Bail when not arrested during investigation

A.   Dataram Singh v. State of U.P., (2018) 3 SCC 22 at page 24 has held that:

 

3. While so introspecting, among the factors that need to be considered is whether the accused was arrested during investigations when that person perhaps has the best opportunity to tamper with the evidence or influence witnesses. If the inveA.   Dataram Singh v. State of U.P., (2018) 3 SCC 22 at page 24 has held that:

 

3. While so introspecting, among the factors that need to be considered is whether the accused was arrested during investigations when that person perhaps has the best opportunity to tamper with the evidence or influence witnesses. If the investigating officer does not find it necessary to arrest an accused person during investigations, a strong case should be made out for placing that person in judicial custody after a charge-sheet is filed. Similarly, it is important to ascertain whether the accused was participating in the investigations to the satisfaction of the investigating officer and was not absconding or not appearing when required by the investigating officer. Surely, if an accused is not hiding from the investigating officer or is hiding due to some genuine and expressed fear of being victimised, it would be a factor that a judge would need to consider in an appropriate case.stigating officer does not find it necessary to arrest an accused person during investigations, a strong case should be made out for placing that person in judicial custody after a charge-sheet is filed. Similarly, it is important to ascertain whether the accused was participating in the investigations to the satisfaction of the investigating officer and was not absconding or not appearing when required by the investigating officer. Surely, if an accused is not hiding from the investigating officer or is hiding due to some genuine and expressed fear of being victimised, it would be a factor that a judge would need to consider in an appropriate case. 

FIling False Affidavit is Contempt of Court

Before proceeding with Contempt Court to verify who has to comply with the order

State Bank of Patiala v. Vinesh Kumar Bhasin, (2010) 4 SCC 368 : (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 152 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 1044 at page 376

26. Before issuing any interim direction in contempt proceedings, or proposing to hold anyone guilty of contempt, the High Court should at least satisfy itself that the person to whom the notice is issued is the person responsible to implement the order. The order retiring the respondent was not passed by the Branch Manager and obviously he was not the officer who could implement the interim direction of the Chief Commissioner or the High Court.

Contempt only against party to original proceedings

Vardha Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. Rajendra Kumar Razdan, (2015) 15 SCC 352 : 2014 SCC OnLine SC 1214 at page 357

15. Admittedly, the appellant was not a party in the writ petition wherein certain directions restraining grant of any permission to raise construction had been passed, nor the judgment passed in the writ petition attracted to the land in dispute. In the contempt petition grievance had been raised by Respondent 1 that the order passed in the writ petition had not been complied with in strict sense. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that under no circumstances, could the appellant be dealt with in contempt proceedings and no order adversely affecting it, could have been passed. Exercise of contempt jurisdiction may have very serious repercussions as basically these are quasi-criminal proceedings in nature and are resorted to punish a person who wilfully disobeys the directions issued by the court. In the instant case, even by a stretch of imagination, it cannot be assumed that the appellant could be subjected to the contempt proceedings. Before us, none of the counsel appearing for the respondent could point out as under what circumstances the Notifications dated 17-1-1997 and 10-12-1999 could be applicable to the land of the appellant. The land in dispute is located about 20 km away from the area described under those two notifications.

Relevance of preliminary file notings

Pimpri Chinchwad New Township Development Authority v. Vishnudev Coop. Housing Society, (2018) 8 SCC 215 : 2018 SCC OnLine SC 784 at page 225

36. Our answer to the question is "no". It is for the reasons that: first, a mere noting in the official files of the Government while dealing with any matter pertaining to any person is essentially an internal matter of the Government and carries with it no legal sanctity; second, once the decision on such issue is taken and approved by the competent authority empowered by the Government in that behalf, it is required to be communicated to the person concerned by the State Government. In other words, so long as the decision based on such internal deliberation is not approved and communicated by the competent authority as per the procedure prescribed in that behalf to the person concerned, such noting does not create any right in favour of the person concerned nor it partake the nature of any legal order so as to enable the person concerned to claim any benefit of any such internal deliberation. Such noting(s) or/and deliberation(s) are always capable of being changed or/and amended or/and withdrawn by the competent authority.

Extending Benefits to Third parties in Service Law

State of U.P. v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava, (2015) 1 SCC 347, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has held that  "if the judgment of the court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence." 

Representation and Extension of Limitation Period

     State of Tripura v. Arabinda Chakraborty, (2014) 6 SCC 460 : (2014) 3 SCC (Civ) 596 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 300 : 2014 SCC OnLine SC 353 at page 463

15. In our opinion, the suit was hopelessly barred by law of limitation. Simply by making a representation when there is no statutory provision or there is no statutory appeal provided, the period of limitation would not get extended. The law does not permit extension of period of limitation by mere filing of a representation. A person may go on making representations for years and in such an event the period of limitation would not commence from the date on which the last representation is decided. In the instant case, it is a fact that the respondent was given a fresh appointment order on 22-11-1967, which is on record. The said appointment order gave a fresh appointment to the respondent and therefore, there could not have been any question with regard to continuity of service with effect from the first employment of the respondent.

Money Claim in Writ Petition - Scope of 226

 Joshi Technologies International Inc. v. Union of India, (2015) 7 SCC 728 : 2015 SCC OnLine SC 490 at page 766

"69. The position thus summarised in the aforesaid principles has to be understood in the context of discussion that preceded which we have pointed out above. As per this, no doubt, there is no absolute bar to the maintainability of the writ petition even in contractual matters or where there are disputed questions of fact or even when monetary claim is raised. At the same time, discretion lies with the High Court which under certain circumstances, it can refuse to exercise. It also follows that under the following circumstances, "normally", the Court would not exercise such a discretion:

69.1. The Court may not examine the issue unless the action has some public law character attached to it.

69.2. Whenever a particular mode of settlement of dispute is provided in the contract, the High Court would refuse to exercise its discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution and relegate the party to the said mode of settlement, particularly when settlement of disputes is to be resorted to through the means of arbitration.

69.3. If there are very serious disputed questions of fact which are of complex nature and require oral evidence for their determination.

69.4. Money claims per se particularly arising out of contractual obligations are normally not to be entertained except in exceptional circumstances."

Suppression in List of Dates

Union of India v. Shantiranjan Sarkar, (2009) 3 SCC 90 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 575 at page 92

8. Before adverting to the contentions raised before us by the learned counsel for the parties, we may notice that the appellants suppressed a material fact. It appears that the fact that the High Court had recalled its earlier order dated 9-7-2004 by an order dated 30-11-2004 had not been mentioned in the list of dates. This Court, therefore, must have proceeded on the basis that the impugned order was passed on a review application and not in the original writ proceedings. We do not find appropriate words to deprecate such a practice and that too by the Union of India. We should have dismissed the special leave petition on this ground alone. Let us, however, also consider the merit of the matter.

Maintainability is a legal plea jurisdictional plea can be raised anytime

State of Rajasthan v. Rao Raja Kalyan Singh, (1972) 4 SCC 165 at page 167

6. Though this issue is not very specific but undoubtedly it covers the plea taken by the respondent in para 1 of his written statement. That apart the plea of maintainability of the suit is essentially a legal plea. If the suit on the face of it is not maintainable, the fact that no specific pleas were taken or no precise issues were framed are of little consequence.

Civil Suit is barred to challenge steps taken in Land Acquisition

State of Bihar v. Dhirendra Kumar, (1995) 4 SCC 229 at page 230

3. The question is whether a civil suit is maintainable and whether ad interim injunction could be issued where proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act was taken pursuant to the notice issued under Section 9 of the Act and delivered to the beneficiary. The provisions of the Act are designed to acquire the land by the State exercising the power of eminent domain to serve the public purpose. The State is enjoined to comply with statutory requirements contained in Section 4 and Section 6 of the Act by proper publication of notification and declaration within limitation and procedural steps of publication in papers and the local publications envisaged under the Act as amended by Act 68 of 1984. In publication of the notifications and declaration under Section 6, the public purpose gets crystallised and becomes conclusive. Thereafter, the State is entitled to authorise the Land Acquisition Officer to proceed with the acquisition of the land and to make the award. Section 11-A now prescribes limitation to make the award within 2 years from the last date of publication envisaged under Section 6 of the Act. In an appropriate case, where the Government needs possession of the land urgently, it would exercise the power under Section 17(4) of the Act and dispense with the enquiry under Section 5-A. Thereon, the State is entitled to issue notice to the parties under Section 9 and on expiry of 15 days, the State is entitled to take immediate possession even before the award could be made. Otherwise, it would take possession after the award under Section 12. Thus, it could be seen that the Act is a complete code in itself and is meant to serve public purpose. We are, therefore, inclined to think, as presently advised, that by necessary implication the power of the civil court to take cognizance of the case under Section 9 of CPC stands excluded, and a civil court has no jurisdiction to go into the question of the validity or legality of the notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6, except by the High Court in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. So, the civil suit itself was not maintainable. When such is the situation, the finding of the trial court that there is a prima facie triable issue is unsustainable. Moreover, possession was already taken and handed over to the Housing Board. So, the order of injunction was without jurisdiction.


See also
Bangalore Development Authority v. K.S. Narayan, (2006) 8 SCC 336

Laxmi Chand v. Gram Panchayat (1996) 7 SCC 218
State of Punjab v. Amarjit Singh, (2011) 14 SCC 713 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 1012 at page 718

Using contracts where sanctioned post is needed is arbitrary

this Court while recognizing that the creation of a cadre or sanctioning of posts was exclusively within the authority of the State, opined that if the State did  not choose to create a cadre but chose to make appointments of persons creating contractual relationship only, such action would be categorized as arbitrary nature of exercise of power. In this context, it was observed by the Bench, thus: “Sanctioned posts do not fall from heaven. The State has to create them by a conscious choice on the basis of some rational assessment of the need.”

(2013) 14 SCC 65
(2018) 7 SCC 270

merely because the name of a candidate finds a place in the select merit list does not given an indefeasible right to appointment

Merely because the name of a candidate finds a place in the select merit list does not given an indefeasible right to appointment, para 17.

(Kulwinder Pal Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab & Ors.) 2016 6 CC 532

Gurmeet Pal Singh (2018) 7 SCC 260

Advertisement is not defective merely because every vacancy is not advertised

There cannot be a blanket proposition that the advertisement is  defective merely because every vacancy which existed or which is contemplated is not taken into account. Certainly, a subsequent vacancy arising from an elevation can hardly be treated as in contemplation. , para 16 (Kaul, J)

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/166116150/ (2018 ) 7 SCC 260

A candidate who appears in an examination without objection cannot challenge later on being unsuccessful

It is a well settled principle of law that when a candidate appears in an examination without objection and is subsequently found to be not successful a challenge to the process is precluded. In a recent judgment in Ashok Kumar & Anr. v. State of Bihar & Ors.  (2017 4 SCC 357) this principle has been re-emphasised by referring to the earlier judgments on this point starting from Chandra Prakash Tiwari v. Shakuntala Shukla (2002 6 SCC 127)

Gurmeet Pal Singh (2018) 7 SCC 260

Gross Injustice - Alternative Remedy argument should give way to Art 226

State of Tripura v. Manoranjan Chakraborty (2001) 10 SCC 740

Cheque bouncing

A. Can a person be convicted under S. 138 NI Act due to a mismatch of signature?

  

     Yes. 3 cases to substantiate the same

1. Laxmi Dyechem v. State of Gujarat  (2012) 13 SCC [para. 16, para. 16.1, para. 16.2, para. 30, para. 31]  
2. Om Prakash Singh v. State of UP (2015) 89 ACC 497 [para. 12-16] 
3. Sushil Kr. Mondal v. Probodh Dihingia (2015) 5 GLR 825 [Page 827 relevant]

B. Can a person be convicted under S. 138 NI Act if cheque bounces due to "account closed"?

Yes, he can be. "Account closed" would amount to returning the cheque unpaid because the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque as envisaged u/S. 138 of the Act. 

(As held in the case of NEPC Micon Ltd. v. Magma Leasing Ltd. [Pages 253, 254 relevant]) 

Power of High Court to cancel bail

Gulabrao Baburao Deokar v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 16 SCC 190 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 232 : 2013 SCC OnLine SC 1116 at page 204

27. Thus it could certainly be said that the order passed by the Sessions Judge was an order passed in breach of the mandatory requirement of the proviso to Section 439(1) CrPC. It is also an order ignoring the material on record, and therefore without any justification and perverse. As held by this Court in Puran v. Rambilas [(2001) 6 SCC 338 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1124] , the High Court does have the power under Section 439(2) CrPC to set aside an unjustified, illegal or perverse order granting bail. This is an independent ground for cancellation as against ground of the accused misconducting himself.

Constitution of India — Art. 129 — Civil contempt — Change in law after inter partes decision has attained finality:Subsequent change in law is not a ground on which obedience/implementation of the final inter partes judgment can be avoided, witheld or refused. Final inter partes order of court must be complied with despite later change in law. [Bhushan Power & Steel Ltd. v. Rajesh Verma] [(2014) 5 SCC 551]

[(2014) 5 SCC 551] 

Mere reference to another contract containing arbitration Clause is not enough to incorporate the arbitration clause itself

2018 4 SCC 281

Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with interim orders

2018 4 SCC 298

Power under Section 21 of General Clauses Act not available for varying quasi judicial orders

(2018) 4 SCC 494

  The general power, under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, to rescind a notification or order has to be understood in the light of the subject matter, context and the effect of the relevant provisions of the statute under which the notification or order is issued and the power is not available after an enforceable right has accrued under the notification or order. Moreover, Section 21 has no application to vary or amend or review a quasi judicial order. A quasi judicial order can be generally varied or reviewed when obtained by fraud or when such power is conferred by the Act or Rules under which it is made. (See Interpretation of Statutes, Ninth Edition by G.P. Singh page 893).  

Domestic inquiry & Labour Court - appreciation of termination order

Kurukshetra University v. Prithvi Singh, (2018) 4 SCC 483

17. If the domestic enquiry was held legal and proper then the next question which arose for consideration was whether the punishment imposed on the respondent(delinquent employee) was proportionate to the gravity of the charge leveled against him or it called for any interference to award any lesser punishment by exercising the powers under Section 11-A of the ID Act.

18. If the domestic inquiry was held illegal and improper then the next question, which arose for consideration, was whether to allow the appellant (employer) to prove the misconduct/charge before the Labour Court on merits by adducing independent evidence against the respondent (employee). The appellant was entitled to do so after praying for an opportunity to allow them to lead evidence and pleading the misconduct in the written statement. (see- also Para 33 at page 1665/66 of Shankar's case(supra) ). 

20. We are constrained to observe that first, the Labour Court committed an error in not framing a "preliminary issue" for deciding the legality of domestic enquiry and second, having found fault in the domestic inquiry committed another error when it did not allow the appellant to lead independent evidence to prove the misconduct/charge on merits and straightaway proceeded to hold that it was a case of illegal retrenchment and hence the respondents' termination is bad in law.

Delay and Laches in Challenging Seniority List

Gratuity Payable upon 10 years of service

Only requisite for payment of gratuity, even upon death, is completion of 10 years of service, not attainment of 60 years of age
[Chandra Prakash Saxena v. State of U.P., 2018 SCC Online ALL 532, order dated 07.05.2018]

Renewal Clause in Lease - Perpetual Lease - Nazul Land

If the Lease Deed contained a clause for renewal on the same terms and covenants which
shall include the clause for renewal and thereby making the same as a perpetual lease. (See
State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Lalji Tandon (2004) 1 SCC 1  )

Lease over Nazul Land - 

Purshottam Das Tandon v. State of UP Lucknow and Ors." in CMWP Nos. 2293/1969

Forest - dictionary meaning

   T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, (1997) 2 SCC 267 at page 269, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that

 

"4. The Forest Conservation Act, 1980 was enacted with a view to check further deforestation which ultimately results in ecological imbalance; and therefore, the provisions made therein for the conservation of forests and for matters connected therewith, must apply to all forests irrespective of the nature of ownership or classification thereof. The word "forest" must be understood according to its dictionary meaning. This description covers all statutorily recognised forests, whether designated as reserved, protected or otherwise for the purpose of Section 2(i) of the Forest Conservation Act. The term "forest land", occurring in Section 2, will not only include "forest" as understood in the dictionary sense, but also any area recorded as forest in the Government record irrespective of the ownership. This is how it has to be understood for the purpose of Section 2 of the Act. The provisions enacted in the Forest Conservation Act, 1980 for the conservation of forests and the matters connected therewith must apply clearly to all forests so understood irrespective of the ownership or classification thereof. This aspect has been made abundantly clear in the decisions of this Court in Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat [(1987) 1 SCC 213] , Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P. [1989 Supp (1) SCC 504] and recently in the order dated 29-11-1996 (Supreme Court Monitoring Committee v. Mussoorie Dehradun Development Authority [ WP (C) No 749 of 1995 decided on 29-11-1996] ). The earlier decision of this Court in State of Bihar v. Banshi Ram Modi [(1985) 3 SCC 643] has, therefore, to be understood in the light of these subsequent decisions. We consider it necessary to reiterate this settled position emerging from the decisions of this Court to dispel the doubt, if any, in the perception of any State Government or authority. This has become necessary also because of the stand taken on behalf of the State of Rajasthan, even at this late stage, relating to permissions granted for mining in such area which is clearly contrary to the decisions of this Court. It is reasonable to assume that any State Government which has failed to appreciate the correct position in law so far, will forthwith correct its stance and take the necessary remedial measures without any further delay.