Renewal Clause in Lease - Perpetual Lease - Nazul Land

If the Lease Deed contained a clause for renewal on the same terms and covenants which
shall include the clause for renewal and thereby making the same as a perpetual lease. (See
State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Lalji Tandon (2004) 1 SCC 1  )

Lease over Nazul Land - 

Purshottam Das Tandon v. State of UP Lucknow and Ors." in CMWP Nos. 2293/1969

Forest - dictionary meaning

   T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, (1997) 2 SCC 267 at page 269, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that

 

"4. The Forest Conservation Act, 1980 was enacted with a view to check further deforestation which ultimately results in ecological imbalance; and therefore, the provisions made therein for the conservation of forests and for matters connected therewith, must apply to all forests irrespective of the nature of ownership or classification thereof. The word "forest" must be understood according to its dictionary meaning. This description covers all statutorily recognised forests, whether designated as reserved, protected or otherwise for the purpose of Section 2(i) of the Forest Conservation Act. The term "forest land", occurring in Section 2, will not only include "forest" as understood in the dictionary sense, but also any area recorded as forest in the Government record irrespective of the ownership. This is how it has to be understood for the purpose of Section 2 of the Act. The provisions enacted in the Forest Conservation Act, 1980 for the conservation of forests and the matters connected therewith must apply clearly to all forests so understood irrespective of the ownership or classification thereof. This aspect has been made abundantly clear in the decisions of this Court in Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat [(1987) 1 SCC 213] , Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P. [1989 Supp (1) SCC 504] and recently in the order dated 29-11-1996 (Supreme Court Monitoring Committee v. Mussoorie Dehradun Development Authority [ WP (C) No 749 of 1995 decided on 29-11-1996] ). The earlier decision of this Court in State of Bihar v. Banshi Ram Modi [(1985) 3 SCC 643] has, therefore, to be understood in the light of these subsequent decisions. We consider it necessary to reiterate this settled position emerging from the decisions of this Court to dispel the doubt, if any, in the perception of any State Government or authority. This has become necessary also because of the stand taken on behalf of the State of Rajasthan, even at this late stage, relating to permissions granted for mining in such area which is clearly contrary to the decisions of this Court. It is reasonable to assume that any State Government which has failed to appreciate the correct position in law so far, will forthwith correct its stance and take the necessary remedial measures without any further delay.

Appeal will lie against decree and not againts judgment (finding)

Amendment to make a suit maintainable

1.    Paragon Rubber Industries v. Pragathi Rubber Mills, (2014) 14 SCC 762 : (2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 394 : 2013 SCC OnLine SC 1054 at page 771, this Hon'ble Court has held that:

20. Having said this, we are still not inclined to interfere with the order passed by the High Court permitting the plaintiff to amend the plaint. The High Court was mindful of the fact that under the 1999 Act, a composite suit could be filed and would be maintainable by the court at Kottayam. The Court was aware that the plaintiff has filed the suit on 19-3-2001, but the 1999 Act was not enforced till 15-9-2003. In our opinion, the High Court has passed the order in exercise of its discretionary powers taking into consideration the entire facts and circumstances of the case. The discretion exercised by the High Court cannot be said to be either erroneous or perverse. It has been exercised only to avoid multiplicity of litigation. The defendant (respondent) could not dispute that insofar as suit predicated on the copyright is concerned, the Court at Kottayam is having requisite jurisdiction in view of the provisions of Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act. Therefore, had the suit been filed for violation of copyright alone, the court at Kottayam could validly entertain the same. By permitting the plaintiff to amend the plaint so that the suit will be maintainable before the District Court, Kottayam, no error was committed by the High Court.

Conduct of Parties in Grant of Injunction

Mandali Ranganna v. T. Ramachandra, (2008) 11 SCC 1 at page 8

21. While considering an application for grant of injunction, the court will not only take into consideration the basic elements in relation thereto viz. existence of a prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury, it must also take into consideration the conduct of the parties.

Strict parameters governing an interim injunction do not have full play in matters of custody

Athar Hussain v. Syed Siraj Ahmed, (2010) 2 SCC 654 : (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 528 at page 668, para 50

Thus the strict parameters governing an interim injunction do not have full play in matters of custody.

Custody in Habeas Corpus

Veena Kapoor v. Varinder Kumar Kapoor, (1981) 3 SCC 92 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 650 at page 93

3. It is difficult for us in this habeas corpus petition to take evidence without which the question as to what is in the interest of the child cannot satisfactorily be determined. We, therefore, direct that the learned District Judge, Chandigarh, will make a report to us before the 23rd of this month on the question as to whether the custody of the child should be handed over to the petitioner-mother, taking into consideration the interest of the minor. The learned Judge will give liberty to the parties to adduce evidence on the question in issue. The learned District Judge may either take up the matter himself or assign it to an Additional District Judge, if there is any at Chandigarh.

Equality of Arms - Bombay HC

2006 SCC OnLine Bom 1155 : (2007) 2 Mah LJ 79 : (2007) 113 FLR 234 (Bom) : (2007) 3 Bom CR 212 : (2007) 1 CLR 580

Post Settlement - Guidelines for Quashing 482 CrPC

Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat, 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1189, decided on 04.10.2017

 

http://www.scconline.com/DocumentLink/qZe7uF78

 

he Court summarised the elaborate principles laid down by the Supreme Court in various cases. Below is the summary of the principles:

• The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Also, the power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.
• In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences.
• As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned.
• Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice.
• Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.

 

156(3) without FIR

Question No. (i)

MANU/MH/1459/2009” Mr. Panchabhai Popotbhai Butani,  vs. The State of Maharashtra through Senior Inspector,  (10.12.2009 - BOMHC) : MANU/MH/1459/2009

 

Whether in absence of a complaint to the police, a complaint can be made directly before a Magistrate ?

 

Answer

 

Normally a person should invoke the provisions of Section 154 of the Code before he takes recourse to the power of the Magistrate competent to take cognizance under Section 190 of the Code, under Section 156(3). At least an intimation to the police of commission of a cognizable offence under Section 154(1) would be a condition precedent for invocation of powers of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Code. We would hasten to add here that this dictum of law is not free from exception. There can be cases where noncompliance to the provisions of Section 154(3) would not divest the Magistrate of his jurisdiction in terms of Section 156(3). There could be cases where the police fail to act instantly and the facts of the case show that there is possibility of the evidence of commission of the offence being destroyed and/or tampered with or an applicant could approach the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Code directly by way of an exception as the Legislature has vested wide discretion in the Magistrate.

 

Question No. (ii)

 

Whether without filing a complaint within the meaning of Section 2(d) and praying only for an action under Section 156(3), a complaint before a Magistrate was maintainable ?

 

Answer

 

A Petition under Section 156(3) cannot be strictly construed as a complaint in terms of Section 2(d) of the Code and absence of a specific or improperly worded prayer or lack of complete and definite details would not prove fatal to a petition under Section 156(3), in so far as it states facts constituting ingredients of a cognizable offence. Such petition would be maintainable before the Magistrate.

 

Mr. Panchabhai Popotbhai Butani,  vs. The State of Maharashtra through Senior Inspector,  (10.12.2009 - BOMHC) : MANU/MH/1459/2009