Parole, Temporary Bail and Suspension of Sentence Pending Appeal on Ill-Health of Family Member: 16 Orders

Orders granting parole, temporary bail or temporary/interim suspension of sentence to a convict, pending appeal, on the ground of ill-health of a family member. Each order has been read in full on Indian Kanoon. Summaries are drawn only from the words of each order. None of these orders shows an SCC, AIR or CriLJ citation on Indian Kanoon; the neutral citation is given where available, otherwise the case number.

Supreme Court

1. Ajay Kumar vs State of Uttar Pradesh

Supreme Court of India | 15 July 2025 | Criminal Appeal arising from SLP (Crl.) No. 9024 of 2025

The High Court rejected the "short term bail / parole application of the appellant, who is a convict and whose appeal before the High Court is pending", "on the ground that earlier also a short term bail was granted to the appellant in respect of his wife's treatment". By its interim order of 13.06.2025 (para 6), the Supreme Court recorded: "His presence, particularly at the time of operation and immediately thereafter, will help her to recover at the earliest", and held that "the petitioner could be granted parole for a week from 15.06.2025 till 21.06.2025". For the second surgery (para 9): "If any such application is filed before the High Court, the same shall be considered expeditiously".

Note: Daily order. Parole was granted by the interim order of 13.06.2025; for the second surgery the appellant was relegated to the High Court.

Delhi High Court

2. Angel Gupta vs State (NCT of Delhi)

Delhi High Court (DB: Vivek Chaudhary and Manoj Jain, JJ.) | 14 November 2025 | CRL.A. 623/2025; CRL.M.(BAIL) 2246/2025

Application "seeking interim suspension of sentence on the ground of surgery of her ailing mother". Conviction under "Sections 302 and 120-B" IPC; sentence of "rigorous imprisonment for life". Counsel submitted "the Appellant is the only adult female member in the household" and "The Appellant's presence is therefore indispensable". Para 8: "in order to enable the appellant to attend to and take care of her ailing mother during the forthcoming surgery and the ensuing post-operative recovery period, the sentence awarded to the appellant is hereby suspended, from the date of her release, for a period of four weeks".

3. Mukesh Sangwan vs State of NCT Delhi

Delhi High Court (Jyoti Singh, J.) | 28 March 2024 | CRL.A. 660/2022; CRL.M.(BAIL) 522/2024

Application "seeking extension of interim suspension of sentence on the ground that the nasal surgery of the Appellant's wife could not be performed". Conviction under "Sections 328/376 IPC and Section 6" of the POCSO Act. The State said "medical documents are genuine". Held: "interim suspension of sentence of the Appellant is extended for a period of two weeks from 03.04.2024".

Note: This is an extension order. The original grant dated 12.03.2024 has not been read.

4. Manish Kalra vs State of NCT of Delhi and Ors.

Delhi High Court (Anoop Kumar Mendiratta, J.) | 10 May 2022 | CRL.A. 129/2022; CRL.M.(BAIL) 459/2022

Application "for suspension of sentence on the ground of ill-health of the wife". Conviction under "Section 10 of POCSO Act". Counsel submitted "that since there is none to look after the wife of the appellant, she could not get admitted". Held: "the sentence of the appellant is suspended and he is admitted to interim bail for a period of four weeks from the date of his release".

5. Honey vs State

Delhi High Court (Yogesh Khanna, J.) | 28 May 2020 | CRL.A. 1325/2019; Crl.M.(B) No. 6334/2020

The applicant, "convicted under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and Section 366 IPC", sought "interim suspension of sentence for the surgery of his mother", for whom "surgery of shoulder has been advised". The surgery date "has been verified by the State". He was "admitted on interim bail for two weeks from the date of his release".

Bombay High Court

6. Pratik Vilas Gangan vs State of Maharashtra and Anr.

Bombay High Court (Madhav J. Jamdar, J.) | 17 July 2025 | 2025:BHC-AS:29608 | IA No. 4618 of 2024 in Criminal Appeal No. 10 of 2021

The applicant sought "temporary bail on the ground that the Applicant's mother is required to undergo the MVR Surgery i.e. Mitral Valve Replacement Surgery". The State and the victim opposed, citing conviction under "Section 376" IPC and the POCSO Act. Para 5: "as the Applicant's mother is seriously ill ... and requires urgent surgery, case is made out for grant of temporary bail". Para 6: "the Applicant is granted temporary bail for a period of 30 days".

Madhya Pradesh High Court

7. Bhura vs State of Madhya Pradesh

MP High Court, Indore (Sanjeev S. Kalgaonkar, J.) | 5 May 2025 | CRA No. 13097 of 2024

Second application under Section 389(1) CrPC "seeking temporary suspension of sentence on the ground of illness of his wife who is suffering from a Piles and requires medical treatment". Conviction under "Section 394 of IPC and 397 of the IPC". The Court was "inclined to grant temporary suspension of sentence of imprisonment for a period of 15 days to appellant".

8. Munnawar Khan vs State of Madhya Pradesh

MP High Court, Indore (S.A. Dharmadhikari and Pranay Verma, JJ.) | 10 May 2024 | CRA No. 4996 of 2023

Application for "temporary suspension of sentence on the ground of illness of daughter of appellant who is suffering from congenital multiple growth disorder and require multiple corrective surgeries". NDPS conviction; "sentenced to undergo 15 years R.I.". The doctor's report confirmed the condition. Held: "The custodial sentence of the appellant is temporarily suspended and it is directed that the appellant be released on bail for period of three months".

9. Rehmat Ali @ Remcha vs State of Madhya Pradesh

MP High Court, Indore (Vijay Kumar Shukla and Alok Awasthi, JJ.) | 5 March 2026 | CRA No. 457 of 2024

Second application under "Section 430 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (equivalent to Section 389(1) of Cr.P.C.)" "on the ground of ailment of his wife Farzana". NDPS conviction; "12 years' RI". As per the doctor, "advise for surgery has been given". Held: "we allow the application for temporary suspension of jail sentence of the appellant from the date of his release till for a period of 01 month only".

10. Ashish vs State of Madhya Pradesh

MP High Court, Indore (Subodh Abhyankar and Pranay Verma, JJ.) | 13 November 2024 | CRA No. 2077 of 2018

Application "on the ground that the appellant's father is terminally ill and requires kidney transplantation", for which "the appellant had also agreed to donate". Conviction under "Section 302 of IPC"; "life imprisonment". Held: "the jail sentence of the appellant Ashish Gupta be temporarily suspended for a period of 30 days from the date of his release".

Rajasthan High Court

11. Mansab vs State of Rajasthan

Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur (Manoj Kumar Garg, J.) | 12 February 2025 | 2025:RJ-JD:8626 | SOSA (Appeal) No. 183/2025

Application "on the ground of illness of his father, who is suffering from heart disease and he needs to be operated and there is no one in the family to take care of the appellant's father". The Public Prosecutor "verified the fact about the illness" but opposed. Held: "the sentence awarded to the appellant can be temporarily suspended and he deserves to be enlarged on bail for a period of thirty days".

12. Sitaram vs State of Rajasthan (with Kamal Kumar alias Sonu)

Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur (DB: Pushpendra Singh Bhati and Sunil Beniwal, JJ.) | 22 May 2025 | 2025:RJ-JD:24997-DB | SOSA (Appeal) Nos. 933 and 934 of 2025

Sita Ram's "father, namely Ramprasad is afflicted with Cancer and is in the terminal stage". Convictions included "Sections 302/149" IPC. "[L]ooking into the peculiar humanitarian circumstances of the case", the application was allowed "qua applicant-appellant Sita Ram only, who is the son of ailing father Ramprasad and his sentence be temporarily suspended for a period of 30 days". The grandsons' applications were dismissed "as the presence of applicant-appellant Sita Ram would be sufficient to provide necessary care".

Punjab and Haryana High Court

13. Rajbir and Anr. vs State of Haryana

Punjab and Haryana High Court | 2 August 2016 | CRM No. 21389 of 2016 in CRA No. D-281-DB of 2016

Rajbir, "undergoing life imprisonment" under "Section 302 IPC", sought "interim suspension of sentence of imprisonment for a period of two weeks on the ground that the back surgery of his wife namely Rajwanti is to be conducted". The State relied on her four "'jeths'". Held that this "may not be such a circumstance for the surgery to be conducted as expenses would have to be borne which can be done by the applicant-appellant No.1 primarily", and the sentence was suspended "for a period of two weeks from the date of his release so as to enable him to attend his wife during surgery".

Note: Names of the judges are not shown in the Indian Kanoon text.

Gujarat High Court

14. Pravinsinh Bavubha Zala vs State of Gujarat

Gujarat High Court (Sonia Gokani and N.V. Anjaria, JJ.) | 24 June 2020 | Crl. Misc. Application (Temporary Bail) No. 3 of 2020 in Criminal Appeal No. 1472 of 2019

The ground was "the knee replacement surgery of wife", during which "the presence of the applicant is sought to be requested by the wife of the applicant". Para 6: "If the same is tested negative, he shall be permitted to attend to the wife who has to undergo the knee replacement surgery." Para 7: "His release shall be for the period of 10 days from the date of his actual release". Earlier order in the same matter: 16 June 2020.

Note: Release was made subject to a negative COVID-19 test.

15. Sallaudin Gulammaudin Kazi vs State of Gujarat

Gujarat High Court (S.G. Shah, J.) | 14 August 2013 | Crl. Misc. Application (for Temporary Bail) No. 13058 of 2013 in Criminal Appeal No. 364 of 2013

"The applicant convict prisoner has preferred this application through his wife for temporary bail on the ground of seriousness of his mother". "Mumtazbibi is practically on death-bed". The Court noted "there is no negative history, so far as the conduct and attitude of the applicant in jail is concerned" and ordered release "on temporary bail for a period of 15 days from the date of his actual release".

16. Gautam Manubhai Makwana vs State of Gujarat

Gujarat High Court (V.M. Sahai and A.G. Uraizee, JJ.) | 16 August 2013 | Crl. Misc. Application (for Temporary Bail) No. 13086 of 2013 in Criminal Appeal No. 83 of 2008

"The convict seeks temporary bail on the ground of undergoing operation of vasectomy of his wife." Held: "the applicant-convict is ordered to be released on temporary bail for a period of 15 days from the date of actual release".

Note: "vasectomy of his wife" is as written in the order.

Checked but not included

• Relief refused: Abdul Khan @ Abdul Jalil vs State (Delhi HC, 21.10.2020); Chandra Shekhar vs State of U.P. (Allahabad HC, 25.01.2010); Firozbhai @ Piriyo Jivanbhai vs State of Gujarat (Gujarat HC, 08.02.2016); M. Rajender alias Raju vs State of Andhra Pradesh (AP HC, 19.12.1997, 1998 CriLJ 3137).
• Not on point: Bhawar Singh Kushwah (MP HC, 2018, adjourned only); Vikram and Anr. (MP HC, 2022, regular suspension on merits); Shyam Singh vs Union of India (MP HC, 2024, undertrial, not a convict).

Source: Indian Kanoon. Verify against certified copies before relying on any order.

Parole - temporary release of convicted prisoner - ill health of family member

1. Sreevidya vs State of Kerala
Kerala High Court | WP(CRL.) No. 884 of 2026 | 18 June 2026 | Neutral Citation: 2026:KER:43764 | Jobin Sebastian, J.

The petition was filed by “the wife of the convict”, who was sentenced to “imprisonment for life” in S.C. No. 747/2022. Her case was that “the convict’s mother, a cancer patient, is presently in a critical condition and on her deathbed”. A medical certificate stated she “is suffering from recurrent carcinoma of the tongue and is critically ill”. The Court found “prima facie grounds to justify the release of the convict on emergency parole”. It allowed the petition “so as to enable the convict to spend some time with his mother, who is on her deathbed”. He was to be released “on interim parole from 10:00 a.m. on 20.06.2026 till 5:00 p.m. on 21.06.2026”, with “adequate police escort”.

2. Asif Hussain @ Jabi @ Jabi Tiger @ Mohammed Asif vs The Chief Superintendent
Karnataka High Court | WP No. 18095 of 2024 | 31 July 2024 | Neutral Citation: NC: 2024:KHC:30153 | Hemant Chandangoudar, J.

The petitioner, “convicted for the offences punishable under Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code, and sentenced to under imprisonment for seven years”, sought release “on parole on account of the ill-health of his mother”. She was “bedbound since around 2 months” and “requires 24 x 7 assistance for daily activities of living”. The Court noted that parole was sought “primarily on the ground that his mother is on deathbed, necessitating his presence by her side”. It also noted that the request was “substantiated by a medical certificate” and that he “has already served one and a half years of imprisonment”. It held that he “has established a prima facie case for granting of parole” and ordered his release “on parole for a period of fifteen days”.

Sanctioned Leave of Advocate - matter remanded.

Para5 

Criminal process as recovery tool

Sarabjit Kaur v. State of Punjab — (2023) 5 SCC 360
Principle: where the complainant did not pursue civil remedies or issue notice and used criminal process after delay, the dispute was treated as civil rather than cheating

• Vijay Kumar Ghai v. State of W.B. — (2022) 7 SCC 124
  Principle: fraudulent or dishonest inducement is essential; breach of contract alone is not cheating - 
  Paras: 31, 32, 38
• Dalip Kaur v. Jagnar Singh — (2009) 14 SCC 696
  Principle: non-refund of advance money is ordinarily a breach of contract unless dishonest intention existed from inception - 
  Paras: 8, 10

319 and discharge

Yashodhan Singh v. State of U.P., (2023) 9 SCC 108 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 890 at page 128

34. In para 13 of Jogendra Yadav [Jogendra Yadav v. State of Bihar, (2015) 9 SCC 244 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 756] , it has been observed that the exercise of power under Section 319CrPC must be placed on a higher pedestal. Needless to say, the accused summoned under Section 319CrPC are entitled to invoke the remedy under law against an illegal or improper exercise of power under Section 319CrPC but that cannot have the effect of the order being undone by seeking a discharge under Section 227CrPC. Therefore, this Court categorically held that a person, who is summoned under Section 319CrPC cannot avail the remedy of discharge under Section 227CrPC. In that context, this Court, as already noted, discussed the difference between Sections 227 and 319CrPC, as extracted above.

Jogendra Yadav v. State of Bihar, (2015) 9 SCC 244 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 756 : 2015 SCC OnLine SC 674 at page 250

13. We are not unmindful of the fact that the interpretation placed by us on the scheme of Sections 319 and 227 makes Section 227 unavailable to an accused who has been added under Section 319 CrPC. We are of the view, for the reasons given above, that this must necessarily be so since a view to the contrary would render the exercise undertaken by a court under Section 319 CrPC, for summoning an accused, on the basis of a higher standard of proof totally infructuous and futile if the same court were to subsequently discharge the same accused by exercise of the power under Section 227 CrPC, on the basis of a mere prima facie view. The exercise of the power under Section 319 CrPC, must be placed on a higher pedestal. Needless to say the accused summoned under Section 319 CrPC, are entitled to invoke remedy under law against an illegal or improper exercise of the power under Section 319, but cannot have the effect of the order undone by seeking a discharge under Section 227 CrPC. If allowed to, such an action of discharge would not be in accordance with the purpose of Criminal Procedure Code in enacting Section 319 which empowers the Court to summon a person for being tried along with the other accused where it appears from the evidence that he has committed an offence.

Financial Hardship pleaded by employeer

In Hindustan Tin Works v. Employees,  (1979) 2 SCC 80  , it has been held that “ If the employer pleads financial incapacity and expects the workmen to sacrifice a part of the back wages due to them, there must be a corresponding reduction by the management in its emoluments and expenses”.

Parole furlough for child’s education

W.P.(CRL)-1389/2026

Parties: VICKY @ GOBIND vs STATE (NCT OF DELHI)

Judge(s): JUSTICE MANOJ JAIN

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The Delhi High Court, in Vicky @ Gobind v. State (NCT of Delhi), directed the immediate release of the petitioner, a life convict, on his third spell of furlough for two weeks, notwithstanding that a co-accused was already out on parole. The Court held that the competent authority’s refusal to release the petitioner, whose sentence had attained finality, was unsustainable, particularly given the petitioner’s stated purpose of securing his 16-year-old daughter’s admission to Class 11. The decisive ground for this ruling was the interpretation of Note-1 attached to Rule 1224 of the Delhi Prison Rules, 2018, which states that simultaneous furlough to co-convicts is “ordinarily” not permissible, thereby implying no absolute prohibition. The Court emphasized that furlough is an incentive for good conduct and the mere fact of a co-accused being on parole should not impede a convict from availing furlough, especially when it concerns a child’s education. This aligns with the principle that prison rules, while maintaining discipline, should not be applied so rigidly as to defeat the rehabilitative purpose of furlough, particularly in circumstances involving family welfare. The Court implicitly relied on the broader principle that discretionary powers, even in prison administration, must be exercised reasonably and not arbitrarily. The Superintendent, Jail, was directed to release the petitioner within three days in terms of the order dated 18.03.2026.

Summons to accused and appearance through counsel

Bhaskar Industries Ltd. v. Bhiwani Denim & Apparels Ltd., (2001) 7 SCC 401 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1254 : 2001 SCC OnLine SC 1004 at page 408

17. Thus, in appropriate cases the Magistrate can allow an accused to make even the first appearance through a counsel. The Magistrate is empowered to record the plea of the accused even when his counsel makes such plea on behalf of the accused in a case where the personal appearance of the accused is dispensed with. Section 317 of the Code has to be viewed in the above perspective as it empowers the court to dispense with the personal attendance of the accused (provided he is represented by a counsel in that case) even for proceeding with the further steps in the case. However, one precaution which the court should take in such a situation is that the said benefit need be granted only to an accused who gives an undertaking to the satisfaction of the court that he would not dispute his identity as the particular accused in the case, and that a counsel on his behalf would be present in court and that he has no objection in taking evidence in his absence. This precaution is necessary for the further progress of the proceedings including examination of the witnesses.

18. A question could legitimately be asked — what might happen if the counsel engaged by the accused (whose personal appearance is dispensed with) does not appear or that the counsel does not cooperate in proceeding with the case? We may point out that the legislature has taken care of such eventualities. Section 205(2) says that the Magistrate can in his discretion direct the personal attendance of the accused at any stage of the proceedings. The last limb of Section 317(1) confers a discretion on the Magistrate to direct the personal attendance of the accused at any subsequent stage of the proceedings. He can even resort to other steps for enforcing such attendance.

Affirmed in TGN Kumar v. State of Kerala, (2011) 2 SCC 772 at p. 778
Followed in Puneet Dalmia v. CBI, (2020) 12 SCC 695

• Bhaskar Industries Ltd. v. Bhiwani Denim & Apparels Ltd. — (2001) 7 SCC 401
  Principle: In appropriate summons cases the magistrate may allow even the first appearance to be made through counsel and may record the accused's plea when counsel so pleads on his behalf. - 
• T.C. Mathai v. District & Sessions Judge, Thiruvananthapuram — (1999) 3 SCC 614
  Principle: Non-advocates may be permitted to act as "pleader" only with prior permission of the court; court must be satisfied that such person can assist the court. - 
• Bibhuti Bhusan Das Gupta v. State of W.B. — 1969 SCR 104
  Principle: Examination under statutory sections requiring accused’s statement (e.g., S. 342/313 analogues) must ordinarily be of the accused personally; pleader’s examination in his stead is not a substitute except in narrow cases (e.g., juridical persons). - 
• Bulbul Guha v. Durga Prasad Ghosh — 1993 SCC OnLine Cal 20
  Principle: An appearance through a pleader should normally be allowed in summons cases unless personal attendance is necessary in the interests of justice. - 
  Paras: 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
• Vivek Bajoria v. State — 2008 SCC OnLine Cal 186
  Principle: It is settled that magistrates can allow the accused’s first appearance through counsel and can record the plea when counsel pleads on his behalf; magistrates should record reasons if they require personal attendance despite a dispensation. - 
  Paras: 3
• Harbeenarora v. Jatinder Kaur — 2012 SCC OnLine Del 3687
  Principle: While granting exemption courts should ensure accused’s identity is not in dispute and may impose conditions (counsel present, no later challenge); discretion to call accused at any stage is reserved. - 
  Paras: 11
• Mithlesh Kumar v. Shyam Lall Paik — 2003 SCC OnLine Cal 609
  Principle: Magistrate’s dispensation of personal attendance is lawful and evidence may be recorded in the accused’s absence provided advocate is present; appropriate for public servants posted away. - 
  Paras: 13
• Hafeez Ullah Khan v. Spl. C.J.M. Allahabad — 1998 (80 FLR 610) (All)
  Principle: Discretion to direct appearance through counsel should be exercised when summons are issued; avoid dispensing personal attendance where offence is serious. - 

sub judice cases and permission of court

1. in Union of India v. Raj Grow Impex LLP, (2021) 18 SCC 601, it has been held that-

“94. […] In other words, though we are at one with the High Court that, ordinarily, when the matter is sub judice in the higher forum and that too before the constitutional court, the executive authorities should not attempt to bring about a new state of affairs without taking permission from the court and/or bringing the relevant facts to the notice of the court. However, even in this regard, before pronouncing on the impropriety on the part of an executive authority who had done anything without prior information to the court or without taking court's permission, all the relevant surroundings factors are also required to be examined so as to find as to whether such an action was calculated at interference with the administration of justice or was a bona fide exercise of power in the given circumstances.”

Elaborate reasoning with a footnote