retributive theory is not valid

Sr. No.	Case Law & Citation	Relevant Extracts (The Principle)
1.	Sunil Batra (I) v. Delhi Administration (1978) 4 SCC 494 (Constitution Bench - 5 Judges)	Para 211: "It is now well settled that the retributive theory has had its day and is no longer valid. Deterrence and reformation are the primary objectives of punishment... The prisoner does not cease to be a human being and he acts like a human being." Para 53: "Brutal man-handling... is not a valid penal programme... Retribution and deterrence are not the sole ends of punishment; reformation and rehabilitation are the primary objectives. The prison system must be therapeutic, not traumatic." Para 244: "Barbaric treatment of a prisoner from the point of view of his rehabilitation and acceptance and retention in the mainstream of social life, becomes counter-productive in the long run."
2.	Maru Ram v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCC 107 (Constitution Bench - 5 Judges)	Para 43: "It is thus plain that crime is a pathological aberration, that the criminal can ordinarily be redeemed, that the State has to rehabilitate rather than avenge. The sub-culture that leads to anti-social behaviour has to be countered not by undue cruelty but by re-culturisation." Para 43: "The infliction of harsh and savage punishment is thus a relic of past and regressive times... We, therefore, consider a therapeutic, rather than an 'in terrorem' outlook, should prevail in our criminal courts, since brutal incarceration of the person merely produces laceration of his mind." Para 45: "It makes us blush to jettison Gandhiji and genuflect before Hammurabi, abandon reformatory humanity and become addicted to the 'eye for an eye' barbarity." Para 72(12): "In our view, penal humanitarianism and rehabilitative desideratum warrant liberal paroles... so that the dignity and worth of the human person are not desecrated by making mass jails anthropoid zoos."

 

Factors for grant of bail and challenge to grant of bail

Judicial Considerations in Bail Orders

(a) Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598 (Para 4): Emphasises that the gravity of the offence alone cannot be the sole basis for denial of bail; the court must assess the risk of tampering with evidence or fleeing from justice.

(b) State of Maharashtra v. Dhanendra Shriram Bhurle, (2009) 11 SCC 541 (Para 7): Reinforces the need to balance individual liberty with societal interest. Courts must be cautious while exercising discretion.

(c) Reasoning to be given in Bail Orders by Courts (Paras 10–13): It is settled law that bail orders must record reasons – vague or mechanical orders fail the constitutional mandate of fairness.

(d) Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528 (Para 11): Reiterates that even at the stage of considering bail, courts must be satisfied that there is no prima facie case, and must record reasons for grant or denial.

(e) Ramesh Bhavan Rathod v. Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana, (2021) 6 SCC 230 (Paras 23–24): Criticises cryptic bail orders and insists on a rational application of judicial mind reflecting judicial discipline.

(f) Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy v. CBI, (2013) 7 SCC 439 (Para 35) (Bail): Recognises that economic offences, though not of violence, are grave and affect public trust; bail must be granted cautiously.

Extension of time ~ due to non-renewal

Beg Raj Singh v. State of U.P., (2003) 1 SCC 726

Expert opinion

Ramesh Chandra Agrawal v. Regency Hospital Ltd., (2009) 9 SCC 709 

18. The importance of the provision has been explained in State of H.P. v. Jai Lal [(1999) 7 SCC 280 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1184] . It is held, that, Section 45 of the Evidence Act which makes opinion of experts admissible lays down, that, when the court has to form an opinion upon a point of foreign law, or of science, or art, or as to identity of handwriting or finger impressions, the opinions upon that point of persons specially skilled in such foreign law, science or art, or in questions as to identity of handwriting, or finger impressions are relevant facts. Therefore, in order to bring the evidence of a witness as that of an expert it has to be shown that he has made a special study of the subject or acquired a special experience therein or in other words that he is skilled and has adequate knowledge of the subject.

19. It is not the province of the expert to act as Judge or Jury. It is stated in Titli v. Alfred Robert Jones [AIR 1934 All 273] that the real function of the expert is to put before the court all the materials, together with reasons which induce him to come to the conclusion, so that the court, although not an expert, may form its own judgment by its own observation of those materials.

20. An expert is not a witness of fact and his evidence is really of an advisory character. The duty of an expert witness is to furnish the Judge with the necessary scientific criteria for testing the accuracy of the conclusions so as to enable the Judge to form his independent judgment by the application of these criteria to the facts proved by the evidence of the case. The scientific opinion evidence, if intelligible, convincing and tested becomes a factor and often an important factor for consideration along with other evidence of the case. The credibility of such a witness depends on the reasons stated in support of his conclusions and the data and material furnished which form the basis of his conclusions. (See Malay Kumar Ganguly v. Dr. Sukumar Mukherjee [(2009) 9 SCC 221 : (2009) 10 Scale 675] , SCC p. 249, para 34.)

21. In State of Maharashtra v. Damu [(2000) 6 SCC 269 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1088 : AIR 2000 SC 1691] , it has been laid down that without examining the expert as a witness in court, no reliance can be placed on an opinion alone. In this regard, it has been observed in State (Delhi Admn.) v. Pali Ram [(1979) 2 SCC 158 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 389 : AIR 1979 SC 14] that "no expert would claim today that he could be absolutely sure that his opinion was correct, expert depends to a great extent upon the materials put before him and the nature of question put to him".

22. In the article "Relevancy of Expert's Opinion" it has been opined that the value of expert opinion rests on the facts on which it is based and his competency for forming a reliable opinion. The evidentiary value of the opinion of an expert depends on the facts upon which it is based and also the validity of the process by which the conclusion is reached. Thus the idea that is proposed in its crux means that the importance of an opinion is decided on the basis of the credibility of the expert and the relevant facts supporting the opinion so that its accuracy can be crosschecked. Therefore, the emphasis has been on the data on the basis of which opinion is formed. The same is clear from the following inference:

"Mere assertion without mentioning the data or basis is not evidence, even if it comes from an expert. Where the experts give no real data in support of their opinion, the evidence even though admissible, may be excluded from consideration as affording no assistance in arriving at the correct value."

23. Though we have adverted to the nature of disease and the relevancy of the expert opinion, we do not think it necessary to go into the merits of the case in view of the course we propose to adopt, and in view of the fact that the Commission is the last fact finding authority in the scheme of the Act.

207 CrPC

P. Gopalkrishnan v. State of Kerala, (2020) 9 SCC 161 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1532 at page 182

18. Be that as it may, the Magistrate's duty under Section 207 at this stage is in the nature of administrative work, whereby he is required to ensure full compliance of the section. We may usefully advert to the dictum in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab [Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92 : (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 86] wherein it was held that : (SCC p. 123, para 47)

"47. Since after the filing of the charge-sheet, the court reaches the stage of inquiry and as soon as the court frames the charges, the trial commences, and therefore, the power under Section 319(1) CrPC can be exercised at any time after the charge-sheet is filed and before the pronouncement of judgment, except during the stage of Sections 207/208 CrPC, committal, etc. which is only a pre-trial stage, intended to put the process into motion. This stage cannot be said to be a judicial step in the true sense for it only requires an application of mind rather than a judicial application of mind. At this pre-trial stage, the Magistrate is required to perform acts in the nature of administrative work rather than judicial such as ensuring compliance with Sections 207 and 208 CrPC, and committing the matter if it is exclusively triable by the Sessions Court."

Accused has a right to watch witness

 [Jayendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, MANU/SC/0995/2009MANU/SC/0995/2009 : (2009) 7 SCC 104 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 500] as quoted above, that the right of the accused to watch the prosecution witness is a valuable right, also need not detain us.

Mohammed Faruk vs. Union of India (21.03.2025 - MADHC) : MANU/TN/1086/2025