Presumption of Delivery by Registered Post

Coal India Ltd. v. Ananta Saha, (2011) 5 SCC 142 at page 154

23. Similarly, we find no force in the submission made by the delinquent that he did not participate in the disciplinary proceedings and did not make any comment on receiving the enquiry report along with the second show-cause notice as the notices had not been served upon him in accordance with law. The second show-cause notice and the copy of the enquiry report had been sent to him under registered post. Therefore, there is a presumption in law, particularly, under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and Section 114, Illustration (f) of the Evidence Act, 1872 that the addressee has received the materials sent by post. (Vide Greater Mohali Area Development Authority v. Manju Jain [(2010) 9 SCC 157 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 639 : AIR 2010 SC 3817] .)

 

Non Return of AD Card or undelivered

M. Ramjayaram v. GM, South Central Railway, (1996) 8 SCC 266 at page 267

2. Though notice has been sent to Respondents 1 to 5, it has been served only on Respondents 1 to 4. In respect of the 5th respondent, neither AD card nor unserved letter has been received back. In the circumstances, notice must be deemed to have been served on the 5th respondent. They are not appearing either in person or through counsel.

 

Pre Litigation Mediation

K. Srinivas Rao v. D.A. Deepa, (2013) 5 SCC 226 at page 242,

“46.3. All mediation centres shall set up pre-litigation desks/clinics; give them wide publicity and make efforts to settle matrimonial disputes at pre-litigation stage.”

 

Order without jurisdiction is a nullity

Hasham Abbas Sayyad v. Usman Abbas Sayyad, (2007) 2 SCC 355 at page 363

22. The core question is as to whether an order passed by a person lacking inherent jurisdiction would be a nullity. It will be so. The principles of estoppel, waiver and acquiescence or even res judicata which are procedural in nature would have no application in a case where an order has been passed by the Tribunal/court which has no authority in that behalf. Any order passed by a court without jurisdiction would be coram non judice, being a nullity, the same ordinarily should not be given effect to. [See Chief Justice of A.P. v. L.V.A. Dixitulu[(1979) 2 SCC 34 : 1979 SCC (L&S) 99 : AIR 1979 SC 193] and MD, Army Welfare Housing Organisation v. Sumangal Services (P) Ltd. [(2004) 9 SCC 619] ]

 

Specific Performance of Development Agreement

 Chheda Housing Development Corporation v. Bibijan Shaikh Farid and Ors, 2007 (3) Mh.L.J. 402

Vipin Bhimani and Anr. v. Smt. Sunanda Das, AIR 2006 Cal. 209

Preliminary issue to be decided at commencement

Ujjam Bhai case

Scope of Sections 145 and 146 of CrPC

Ashok Kumar v. State of Uttarakhand, (2013) 3 SCC 366

 

Section 146(1), a Magistrate can pass an order of attachment of the subject of dispute if it be a case of emergency, or if he decides that none of the parties was in such possession, or he cannot decide as to which of them was in possession. Sections 145 and 146 of the Criminal Procedure Code together constitute a scheme for the resolution of a situation where there is a likelihood of a breach of the peace and Section 146 cannot be separated from Section 145,Cr.P.C. It can only be read in the context of Section 145, Cr.P.C. If after the enquiry under Section 145 of the Code, the Magistrate is of the opinion that none of the parties was in actual possession of the subject of dispute at the time of the order passed under Section 145(1) or is unable to decide which of the parties was in such possession, he may attach the subject of dispute, until a competent court has determined the right of the parties thereto with regard to the person entitled to possession thereof.

 

The ingredients necessary for passing an order under Section 145 (1)of the Code would not automatically attract for the attachment of the property. Under Section 146, a Magistrate has to satisfy himself as to whether emergency exists before he passes an order of attachment. A case of emergency, as contemplated under Section 146 of the Code, has to be distinguished from a mere case of apprehension of breach of the peace. The Magistrate, before passing an order under Section 146, must explain the circumstances why he thinks it to be a case of emergency. In other words, to infer a situation of emergency, there must be a material on record before Magistrate when the submission of the parties filed, documents produced or evidence adduced.