Parole furlough for child’s education

W.P.(CRL)-1389/2026

Parties: VICKY @ GOBIND vs STATE (NCT OF DELHI)

Judge(s): JUSTICE MANOJ JAIN

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The Delhi High Court, in Vicky @ Gobind v. State (NCT of Delhi), directed the immediate release of the petitioner, a life convict, on his third spell of furlough for two weeks, notwithstanding that a co-accused was already out on parole. The Court held that the competent authority’s refusal to release the petitioner, whose sentence had attained finality, was unsustainable, particularly given the petitioner’s stated purpose of securing his 16-year-old daughter’s admission to Class 11. The decisive ground for this ruling was the interpretation of Note-1 attached to Rule 1224 of the Delhi Prison Rules, 2018, which states that simultaneous furlough to co-convicts is “ordinarily” not permissible, thereby implying no absolute prohibition. The Court emphasized that furlough is an incentive for good conduct and the mere fact of a co-accused being on parole should not impede a convict from availing furlough, especially when it concerns a child’s education. This aligns with the principle that prison rules, while maintaining discipline, should not be applied so rigidly as to defeat the rehabilitative purpose of furlough, particularly in circumstances involving family welfare. The Court implicitly relied on the broader principle that discretionary powers, even in prison administration, must be exercised reasonably and not arbitrarily. The Superintendent, Jail, was directed to release the petitioner within three days in terms of the order dated 18.03.2026.

Summons to accused and appearance through counsel

Bhaskar Industries Ltd. v. Bhiwani Denim & Apparels Ltd., (2001) 7 SCC 401 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1254 : 2001 SCC OnLine SC 1004 at page 408

17. Thus, in appropriate cases the Magistrate can allow an accused to make even the first appearance through a counsel. The Magistrate is empowered to record the plea of the accused even when his counsel makes such plea on behalf of the accused in a case where the personal appearance of the accused is dispensed with. Section 317 of the Code has to be viewed in the above perspective as it empowers the court to dispense with the personal attendance of the accused (provided he is represented by a counsel in that case) even for proceeding with the further steps in the case. However, one precaution which the court should take in such a situation is that the said benefit need be granted only to an accused who gives an undertaking to the satisfaction of the court that he would not dispute his identity as the particular accused in the case, and that a counsel on his behalf would be present in court and that he has no objection in taking evidence in his absence. This precaution is necessary for the further progress of the proceedings including examination of the witnesses.

18. A question could legitimately be asked — what might happen if the counsel engaged by the accused (whose personal appearance is dispensed with) does not appear or that the counsel does not cooperate in proceeding with the case? We may point out that the legislature has taken care of such eventualities. Section 205(2) says that the Magistrate can in his discretion direct the personal attendance of the accused at any stage of the proceedings. The last limb of Section 317(1) confers a discretion on the Magistrate to direct the personal attendance of the accused at any subsequent stage of the proceedings. He can even resort to other steps for enforcing such attendance.

Affirmed in TGN Kumar v. State of Kerala, (2011) 2 SCC 772 at p. 778
Followed in Puneet Dalmia v. CBI, (2020) 12 SCC 695

• Bhaskar Industries Ltd. v. Bhiwani Denim & Apparels Ltd. — (2001) 7 SCC 401
  Principle: In appropriate summons cases the magistrate may allow even the first appearance to be made through counsel and may record the accused's plea when counsel so pleads on his behalf. - 
• T.C. Mathai v. District & Sessions Judge, Thiruvananthapuram — (1999) 3 SCC 614
  Principle: Non-advocates may be permitted to act as "pleader" only with prior permission of the court; court must be satisfied that such person can assist the court. - 
• Bibhuti Bhusan Das Gupta v. State of W.B. — 1969 SCR 104
  Principle: Examination under statutory sections requiring accused’s statement (e.g., S. 342/313 analogues) must ordinarily be of the accused personally; pleader’s examination in his stead is not a substitute except in narrow cases (e.g., juridical persons). - 
• Bulbul Guha v. Durga Prasad Ghosh — 1993 SCC OnLine Cal 20
  Principle: An appearance through a pleader should normally be allowed in summons cases unless personal attendance is necessary in the interests of justice. - 
  Paras: 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
• Vivek Bajoria v. State — 2008 SCC OnLine Cal 186
  Principle: It is settled that magistrates can allow the accused’s first appearance through counsel and can record the plea when counsel pleads on his behalf; magistrates should record reasons if they require personal attendance despite a dispensation. - 
  Paras: 3
• Harbeenarora v. Jatinder Kaur — 2012 SCC OnLine Del 3687
  Principle: While granting exemption courts should ensure accused’s identity is not in dispute and may impose conditions (counsel present, no later challenge); discretion to call accused at any stage is reserved. - 
  Paras: 11
• Mithlesh Kumar v. Shyam Lall Paik — 2003 SCC OnLine Cal 609
  Principle: Magistrate’s dispensation of personal attendance is lawful and evidence may be recorded in the accused’s absence provided advocate is present; appropriate for public servants posted away. - 
  Paras: 13
• Hafeez Ullah Khan v. Spl. C.J.M. Allahabad — 1998 (80 FLR 610) (All)
  Principle: Discretion to direct appearance through counsel should be exercised when summons are issued; avoid dispensing personal attendance where offence is serious. - 

sub judice cases and permission of court

1. in Union of India v. Raj Grow Impex LLP, (2021) 18 SCC 601, it has been held that-

“94. […] In other words, though we are at one with the High Court that, ordinarily, when the matter is sub judice in the higher forum and that too before the constitutional court, the executive authorities should not attempt to bring about a new state of affairs without taking permission from the court and/or bringing the relevant facts to the notice of the court. However, even in this regard, before pronouncing on the impropriety on the part of an executive authority who had done anything without prior information to the court or without taking court's permission, all the relevant surroundings factors are also required to be examined so as to find as to whether such an action was calculated at interference with the administration of justice or was a bona fide exercise of power in the given circumstances.”