a diversity of meaning and may be employed to indicate ‘all’ or ‘every’ as well as ‘some’ or ‘one’ and its meaning in a given statute depends upon the context and the subject-matter of the statute”. The use of the word ‘any’ in the context it has been used in clause (o) indicates that it has been used in wider sense extending from one to all.

3. K. Prabhakaran v. P. Jayarajan, (2005) 1 SCC 754 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 451 at page 779

50. In Black's Law Dictionary (6th Edn.) the word “any” is defined (at p. 94) as under:

“Any.—Some; one out of many; an indefinite number. One indiscriminately of whatever kind or quantity.

One or some (indefinitely).

‘Any’ does not necessarily mean only one person, but may have reference to more than one or to many.

Word ‘any’ has a diversity of meaning and may be employed to indicate ‘all’ or ‘every’ as well as ‘some’ or ‘one’ and its meaning in a given statute depends upon the context and the subject-matter of the statute.

It is often synonymous with ‘either’, ‘every’, or ‘all’. Its generality may be restricted by the context; thus, the giving of a right to do some act ‘at any time’ is commonly construed as meaning within a reasonable time; and the words ‘any other’ following the enumeration of particular classes are to be read as ‘other such like’, and include only others of like kind or character.”

51. The word “any” may have one of the several meanings, according to the context and the circumstances. It may mean “all”; “each”; “every”; “some”; or “one or many out of several”. The word “any” may be used to indicate the quantity such as “some”, “out of many”, “an infinite number”. It may also be used to indicate quality or nature of the noun which it qualifies as an adjective such as “all” or “every”. (See The Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 2nd Edn. at p. 116.) Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh (9th Edn., 2004) states (at p. 302)—

“When a word is not defined in the Act itself, it is permissible to refer to dictionaries to find out the general sense in which that word is understood in common parlance. However, in selecting one out of the various meanings of a word, regard must always be had to the context as it is a fundamental rule that ‘the meanings of words and expressions used in an Act must take their colour from the context in which they appear’. Therefore, ‘when the context makes the meaning of a word quite clear, it becomes unnecessary to search for and select a particular meaning out of the diverse meanings a word is capable of, according to lexicographers’.”

4. Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217 : 1992 SCC (L&S) Supp 1 : (1992) 22 ATC 385 at page 595

579. ‘Backward class’ in Article 16(4) thus cannot be read as backward caste. What is the scope then? Is it social backwardness, educational backwardness, economic backwardness, social and economic backwardness, natural backwardness etc.? In absence of any indication expressly or impliedly any group or collectivity which can be legitimately considered as ‘backward’ for purposes of representation in service would be included in the expression ‘backward class’. Word ‘any’ is indicative of that the backward class was not visualised in singular. When the Constitution was framed the anxiety was to undo the historical backwardness. Yet a word of wider import was used to avoid any closed-door policy. For instance, backwardness arising out of natural reasons was never contemplated. But today with developments of human rights effort is being made to encourage those to whom nature has not been so kind. Do such persons not form a class? Are they not backward? They cannot, obviously compete on equal level with others. Backwardness which the Constitution-makers had to tackle by making special provision, due to social and economic condition, was different but that does not exclude backwardness arising due to different reasons in new set-up.

580. Although dictionarily the word ‘any’ may mean one or few and even all yet the meaning of a word has to be understood in the context it has been used. In Article 16(4) it cannot mean all as it would render the whole Article unworkable. The only, reasonable meaning that can be attributed to it is that it should be the States' discretion to pick out one or more than one from amongst numerous groups or collectivity identified or accepted as backward class for purposes of reservation. Whether such picking is reasonable and satisfies the test of judicial review is another matter. That explains the rationale for the non-obstante clause being discretionary and not mandatory. A State is not bound to grant reservation to every backward class. In one State or at one place or at one point of time it may be historical and social backwardness or geographical and habitational backwardness and at another it may be social and educational or backwardness arising out of natural cause.

Plea of Jurisdiction can be raised at any stage

Most Rev. P.M.A Metropolitan v. Mar Marthoma 1995 Supp (4) 286, that the plea of bar of jurisdiction of Civil Court can be raised even at the stage of Supreme Court directly.

Review cannot be moved after moving Appeal

In  Kabari (P) Ltd. v. Shivnath Shroff [(1996) 1 SCC 690 : AIR 1996 SC 742]:Court cannot entertain an application for review if before making the review application, the superior court had been moved for getting the selfsame relief, for the reason that for the selfsame relief two parallel proceedings before the two forums cannot be taken.

 

However: where the matter has been decided by a non-speaking order in limine the party may approach the High Court by filing a review petition. National Housing Coop. Society Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan [(2005) 12 SCC 149] .

Promotion should be challenged within 6 months or at most a year

PS Sadasivaswamy v. State of TN, (1975) 1 SCC 152

Statutory rules cannot be amended by Executive instructions, but filling of gaps is permissible

Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1967 Supreme Court 1910 (Consti. Bench)