Failure to frame points of determination is not fatal in First Appeal

2017 (2) SCC 415
Sent from Phone

Supreme Court: Enlargement of Notice

Yomeshbhai Pranshankar Bhatt v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 6 SCC 312 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 944 at page 317

11. In view of this position under the Rules and having regard to the constitutional provision under Article 142, we do not think that this Court at the time of final hearing is precluded from considering the controversy in its entire perspective and in doing so, this Court is not inhibited by any observation in an order made at the time of issuing the notice.

 

Supreme Court passing order without notice to Respondent

State of Rajasthan v. Mahila Mandal, (2011) 15 SCC 499 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 615 at page 499

2. We are quite conscious of the fact that we are passing this order without giving notice to the respondent(s) because the controversy is very limited and giving notice would cause much greater financial hardship for the respondent(s). In this view of the matter, we are passing this order in absence of the respondent(s). In case the respondent(s) is/are still aggrieved then the respondent(s) would be at liberty to approach this Court.

 

Daughters in Family Settlement

Public Interest v. Private Interest

Brij Pal Sharma v. Ghaziabad Development Authority, (2005) 7 SCC 106 at page 109

17. We, however, clarify that dismissal of the appeal should not be construed as approval of the conduct of the statutory authority in the manner in which it is sought to be done. The statutory authority, like GDA, being the State within the ambit of Article 12 of the Constitution, is duty-bound to act in a manner, which would benefit the public interest, overlooking the private interest. It is trite law that when the private interest is pitted against the public interest, the later must prevail over the former. If such instances are brought to the notice of the Court in future, they would be examined on their own merits.

 

Undertaking to pay under threat of arrest

Arrest warrant — Release upon undertaking to deposit Rs. 10 lac — Legality — Undertaking given by appellant while being under constraint of his arrest cannot be termed as voluntary one — Legal liability of appellant is yet to be ascertained — Arrest and release upon undertaking order cannot be legally sustained.
II (2015) BC 155 (DRAT — Delhi)

Filing 32 after 136

Once SLP is dismissed, another SLP from same order can be entertained

Binding Nature of Judgment set aside on a different point

 

S. Shanmugavel Nadar v. State of T.N., (2002) 8 SCC 361 at page 369

15. A situation, near similar to the one posed before us, has been dealt in Salmond's Jurisprudence (12th Edn., at pp. 149-50) under the caption — “Circumstances destroying or weakening the binding force of precedent: (perhaps) affirmation or reversal on a different ground.” It sometimes happens that a decision is affirmed or reversed on appeal on a different point. As an example, suppose that a case is decided in the Court of Appeal on ground A, and then goes on appeal to the House of Lords, which decides it on ground B, nothing being said upon A. What, in such circumstances, is the authority of the decision on ground A in the Court of Appeal? Is the decision binding on the High Court, and on the Court of Appeal itself in subsequent cases? The learned author notes the difficulty in the question being positively answered and then states: (i) The High Court may, for example, shift the ground of its decision because it thinks that this is the easiest way to decide the case, the point decided in the court below being of some complexity. It is certainly possible to find cases in the reports where judgments affirmed on a different point have been regarded as authoritative for what they decided. (ii) The true view is that a decision either affirmed or reversed on another point is deprived of any absolute binding force it might otherwise have had; but it remains an authority which may be followed by a court that thinks that particular point to have been rightly decided.

 

"Second" SLP (by different party) against same impugned order may still be entertained

Delhi Admn. v. Madan Lal Nangia, (2003) 10 SCC 321 at page 326

4. Dr Dhavan submitted that this civil appeal should be dismissed because the Delhi Development Authority had also filed a special leave petition against this portion of the judgment whereby the writ petition of the respondents had been allowed. He pointed out that in that special leave petition the Union of India and the Delhi Administration were Respondents 10 and 13 respectively. He submitted that that special leave petition was dismissed on 18-11-1996. He pointed out that the review filed by the Delhi Development Authority was also dismissed on 7-11-2000. He submitted that in this special leave petition the Union of India and the Delhi Development Authority have not been made parties obviously with an intention of hiding the fact that the Delhi Development Authority's special leave petition had been dismissed. We are unable to accept this submission. We have seen the orders dated 18-11-1996 whereby the Delhi Development Authority's special leave petition was summarily dismissed. It is settled law that if a special leave petition is summarily dismissed such a dismissal does not bar other parties from filing a special leave petition against the same judgment. No authority is required for this proposition but if any is required, then the cases of Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala [(2000) 6 SCC 359] and S. Shanmugavel Nadar v. State of T.N. [(2002) 8 SCC 361] may be looked at. Even otherwise, the order dated 7-11-2000 is very clear. On this date the Delhi Development Authority's review petition was dismissed, but this order specifically delinked this civil appeal along with two other civil appeals. Once this Court has specifically chosen to keep this appeal alive, we do not consider it correct or proper to now dismiss this appeal only on the ground that the special leave petition and the review petition of the Delhi Development Authority have been dismissed.