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Thursday, December 23, 2010

Writ Petition: Money Claim / Refund as consequential relief

"We are of the opinion that though the High Courts have power to pass any appropriate order in the exercise of the powers conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution, such a petition solely praying for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the State to refund the money is not ordinarily maintainable for the simple reason that a claim for such a refund can always be made in a suit against the authority which had illegally collected the money as a tax.

We, therefore, hold that normally petitions solely praying for the refund of money against the State by a writ of mandamus are not to be entertained. The aggrieved party has the right of  going to the civil court for claiming the amount and it is open to the State to raise all possible defences to the claim, defences which cannot, in most cases, be appropriately raised and considered in the exercise of writ jurisdiction."

2001 (2) SCC 549 relied in ABL v. ECGC, 2004 (3) SCC 553

Thursday, December 16, 2010

Offences by Companies - Directors

Directors is entitled to discharge once he proves that he was not director at the relevant time or was not officiating the the business of the company.  Shree Raj Travels [2010] 104 SCL 127 (Delhi)

Section 8 of Arbitration Act, 1996 - file original or certified copy

Parties are required to file original or certified copy of the arbitration agreement, failing which the application u/s 8 will be dismissed [2010] 104 SCL 13.

CLB and Arbitration : Articles v. Agreement

Gautam Kapoor v. Limrose Engg, [2007] 137 Comp Cas 513 (CLB - New Delhi)
if the allegations could be examined without reference to the terms of the agreement containing the arbitration clause, then the parties need not be referred to arbitration even if the subject-matter is covered in the arbitration agreement.


Enercom GmBH [2009] 91 SCL 60 (CLB - New Delhi)
if the subject-matter brought before this Board is the subject matter of Arbitration Agreement, the Board is bound to refer the parties to arbitration.
Relied in [2010]  104 SCL 13


Also:
Escorts Finance Limited v GR Solvents and Allied Industries Ltd., [1999] 96 Comp Cas 323 
we are of the view that the present disputes being disputes arising out of or in connection with the sponsorship agreement which provides for arbitration clause have to be referred to arbitration.... 


relied upon in [2011] 161 comp cas 427 (clb) - where apart from breach of agreement no allegation of oppression and mismanagement was made.

Interim order : Consumer Protection Act

Section 27 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 providing for punishment for breach of court's order applies also to interim orders. 2010 (6) Bom CR 241

Death of Arbitrator

Default appointment mechanism under Section 11 of the 1996 Act should be resorted to if the named arbitrator dies. The clause does not become unworkable. Khorshed E. Nagarwalla v. Daryus Panthkey, 2010 (6) BomCR 462 

Admission to School (Class XI and Class XII)

Raunak A. Gandhi v. Bhavans, 2010 (6) Bom CR 198


Bhavans (the School) has a right to adopt its own method for granting admission to students in the Xith Standard since its is part of the autonomy which the Bhavans (the School) possess as a private educational institution.

Expert Witness

In a medical negligence case, expert witness is not always necessary.
V. Kishan Rao v. Nikhil Super Speciality Hospital, 2010 (6) Bom CR 155 (SC)

Amendment / Deletion of Affidavits

Once affidavit in lieu of examination in chief is filed, it partakes character of examination in chief. There is no provision in the Code to enable court to order its deletion. 2010 (6) Bom CR 379

Wednesday, December 15, 2010

Imposition of costs on frivolous litigants

Principles explained in Vinod Sethi v. Devinder Bajaj, (2010) 8 SCC 1

economic duress and arbitrability

Sirajuddin Kasim v. Paramount Investment, (2010) 8 SCC 557 following Boghara Polyfab (2009) 1 SCC 267.

whether or not agreement was entered into under economic duress is arbitrable dispute.

Suit to claim interest alone

Mrs. Prabhadevi Ramgarib B. v. Divisional Railway Manager, Western Railway Manager, Manu/MH/0238/2010  (para 20).

See also:  2010 5 SCC 44, 56.


Rule 2, Order 2 (where only interest is claimed, principal is barred from being claimed) - AIR 1922 PC 23

Tuesday, November 16, 2010

Cases Suitable for ADR

Afcon Infra Limited v. Cherian Varkey Construction, http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1875345/ 2010 (8) SCC 24


18. The following categories of cases are normally considered to be not suitable for ADR process having regard to their nature : 

(i) Representative suits under Order 1 Rule 8 CPC which involve public interest or interest of numerous persons who are not parties before the court. (In fact, even a compromise in such a suit is a difficult process requiring notice to the persons interested in the suit, before its acceptance). 

(ii) Disputes relating to election to public offices (as contrasted from disputes between two groups trying to get control over the management of societies, clubs, association etc.).

(iii) Cases involving grant of authority by the court after enquiry, as for example, suits for grant of probate or letters of administration. (iv) Cases involving serious and specific allegations of fraud, fabrication of documents, forgery, impersonation, coercion etc.

(v) Cases requiring protection of courts, as for example, claims against minors, deities and mentally challenged and suits for declaration of title against government.

(vi) Cases involving prosecution for criminal offences.

19. All other suits and cases of civil nature in particular the following categories of cases (whether pending in civil courts or other special Tribunals/Forums) are normally suitable for ADR processes : 

(i) All cases relating to trade, commerce and contracts, including - disputes arising out of contracts (including all money claims); - disputes relating to specific performance;
- disputes between suppliers and customers;
- disputes between bankers and customers;
- disputes between developers/builders and customers; - disputes between landlords and tenants/licensor and licensees; - disputes between insurer and insured;

(ii) All cases arising from strained or soured relationships, including - disputes relating to matrimonial causes, maintenance, custody of children;
- disputes relating to partition/division among family members/co- parceners/co-owners; and
- disputes relating to partnership among partners.


 (iii) All cases where there is a need for continuation of the pre-existing relationship in spite of the disputes, including
- disputes between neighbours (relating to easementary rights, encroachments, nuisance etc.);
- disputes between employers and employees;
- disputes among members of societies/associations/Apartment owners Associations;

(iv) All cases relating to tortious liability including - claims for compensation in motor accidents/other accidents; and

 (v) All consumer disputes including
- disputes where a trader/supplier/manufacturer/service provider is keen to maintain his business/professional reputation and credibility or `product popularity.

The above enumeration of `suitable' and `unsuitable' categorization of cases is not intended to be exhaustive or rigid. They are illustrative, which can be subjected to just exceptions or additions by the court/Tribunal exercising its jurisdiction/discretion in referring a dispute/case to an ADR process. 

Thursday, November 11, 2010

Advocates Act - suspension of enrollment

Upon taking up employment and upon his request to Bar Council, what is suspended is not enrollment with the Bar Council  but only his right to practise as advocate.  AIR 2010 Ker 170

Tuesday, November 9, 2010

consumer - unfair practice

Non-paymet of interest on security deposit or payment at lesser rate than prescribed by Electricity Regulatory Commission amounts to unfair practice,  AIR 2010 P&H 173

Monday, November 8, 2010

Implied exclusion of Part I

 Where both the seat of arbitration is abroad and the law governing the contract is foreign, an implied exclusion of Part I can be presumed according to the dicta of the Delhi and Bombay High Court (Max India Ltd. v. General Binding Corporation (2009) 3 Arb LR 162 (DEL) (DB) , DGS Realtors Pvt. Ltd. v. Realogy Corporation MANU/DE/2115/2009 and Frontier Drilling A.S. v. Jagson Internatural Ltd  (2003) 3 Arb. LR 548). The Delhi and Bombay High Courts’ views work on the presumption that where the proper law of contract is foreign and seat is abroad, the proper law of arbitration agreement can reasonably be presumed to be foreign

But see National Aluminium Company Limited v. GERALD Metals 2004(2)ARB LR 382 (AP).


Merely specifying the seat of the arbitration to be foreign without specifying the proper law of contract does not amount to an implied exclusion of Part I. (Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading S.A.: 2002 (4) SCC 105)
Merely specifying the proper law of contract to be foreign without specifying the seat of arbitration or proper law of arbitration does not amount to an implied exclusion of Part I. (Indtel Technical Services Private Ltd. v. W.S. Atkins Rail Ltd.: 2008 (10) SCC 308  and Citation Infowares Ltd. v. Equinox Corporation: 2009 (7) SCC 220


Overall See:  Dozco India P. Ltd. v. Doosan Infracore Co. Ltd.:  MANU/SC/0812/2010 

Joint Venture / Oppression & Mismanagement

CG Holdings P. Ltd v. Cheran Enterprises P. Ltd., 2010 159 Comp Cas 266 (CLB - Chennai)
Petition for relief on the ground of oppression and mismanagement arising out of JV Agreement to be decided by civil court and not by CLB. Sangramsinh Gaekwad v. Shantadevi Gaekwad, 2005 123 Comp Cas 566 (SC).

Appeal - Impleadment

Nagarjuna Finance Ltd v. RBI, 2010 159 Comp Cas 249 (AP).
Party not a part of proceedings before the CLB cannot be impleaded as a party in Appeal. 

Cheque Dishonour and Scheme of Arrangement

Offence of Dishonour of Cheques is not compounded by passing of scheme of arrangement with said creditors. JIK Industries Ltd. v. Sunil Ranchorlal Bajaj, 2010 159 Comp Cas 485 (Bom)

Cheque Bounce - Liability of Directors

1. There is a presumption under law that a cheque is isssued in discharge of a debt or liability and this presumption has to be rebutted by the person issuing a cheque. 


2. Law enjoins responsibility of running a company on all the directors collectively and if a director takes the stand that he has no responsibility, the onus to rebut legal presumption is on him. 

3. When the has made BoD responsible for the conduct of the business as a body of the company, each and every Director has to be considered in-charge of responsibility for conduct of the business and can be summoned by the court.

Shree Raj Travels & Tours Ltd v. Destination of the World (Subcontinent) Pvt Ltd., 2010 7 Taxmann.com 64 (Delhi)

Wednesday, November 3, 2010

Legal Professional Privilege & In house counsels

applies to in house counsels, Vijay Metal Works, AIR 1982 Bom 6.

Monday, November 1, 2010

Section 8 of Arbitration Act, 1996 - waiver of arbitration clause

FCI v. Yadav Engieer & Contractor, (1982) 2 SCC 499: "taking any other steps in the proceeding must be confined to taking steps in the proceedings for resolution of the substantial dispute in the suit..." Appearing at interim stage does not mean waiver of arbitration clause. 


Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited v. Verma Transport Co. (2006) 7 SCC 275. 

Thursday, October 21, 2010

Section 8 - Arbitration, Bar on civil court jurisdiction

2006 7 SCC 275

Participation in interim application does not mean waiver of arbitrability.

Statement on substance of dispute and "written statement".

Sunday, October 17, 2010

Arbitration: Questions which arbitrator must decide, can decide and which court must decide


National Insurance Co. Ltd vs M/S. Boghara Polyfab Pvt. Ltd, 
http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1482268/

Limitation and Arbitration


Krishna Mittal v. MCD, MANU/DE/1502/2010.

Rameswara Home & Apartments Pvt Ltd v. Manojlal, 2008(3)CHN349.

Shiv Construction Company v. State of Rajasthan, RLW 2005 (4) Raj 2656, 2005 (4) WLC 234 (arbitrator to decide questions of limitation)

Legal heirs can invoke arbitration clause


Ravi Prakash Goel v. Chandra Prakash Goel, (2008) 13 SCC 667

Partnership ceases upon death of partners


CIT v. Seth Govindram Sugar Mills, AIR 1966 SC 24
CIT v. Sherally Meherally & Sons, [1998] 230 ITR 120(Bom)
Mohammad Laiquddin, 2010 (2) SCC 407 
Jagannath Mineral v. State of Orissa (on Manupatra)

Arbitration: Arbitrator powers to award interest

http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1939558/

Arbitrator has power to award pre-reference, pendente lite and post award interest.

Friday, October 15, 2010

Wednesday, October 13, 2010

Termination of Contract at will : no reason for termination

Classic Motors Ltd v. Maruti Udyog Limited, 1995 II AD (Delhi) 997; 57 (1995) DLT 677

termination without reason is improper

Tuesday, October 12, 2010

Umbrella Clause - Arbitration Clause Incorporation by reference

The Supreme Court accepted the proposition that even where a contract between two parties does not contain a provision for arbitration, an arbitration clause contained in an independent document will be incorporated into the contract between the parties by reference to an independent document in the contract if the reference is such to make thearbitration clause in the independent document a part of the contract. However, based on the facts of the case, it was held that there was no incorporation of the arbitration clause  r because: (i) the parties never intended to incorporate the same into the subcontract; and (ii) the entire arbitration agreement contained in the main contract was tailor-made to meet the requirements of the contract between X and Y, where Z did not have any role. 


MR Engineers and Contractors Pvt Ltd v Som Datt Builders Ltd, (2009) 7 SCC 696








Foreign Law and Part I

Citation Infowares Ltd. v. Equinox Corporation, 2009 (5) UJ 2066 (SC). The Chief Justice of India ruled that unless it is specifically excluded in an agreement between the parties or by implication, the provisions of Part I of the Indian Arbitration Act apply to international commercial arbitrations, even though the contract is governed by foreign law. Part I of the Indian Arbitration Act provides for, among others things, the appointment of arbitrators.

Contract and writ: arbitration

Principle:  Writ remedy may not be invoked when the case involves an essentially contractual disputes with the State, or involves questions of fact.  


State of U.P. v. Bridge & Roof (India) Limited, AIR 1996 SC 3515 "that the writ petition filed by the respondent for the issuance of a writ of Mandamus restraining the Government from deducting or withholding a particular sum, which according to the respondent is payable to it under the contract, was wholly misconceived and was not maintainable in law".  Followed by Vindhya Telelinks Limited v. MTNL, 95 (2002) DLT 865.

 The Bridge & Roof Case has been distinguished by the High Court at Guwahati in J. Deep  Chemicals and Fertilizers v. State of Tripura, 2007 (2) GLT 173.  The Guwahati High Court, while agreeing with the principle laid down in the Bridge & Roof Case, held that "the rightful claim or writ petitioner for payment of the remaining amount was not to be withheld by the State authorities. For that purpose the writ petition could have been entertained and there has been no necessity to refer the matter to the arbitrator as no such dispute for interpretation of contract or its terms or controversial facts was involved which could have been referred to the arbitrator".

Wednesday, October 6, 2010

Arbitration clause, further consent necessary.

Wellington Associates Ltd. v. Kirit Mehta, (2000) 4 SCC 272, the Supreme Court dealing with interpretation of an arbitration clause has held that an 'arbitration agreement' "… postulate an agreement which necessarily or rather mandatorily requires the appointment of an arbitrator/arbitrators. [It] does not cover a case where the parties agree that they "may " go to a suit or that they 'may' also go to arbitration".  

P. Gopal Das v. Kota Straw Board, AIR 1971 Raj 258, it was held by the Rajasthan High Court that the use of the word 'may' indicated that a fresh consent of both parties for arbitration was necessary, and may not constitute a binding arbitration clause. 


Jindal Exports Limited v. Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd, MANU/DE/3204/2009 decided on December 11, 2009, the Delhi High Court has held that "mere use of the word 'arbitration' or 'arbitrator' in a clause will not make it an arbitration agreement, if it requires or contemplates a further or fresh consent of the parties for reference to arbitration. For example, use of words such as "parties can, if they so desire, refer their disputes to arbitration" or "in the event of any dispute, the parties may also agree to refer the same to arbitration" or "if any disputes arise between the parties, they should consider settlement by arbitration" in a clause relating to settlement of disputes, indicate that the clause is not intended to be an arbitration agreement. Similarly, a clause which states that "if the parties so decide, the disputes shall be referred to arbitration" or "any disputes between parties, if they so agree, shall be referred to arbitration" is not an arbitration agreement. Any agreement or clause in an agreement requiring or contemplating a further consent or consensus before a reference to arbitration is not an arbitration agreement, but an agreement to enter into an arbitration agreement in future." However, please note that each arbitration clause is unique and therefore, it is not necessary that the use of the word 'may' would necessarily be construed as a non-binding arbitration clause.  

Sunday, October 3, 2010

Fraudulent Preference

In Official Liquidator of Piramal Financial Ltd. v. Reserve Bank of India, [2004] 51 SCL 691 (Guj), the Gujarat High Court has held that “the use of word ‘preference’ implies an act of free will and that would by itself make it necessary to consider whether pressure was or had not been used. A payment made under the impression that unless a particular creditor was paid, the Company would go into liquidation is not done out of free will and volition. If the object was to save the company, it may not amount to fraudulent preference”. Further in Monark Enterprises v. Kishan Tulpule, [1992] 74 Comp Cas 89 (Bombay), the Bombay High Court has held that “if the transaction was entered into as a result of lawful pressure  of a bonafide creditor to recover his dues, the transaction of transfer could not be treated as a fraudulent preference.  


 transaction by a company to “save its own skin” for its own benefit in the circumstances then prevailing, may     not be construed as fraudulent preference.

Friday, October 1, 2010

Seat will not give jurisdiction

Amrit Lal Madan v. KD Ahuja, delhi high court decided on Feb 8, 2010.
See also

2010 1 BCR 175.

Thursday, September 30, 2010

Approbate Reprobate

In this respect, recently in Mumbai International Airports Limited v. Golden Chariot Airports, decided by the Supreme Court on September 22, 2010, the Court has held that a person cannot be allowed to take inconsistent stand in litigation, and once having elected to take a stand cannot be allowed to resile from such a position.


Certificate of posting and presumption

Certificate of posting

119. This general rule regarding certificates of posting has not been changed under Section 53 of the 
Companies Act, although it does provide that if a document is sent by post in the manner specified. "service thereof shall be deemed to be effected". The word "deemed". literally means "thought of" or, in legal parlance "presumed".

120. There is a distinction between "presumption" and "proof". A presumption has been defined as "an inference, affirmative or dis-affirmative of the truth or falsehood of a doubtful fact or proposition drawn by a process of probable reasoning from something proved or taken for granted" (Izhar Ahmad V. Union of India : AIR1962SC1052 ). They are rules of evidence which attempt to assist the judicial mind in the matter of weighing the probative or persuasive force of certain facts proved in relation to other facts presumed or inferred (ibid). Sometimes a discretion is left with the Court either to raise a presumption or not as in Section 114 of the Evidence Act. On other occasions no such discretion is given to the Court so that when a certain set of facts are proved, the Court is bound to raise the prescribed presumption. But that is all. The presumption may be rebutted.


Madhoosoodanan, 2003(6)ALD1(SC), [2003]117CompCas19(SC), (2003)4CompLJ185(SC),
2003(6)SCALE191, (2004)9SCC204, [2003]46SCL695(SC)






Certificate of posting viewed with suspicion

1981 3 SCR 647
1995 I LLJ 1162 SC

Monday, September 27, 2010

Appeal, when interfered

Dollar Company AIR 1975 SC 1670 A three Judge Bench
of the Apex Court observed, inter alia, that a Court of appeal interferes
not when the judgment under attack is not right, but only when it is shown
to be wrong.

Award / Decree and winding up

433(1)(a) can be invoked after obtaining award / decree.




Title

• Madhuban Private Limited v. Narain Dass Gokul Chand, 1971 (41) CompCas 685

• In re Unique Cardboard Box Mfg Co. Pvt Ltd, 1978 (48) Comp Cas 604

• All India General Transport Corporation Limited v. Raj Kumar Mittal, 1978 (48) Comp Cas 604

• Seethai Mills Limited, 1980 (50) Comp Cas 422

• Sarabhai Machinery v. Haryana Detergents Limited, 1986 (60) Comp Cas 169

• Sugam Constructions Private Limited (unreported Bombay HC)

• National Aluminium Company Limited v. SGN Telecoms (reported on Manupatra)

• 1997 88 Comp Cas 673

• 1971 41 Comp Cas 685

• 1984 56 Comp Cas 165

• 2007 (5) Bom CR 752





Contrary case-laws

Title

• Kitti Steels Ltd. vs. Sanghi Industries Ltd., [2010] 154 Comp Cas 102 (AP)

• National Research Development Corporation vs. Electro Flux (P.) Ltd., [2005] 127 Comp Cas 23 (AP)

• Maharashtra Apex Corporation Ltd. vs. Spartek Ceramics India Ltd., [2005] 57 SCL 467 (AP)

• Manipal Finance Corporation Ltd. vs. CRC Carrier Ltd., [2001] 107 Comp Cas 288 (Bom)

• Ishwar Industries Ltd. vs. Lakshmi Machine Works Ltd., MANU/TN/2947/2009

• Pradeshiya Industrial and Investment Corporation of Uttar Pradesh vs. North India Petro Chemical Ltd. and Another, [1994] 79 Comp Cas 835 (SC)

Kesar Enterprises Ltd. vs. IDI Ltd., [2002] 112 Comp Cas 174 (Bom)

I.C.D.S Ltd. vs. Asha Latex and Allied Industries Pvt. Ltd, [2003]144 Comp Cas 581 (Bom).

Rediffusion – Dentsu, Young & Rubicam P. Ltd vs. Solidaire India Ltd., [2008] 145 Comp Cas 693 (Mad)

Berger Paints India Ltd. vs. Steel Strips Wheels Ltd., MANU/PH/0571/1997.

Pankaj Aluminium Industries P. Ltd. vs. Pankaj Extrusions Ltd., [2009] 149 Comp Cas 660 (Guj)

Tuesday, September 21, 2010

Arbitrator misconstruing contract and relying on equity

The Arbitrators have proceeded on the erroneous notions of equity by using phrase "Heads I win tails you lose" to describe the contentions of the petitioner. The question of interpreting a legal document voluntarily entered into between two parties is a question of law and the document is required to be construed according to law and notions of equity cannot be imported for construing such a document. An arbitrator is not a conciliator and cannot ignore the law or misapply it in order to do what he thinks is just and reasonable. He is a tribunal selected by the parties to decide their disputes according to law and so is bound to follow and apply the law and if he does not he can be set right by the Court provided his error appears on the face of the award. see Seth Thawardas v. Union of India, reported in MANU/SC/0070/1955 : [1955]2SCR48
\

Disclosure in Scheme Petition

From RNRL v. RIL, Supreme Court, [2010]156CompCas455(SC), JT2010(5)SC413, 2010(5)SCALE223, 2010(4)UJ2400(SC)   

145. The Companies (Amendment) Act, 1965, based on the recommendations of Daphtary-Sastri Committee specifically provided that the applicants for a scheme shall "disclose by affidavit all material facts". (See: Section 391(2) of the Companies Act, 1956). In as much as the terms and conditions of gas supply, as specified in the MoU, were not specifically informed to all the shareholders and stakeholders, including in this case the GoI (as a party to the PSC), we simply fail to see how the MoU can be read into the Scheme itself. It doesn't matter whether one calls MoU the guiding light or a tool for interpretation or a foundation - the sheer fact that the terms of gas supply contained in the MoU were withheld from the shareholders implies that it cannot now be imported into the Scheme. The argument that contracts are entered into all the time, and are treated as day to day affairs for the management and the Board, fails at the point of division of a company. Where, in regular times a shareholder or a stakeholder can demand and obtain information and have time to try and monitor such contracts and the actions of the management, the act of hiving off an undertaking is a much more crucial point, when the shareholders have to be even more careful about the transfer of value. The whole purpose of Section 293 which prohibits the Board from hiving off an undertaking without shareholders approvals, is to prevent such transfers being effectuated on a permanent basis without the knowledge of the shareholders. The very essence of the requirement that all material facts be disclosed would have been decimated. Consequently, we hold that the Scheme as propounded by the Board, placed before and approved by shareholders and stakeholders and sanctioned by the court is completely different from the MoU. The MoU may have been the starting point. The end point is significantly, substantially and materially different from it and it cannot now be brought back in the guise of interpretation.   

Recalling winding-up

Simply because the winding up order is passed, the company cannot be restrained from approaching the court for the purpose of recalling or reviewing the winding up order.


Shreeji Concast v. Shreeji Oxygen, [2007]138CompCas717(Guj)



Monday, September 20, 2010

Partnerships have implied non-compete

Novartis v. Aventis Pharma
Arb Petn No. 763 of 2009
Bombay High court

arbitration, foreign award and letters patent

Clause 10 of LPA (Delhi)
Since order enforcing foreign award within meaning of Ss. 44,47 of Arbitration Act, 1996 does not in categories specified in Section 50 of the 1996 Act - Cl. 10 LPA is not maintainable.

AIR 2010 Del 135

Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by arbitration clause

Parties cannot confer jurisdiction on Court by agreement which it does not possess. Said clause would be void and hit by Section 28.

AIR 2010 Guj 843 (NOC)

(There is a Delhi HC decision also)

Friday, September 3, 2010

Creditors

Foreign creditors and Indian creditors stand at par. AIR1959Cal762

Scheme of Arrangement Voting

Votes with conditions atached not to be counted - 2002 111 Comp Cas 118 (Guj)

Friday, August 27, 2010

Cheque bounce not for signature mismatch

Mustafa Surka - vs State Of Gujarat 

http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1874147/

11. In the instant case, there is no dispute about the endorsement that "drawers signature differs from the specimen supplied" and/or "no image found-signature" and/or "incomplete signature / illegible" and for return/dishonour of cheque on the above endorsement will not attract ingredients of Section 138 of the Act and insufficient fund as a ground for doshonouring cheque cannot be extended so as to cover the endorsement "signature differed from the specimen supplied" or likewise. If the cheque is returned/bounced/dishonoured on the endorsement of "drawers signature differs from the specimen supplied" and/or "no image found-signature" and/or "incomplete signature / illegible", the complaint filed under Section 138 of the Act is not maintainable. Hence, a case is made out to exercise powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in favour of the petitioner.

Thursday, August 26, 2010

Error on the face of record

2009 14 SCC 663

2006 4 SCC 78

1997 8 SCC 715

Saturday, August 21, 2010

Section 62 - Damages - Sale of Goods - Freedom to contract - conditions

MANU/GJ/0642/2004 - Suraj Enterprises


MANU/MH/0300/2000 - MSEB v. Sterlite Industries (India) Ltd.
MANU/MH/0085/1958: AIR 1958 Bom 291.


MANU/KA/0020/1958 : AIR 1958 Kant 10 - KCN Gowda v. Molakram Tekchand 
distinction between conditions implied by law and conditions provided by contract

Indemnity v. Damages: distinction

AIR 1938 Rangoon 359
AIR 1928 Madras 43

Appointment of Provisional Liquidator - Factors to be considered

Darshan Anilkumar Patel v. Gitaneel Hotel Pvt Ltd, [1994] 81 Comp Cases 805

Parallel Remedies - Stay of proceedings

Jai Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1977 SC 898

a litigant cannot pursue two parallel remedies in respect of the same matter at the same time.


See also:


Awadh Bihari Yadav  v. State of Bihar, AIR 1996 SC 122
Arunima Baruah v. Union of India, (2007) 6 SCC 120
Manish Goel v. Rohini Goel, 2010 (3) BomCR 44

BMC 'person' required to take license

Manibhai Tulsibhai Patel v. MCGM, 1965 MhLJ 458: (1964) 66 BomLR 677

A person required to take a license, could be landlord or tenant.

Stamp Duty at Interim Stage is relevant

K.B. Jayram v. Navineethamma, AIR 2003 Kant 241 (para 4)


the court below would have been justified in first insisting upon the payment of the stamp duty and the penalty on the agreement to sell before it could issue an injunction in favour of the appellant on that basis. 




Also see 


Conwood Agencies v. Namdeo Pandurang, 2005(1)ALLMR335, (2005)107BOMLR319



[A] Civil Procedure Code, 1908 - Order 18, Rule 4 - Order 7, Rules 3, 4 -- Bombay Stamp Act, 1958 - Sections 33, 34, 37 -- Registration Act, 1908 - Sections 17, 18, 49 -- Admissibility of document in evidence - Admissibility objected to on the ground that it is insufficiently stamped - Court must at the outset determine the question of its admissibility before allowing the party to rely on such document even for collateral purpose.



Tuesday, August 17, 2010

Company court and civil court

CDS Financial Services v. BPL communications, 2004 121 comp cas 374

If the right is traceable to the general law of contracts or it is a common law right, it can be enforced through the civil court, even though the forum under the statute also will have jurisdiction to enforce that right.

Section 397/398 provide a convenient remedy for minority shareholders under certain conditions and the provisions therein are not intended to exclude all other remedies.




Tuesday, August 10, 2010

Arbitrability of landlord tenant dispute

Follows nataraj studio and central warehousing
2010 (4) Bom C. R. 394
Ravindra Vithalrao

Cheque bounce compounding procedure

2010 4 Bom C. R. 45 (SC)

Damodar prabhu v. Sayed babalal.

Monday, August 9, 2010

Scrutiny of scheme of arrangement

*(2008) 3 Comp LJ 345 (AP): [2007] 80 SCL 496 (AP)*
*
*
*Magnaquest Solutions (P) Ltd.*

while exercising powers under section 391(2), company court should examine whether proposed scheme of arrangement is violative of any provision of law and is not contrary to public policy, and for ascertaining real purpose underlying the scheme, the court if necessary can pierce veil of apparent corporate purpose underlying scheme and can judiciously x-ray same.


It should not be unfair / unconscionable or contrary to public policy.


Latest auditors report connotes the latest auditors report available or which should normally be available at the time of filing of the petition. --thats the one that should be filed.


Notice in scheme of arrangement

LG Electronics System India Ltd. 2003 42 SCL 554 (Delhi)

When under rule 75 a copy of the scheme is not provided, normally such a conduct by the transferor and transferee companies would immediately invite suspicion in the mind of the judge and may even lead to the rejection of the proposed scheme on this short ground.

Friday, July 30, 2010

Advocate Power of Attorney

2000 4 BomCR 740
1994 4 BomCR 538

In the same matter, an advocate cannot combine the roles of a counsel and power of attorney holder.

Power of Attorney Notarisation Process

Para 20.7 of 2009 MLJ 520

Tuesday, July 27, 2010

Proportionality

2001 2 SCC 386
2004 2 Scc 130
2004 2 scc 50
1987 4 scc 611
2002 104(1) bom LR 150

Monday, July 26, 2010

Thursday, July 22, 2010

Bank guarantee

Separate contract and necessity of bank to be made a party:
74 comp cas 192
1990 (1) CLT 200
(1996) 1 scc 735
AIR 1996 SC 2268

Wednesday, July 14, 2010

Limitation condonation

Maximum period prescribed under section 125 of the Electricity Act is 120 days from date of communication of order of tribunal. It cannot be extended by section 5 of the Limitation Act.
AIR 2010 SC 2061

courts cannot rewrite the contract


Vice-Chairman and Managing Director, APSIDC Ltd, v. R.Varaprasad reported in  2003 (11) SCC 572  "it is not for the courts to rewrite the terms of the contract, which were clear to the contracting parties" and in Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd. v. Jain Studios Ltd. reported in 2006 (2) SCC 628 on the issue of rewriting of contracts by the Courts as also interpretation of a severance clause in an agreement.

Fraud on Court, in pari delicto


Satpal Singh Arora v. Santdas Prabhudas Malkani, (1970) 73 BLR 777 (relevant page 789 of the judgement) which, inter alia, holds that if in a Suit it is established that both the parties intended to play fraud upon law to circumvent its provisions, the maxim in pari delicto, potior est condition defendatis, i.e. where both parties are equally at fault, the position of the Defendant is stronger, will apply.

 S. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath 1994 (1) SCC 1 (relevant paragraphs 5 & 6), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that if a Plaintiff's case is based on fraud he can be thrown out at any stage.

fresh leave and license



Alban Joseph Gonsalves v. Rallis India Ltd, 2004 (1) ALL MR 702 (Relevant paragraphs 4 & 9) which holds that entering into a fresh leave and license agreement, amounts to waiver and a deemed surrender of the prior agreement and the licensee cannot claim any right thereunder.

Friday, July 9, 2010

Limitation: Power to condone delay


1. AIR 1962 SC 1217 Board of Revenue, U. P. Allahabad versus Sardarni Vidyawati and Another wherein the Supreme Court has held that the Board of Revenue acts as a quasi judicial body under Section 56 (2) Indian Stamp Act.
2. 1985 3 Supreme Court Cases 590 Sakuru versus Tanaji wherein the Supreme 
Court has held that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 apply only to proceedings in 'courts' and not to appeals or applications before bodies other than courts such as qu asi judicial
tribunals or executive authorities.
3. 2003 8 Supreme Court Cases 431 Prakash H. Jani versus Marie Fernandes (Ms) wherein the Supreme Court has referred to Sakuru v. Tanaji .

Wednesday, June 30, 2010

Arbitration under terminated contract

Everest Holding Ltd v. Shyam Kumar Shrivastava, 2006 16 SCC 774.
If the agreement was valid, arbitration can proceed despite termination. (para 26)

Monday, June 28, 2010

Lease / License / Conducting Agreement / BMC Notice to Occupier



I.                   AGREEMENT WITH [ ] IS ONLY CONDUCTING AGREEMENT.

  1. Rasiklal Kumbha Gala v. Manilal Ravji, 2006 (1) Bom CR 425: Manu/MH/0650/2005

Indicative Facts

The petitioner here was aggrieved by the order of the Small Causes Court allowing Ejectment Application filed by the alleged Licensor against the alleged Licensee, who had in fact entered into a Conducting Agreement. The petitioner was the conductor, and the respondent was the owner.

The alleged licensee had sought protection under the Bombay Rent Act, 1947. The same was held to be not applicable in view of the specific exception excluding conducting agreements.

Key Observations/Ratio

“Whatever may be the reason for occupying the premises in question, but if it based on the foundation of conducting business, I am of the view that the occupant or such person is not entitled for protection as available under the Bombay Rent Act, either as a licensee or sub-tenant. The exclusion of the word ‘conducting agreement’ makes provisions amply clear.”

The long and exclusive possession is the basic foundation to claim the protection of lease or license. But if the possession of the premises has a foundation of the conducting business, it is difficult to accept that in each and every case, the intention was to create license or lease. The agreement as referred above, made the conditions very clear which were well within the knowledge of the parties. The parties, having once accepted these terms and conditions, cannot turn around to say later on that the intention was to create lease. (para. 7)

Knowing fully well, the effect and operation of the law, including the definition of ‘license’, still if a party agrees to enter into such agreement to conduct business, there remains further no doubt that the intention was always to carry on business on the basis of such conducting agreement and there was no intention to create lease or license. (para. 8)

  1. Paradigm Franchising Pvt Ltd v. Krishna Continental, Manu/DE/0762/2008

Indicative Facts: Arbitration dispute arising out of conducting agreement.

Key Observation/Ratio

Arbitration Dispute – conducting agreement. Section 9 considered  by the court, and not rejected as non-arbitrable.

(Note: No tenancy issue raised specifically)
  1. Jayant L. Shah v. Naranji Lalji Khona, 2006 (4) Bom CR 653

Indicative Facts:
Suit for declaration that the Defendant has no right, title or interest to carry on the business in the suit premises.

On facts (not enumerated at length), the court found that the agreement was actually leave and license, and not a mere conducting agreement.

Clause 7 of the agreement under consideration provided for “leave and license”

Key Observations/Ratio:
It is now settled law that in case of the leave and license agreement or conducting agreement what is required to be seen by the Court is the true and correct intention of the parties at the time of executing the said agreements.


Held on facts that the agreement was a leave and license agreement, distinct from conducting agreement.

  1. Frank Warr & Co. Ltd. v. London County Council, (1904) 1 KB 713


Indicative Facts
The Agreement provided:  “The landlord hereby grant and let, and the tenant hereby take for the term…. The free and exclusive right to sell refreshments at the [theatre] , with the necessary use of the refreshment rooms and bars and cloak rooms and wine cellars of the said theatre…

The theatre acquired by State and compensation payable only if there is “interest” in the theatre.  Held License

Similarities with [ ]’s Case
The tenant shall provide and maintain a proper and efficient staff…
The keys were given to the tenants who kept the cellars locked, and used them for the purpose of storing the wines and spirits which were to be sold…

Key Observations/Ratio
Instead of letting the refreshment rooms or the cellars, the agreement provides merely for the use of them by the plaintiffs so far as necessary for its purposes. (@page 719)


License for pleasure – personal.

License for profit – extends to servants, agents etc.

It cannot in law be the case, in my opinion, that if a man gave a license to persons to come on to his field to play cricket, and to other persons a license to come there for the purpose of supplying to  those engaged in the game with refreshments for profit, the one license would not confer an interest in the land but the other would. @ page 723

  1. Vidya Securities v.  Comfort Hotels, AIR 2003 DEL 214


Indicative Facts:
Arbitration petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act for interim injunction from parting with possession.

The question whether there is lease or a mere license came up because it would affect the procedure for dispossession.


Aspects considered
·         Before the conducting agreement was entered into, the restaurant was being run by the owner.
·         The keys of the premises were always with the respondent;
·         The staff earlier employed by the respondent continued to work in the restaurant although salaries were being paid by the petitioner;
·         The raw material for use in the restaurant was being supplied by the respondent,  and the petitioner could bring in raw material only with the approval of the respondent.
·         The electricity matters and air conditioner remained under the control of the respondent;
·         The licenses were in the name of the respondent;
·         Even the sales being made in the restaurant were not directly going to the pocket of the petitioner but were being credited to its account;
·         Clause (xiii) on page 8 of the agreement dated 26.11.2001 provided that in case of breach of any terms and conditions of the management agreement the respondent could cancel the agreement or impose any penalty upon the petitioner if within 10 days of the service of the notice remedial measures were not taken by the petitioner. Such a condition could never be a part of a lease agreement and could be only in a leave and license agreement.
·         The respondent always remained in physical possession of the premises in question and had full control not only over the premises but upon the staff and stuff also as catering was to not only the restaurant and the bar but to the respondent's rooms also in the Hotel.
The mere use of word “rent” in the agreement between the parties is meaningless and does not establish that a lease had been created in favour of the petitioner

Key Observations/Ratio/Finding:

On facts, held  the agreement was only to run the restaurant and not a lease agreement (para 8).

  1. Nariman Nassarwanji Dubash v. Clover Co-operative Housing Society Limited, 2004 MhLJ (4) 717

Indicative Facts:
Paying Guest as Licensee

Similarity with [ ]’s Case
(It appears that [ ] has overall control on the entire premises, and can restrict the entry of any person by virtue of its control on the main gates)

Key Observations/Findings/Ratio
Paying Guest is not tenant. Licensor was staying in rest of premises not let out to paying guest and what paying guest was paying was consideration as a paying guest. … Mere possession of a part of residence, may be in a distinct portion having independent access, kitchen and toilet by itself cannot result in sub-lease and appellants are not entitled to protection…(@ para 13/14)

  1. Md Salim v. Md. Ali, (1987) 4 SCC 270

Indicative Facts
An eviction decree was passed against the tenant. A person claimed to be sub-tenant and argued that he was not bound by the eviction decree as he was not a party in the eviction proceedings. If he were decided as a licensee, he would be bound by the eviction decree.


Similarities
The court considered the agreement, which provided, inter alia:

Recital – clearly setting out the inconvenience to look after and manage the [shop].

..manage the affairs of the said business under his personal supervision for two years with effect from [●] to [●] and will restore the business along with the said articles in good condition with the expiry of the terms of this contract;

The second party will be entitled to appropriate the entire issues and profits arising out of the business in its entirety subject to the aforesaid payment to be made to the first party and the costs of license fee.

The second party shall also bear all incidental costs for carrying out business properly

Key Observations/Findings/Ratio

There was no exclusive possession with the Respondent. There was no parting of possession of the premises, there was only a right to manage the business, looking after the existing business with fixed monthly payments and this cannot be construed as an agreement of sub-tenancy.

Held License.



  1. Anusuyabai Narayanrao Ghate v. Maktumbi S. Nadaf, 1999 (2) Bom CR 374

Indicative Facts: Eviction application filed against the Petitioner by the Respondent, after Respondent terminated the conducting agreement with petitioner for conducting tailoring business.


Key Observations/Ratio/Findings
This Court has interpreted the agreement and found that what was agreed between the parties is for conducting the business of tailoring. Therefore, possession of the room has become a consequential act.


  1. Isaac v. Hotel De Paris Ltd., [1980] 1 All ER 348

Indicative Facts:
[Complex facts / Not discussed here]

Short point: Depending upon whether the petitioner is a licensee or a tenant, different statutory protection was to apply.

Key Observations/Findings:

The intention of the parties is the paramount consideration and while fact of exclusive possession together with the payment of rent is of the first importance, the circumstances in which exclusive possession has been given and the character in which money paid as rent has been received are also matters to be considered. (@page 352E)

(Note: [ ]’s paid Rs. 3.5 crores as conducting fees for the first year, but in the second year alleged tenancy and offered to pay standard rent)



II.               assuming that the agreement with [ ]’s is not a conducting  agreement, it as best only a leave and license agreement and not result in a sub-lease with parting/transfer of possession.


1.     Rajbir Kaur v.  S. Chokesari, (1989) 1 SCC 19

Indicative Facts
Respondent had, in about the year 1973, unauthorisedly and without the consent of
the appellants, inducted two sub-tenants in two portions of the premises who, thereafter, carried on their respective businesses in their respective portions so sub-let.

The respondent argued that he did not sub-let the premises, and that the business run in the two portions (tailor shop and ice cream parlor) was ancillary and incidental to the business of the respondent.

Ice Cream parlor agreement:

1. That 1st party will provide Softy Ice Cream Machine along with one employee at their premises and the whole Softy Ice Cream will be supplied by the 1st part at his own risk and costs
2. Terminable at will, at which the first part will take away the machine from the premises.

Tailor Shop Agreement

First party will do tailoring work, and will keep the employees with prior consent of the second part.
Second part will lock the premises in the evening, and possession to remain with the second part.
Arrangement has been done as it beneficial to both parties.. and will boost the business of the second part…
Second part not liable to any damages.

Except for electricity no other rent is payable.

The Ice-Cream premises can be locked from outside independently.

Key Observations/Ratio/Finding

Thus exclusive possession itself is not decisive in favour of a lease and against a mere licence, for, even the grant of exclusive-possession might turn out to be only a licence and not a lease where the grantor himself has no power to grant the lease. (@para 22)

In the last analysis the question whether a transaction is a lease or a licence "turns on the operative intention of the parties" and that there is no single, simple litmus-test to distinguish one from the other. The "solution that would seem to have been found is, as one would expect, that it must depend on the intention of the parties"

To give exclusive possession, there need not be express words to that effect; it is sufficient if the nature of the acts done by the grantee show that he has and was intended to have the right of exclusive possession. The fact that the agreement contains a Clause that no tenancy is to be created will not, of itself, preclude the instrument from creating a lease. (@para. 32)

  1. Delta International Limited v. Shyam Sundar Ganeriwalla, (1999) 4 SCC 545
Followed by Jainabi Yusuf v. Jainabi Alimiya, AIR 2004 Bom 394

Indicative Facts:
M is original lessee. M entered into an ‘agreement’ with D  ( later amalgamated into Delta), executed a license in favour of ESSO, which inter alia provided that if D is able to obtain a lease of the said premises on terms which would not be inconsistent with ESSO’s standard form, then D will grant sub-lease to ESSO for at least a period of 10 years with three renewal options.  ESSO created a  sub-license in favour of Shyam Sundar, which he contended was a lease.

Key Observations/Ratio/Findings

Summary of law after reviewing various provisions of law (@para 16)
(1) To find out whether the document creates lease or license real test is to find out 'the intention of the parties'; keeping in mind that in cases where exclusive possession is given, the line between lease and licence is very thin.

(2) The intention of the parties is to be gathered from the document itself. Mainly, intention is to be gathered from the meaning and the words used in the document except where it is alleged and proved that document is a camouflage. If the terms of the document evidencing the agreement between the parties are not clear, the surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the parties have also to be borne in mind for ascertaining the real relationship between the parties.

(3) In the absence of a written document and when somebody is in exclusive possession with no special evidence how he got in, the intention is to be gathered from the other evidence which may be available on record, and in such cases exclusive possession of the property would be most relevant circumstance to arrive at the conclusion that the intention of the parties was to create a lease.
(4) If the dispute arises between the very parties to the written instrument, the intention is to be gathered from the document read as a whole. But in cases where the landlord alleges that the tenant has sublet the premises and where the tenant in support of his own defence sets up the plea of a mere licensee and relies upon a deed enter into inter se, between himself and the alleged licensee, the landlord who is not a party to the deed is not bound by what emanates from the construction of the deed; the tenant and the subtenant may jointly set up the plea of a license against the landlord which is a camouflage. In such cases, the mask is to be removed or veil is to be lifted and the true intention behind a facade of a self-serving conveniently drafted instrument is to be gathered from all the relevant circumstances. Same would be the position where the owner of the premises and the person in need of the premises executes a deed labelling it as a licence deed to avoid the operation of rent legislation.

(5) Prima facie, in absence of a sufficient title or interest to carve out or to create a similar tenancy by the sitting tenant, in favour of a third person, the person in possession, to whom the possession is handed over cannot claim that the sub-tenancy was created in his favour; because a person having no right cannot confer any title of tenancy or sub-tenancy. A tenant protected under statutory provisions with regard to occupation of the premises having no right to sublet or transfer the premises, cannot confer any better title. But, this question is not required to be finally determined in this matter.

(6) Further lease or licence is a matter of contract between the parties. Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act inter alia provides that leases of immoveable property may be made either by registered instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession; if it is a registered instrument, it shall be executed by both the lessee and the lessor. This contract between the parties is to be interpreted or construed on the well laid principles for construction of contractual terms, viz. for the purpose of construction of contracts, the intention of the parties is the meaning of the words they have used and there can be no intention independent of that meaning; when the terms of the contract are vague or having double intendment one which is lawful should be preferred; and the construction may be put on the instrument perfectly consistent with his doing only what he had a right to do.


  1. Prakash Warehousing v. Muncipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, (1991) 2 SCC 304

Indicative Facts
MCGM terminated lease agreement on the ground of creation of alleged sub-tenancy. Subsequent to enquiry under Section 105B of MMC Act, an eviction order was passed.

Key Observations/Findings/Ratio
Held that MCGM was aware of the sub-letting, and is therefore estopped from terminating the lease agreement on that ground.

(Precise nature of transaction was not relevant  in the facts of the case)]


  1. Corporation of Calicut v. K. Sreenivasan, (2002) 5 SCC 361

Indicative Facts
Licensee of the Corporation was sought to be evicted as being “unauthorized occupant”. Depending on whether the licensee was covered under “any other mode of transfer” would change the nature of proceeding for eviction.

Refers to (inter alia)
Associated Hotels Case

Qudrat Ullah v. Municipal Board, Bareilly, (1980) 4 SCC 435: If an interest in immovable  property, entitling the transferors to enjoyment is created, it is a lease; if the permission to use land without right to exclusive possession is alone granted a license is the legal result.

Key Observations/Findings/Ratio
It is true that the licensee does not acquire any interest in the property by virtue of grant of license in his favour in relation to any immovable property, but once the authority to occupy and use the same is granted in his favour by way of license, he continues to exercise that right so long the authority has not expired or has not been determined for any reason whatsoever, meaning thereby so long the period of license has not expired or the same has not been determined on the grounds permissible under the contract or law.

Occupation of licensee is permissive by virtue of the grant of license in his favour, though he does not acquire any right in the property and the property remains in possession and control of the grantor, but by virtue of such a grant, he acquires a right to remain in occupation either in accordance with law or otherwise. (@ para. 16)

  1. ICICI v. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 5 SCC 708

Indicative Facts:
Under Bombay Stamp Act, Article 36- an agreement of lease is chargeable to duty only when there is an immediate and present demise –

The agreement in the present case was an agreement to lease in future while granting license rights only for first three years.

Key Observations/Findings/Ratio:
Held not chargeable to duty.

If a document gives only a right to use the property in a particular way or under certain terms, while it remains in possession and control of the owner thereof, it will be a licence. In the present case the licensee has been put in possession only for the purpose of constructing a building or buildings. Under this document, no interest in the land is conveyed in favour of the appellants. The agreement does not create a lease nor does it demise any interest in land in favour of the appellants. (@ para 8)

Although it has been contended by the respondent that there is a demise of interest in the land under the said under the said agreement….. Clause 2 expressly sets out that this agreement is not to be construed as demise in law of the said land so as to give to the licensee any legal interest in the land. (@ para. 9)

  1. Associated Hotels of India v. RN Kapoor, (1960) 1 SCR 368

Indicative Facts:
RN Kapoor was a proprietor of a business carried under the name of Madam Janes (hair dresser business). Under an agreement with the hotel he came to occupy certain spaces in the Ladies’ and Gents’ cloak room @ Rs. 700 per month.  Later made an application under applicable Rent Control Act for determination of standard rent. Hotel contested this.

The term of the document was, in the first instance, for one year, but it might be renewed.
The amount payable for the use and occupation was fixed in a sum of Rs. 9,600 per annum, payable in four instalments.

The respondent was to keep the premises in good condition. He should pay for power and electricity.

 He should not make alterations in the premises without the consent of the appellants.  If he did not pay the prescribed amount in the manner agreed to, he could be evicted therefrom without notice, and he would also be liable to pay compensation with interest.
He could transfer his interest in the document with the consent of the appellants.  The respondent agreed to pay the amount prescribed whether he carried on the business in the premises or not.

Shortly stated, under the document the respondent was given possession of the two rooms for carrying on his private business on condition that he should pay the fixed amount to the appellants irrespective of the fact whether he carried on his business in the premises or not.

Key Observations/Finding/Ratio:
Subba Rao, J. (@para 28)

1) To ascertain whether a document creates a licence or lease, the substance of the document must be preferred to the form;

 (2) the real test is the intention of the parties - whether they intended to create a lease or a licence;

(3) if the document creates an interest in the property, it is a lease; but, if it only permits another to make use of the property, of which the legal possession continues with the owner, it is a licence; and

(4) if under the document a party gets exclusive possession of the property, prima facie, he is considered to be a tenant; but circumstances may be established which negative the intention to create a lease.

[License confer] only a bare personal privilege on the respondent to make use of the rooms.

[License must not] put  him in exclusive possession of them, untrammeled by the control and free from the directions of the appellants

The covenants are those that are usually found or expected to be included in a lease deed.

The right of the respondent to transfer his interest under the document, although with the consent of the appellants, is destructive of any theory of license.

The solitary circumstance that the rooms let out in the present case are situated in a building wherein a hotel is run cannot make any difference in the character of the holding.


  1. Dipak Banerjee v. Smt. Lilabati Chakroborty (1987) 4 SCC 161

Indicative Facts:
There, the question was whether the tenant had sub-let two rooms in the premises to a tailor who is stated to have established therein a tailoring business. The tenant denying the subletting contended that the tailor was allowed to occupy a part of the premises "due to pity and charity" and that he was "sewing in the house without any rent". It would appear that the tenant also did some service for the landlord and the members of his family. The alleged sub-tenant not having entered the box, the plea of sub-letting had come to be accepted. In the appeal before this Court it was held that there was neither pleading nor evidence nor a specific-finding on the question of exclusive possession of the alleged sub-tenant and that, therefore, one of the essential ingredients of a sub-lease was a lacking. It was further held that providing of services could not also be construed as consideration for purposes of the Rent Acts and that therefore, the second ingredient was also absent.


Key Observations / Findings / Ratio:
In order to prove tenancy or sub-tenancy two ingredients had to be established, firstly the tenant must have exclusive right of possession or interest in the premises or part of the premises in question and secondly that right must be in lieu of payment of some compensation or rent.

  1. K. Achyuta Bhat v. Veeramaneni Manga Devi, (1989) 1 SCC 9

Veera had leased a premises to Achyuta to run a hotel, who then allowed X to run the business of a hotel. Being suspicious of the transaction, Veera terminated the lease with Achyuta and proceeded for eviction.

As regards the agreement between Achyuta and X, the court find its true nature to be of sub-lease based on inter alia  the following observations.

The second party to pay all taxes, fees, rates and other statutory outgoings in respect of the business;

If loss is caused to the first party by non-payment, the latter was entitled to recover all such charges from the second party..

The second party was responsible for not only payment of all expenses and charges relating to the running of the business but also for carrying out “repairs to business premises, painting, color, wash, etc. and the like”.

The second party shall on the expiry of the agreement peacefully and quietly surrender and hand over possession of the said premises to the first party ….”

The second party will be solely responsible for any consequences arising out of non-compliance with the orders passed by the competent authorities…

There is a specified provision in Clause 16 that in the event of the landlord enhancing rent there is a liability to pay enhanced rent.

Key Observation/Ratio/Findings
Held lease.. ([ ] will need to steer clear of this decision)


  1. Puran Singh v. Sundari Bhagwandas Kriplani, (1991) 2 SCC 180

Indicative Facts:
Broadly, whether Appellant is a lessee or a licensee – depending upon that protection under Section 15A(1) of the Bombay Rent Act would or would not be applicable

Key Observations/Findings/Ratio:
The intention of the parties in making the agreement is determinative of the question whether it was a lease or license. The test of exclusive possession though significant is not decisive. While interpreting the agreement court has also to see what transpired before and after the agreement. (@para 12)

Primarily the court is concerned to see whether the parties to the agreement intend to create an arrangement personal in its nature or not, so that the assignability of the grantee's interest, the nature of the land and the grantor's capacity to grant a lease will all be relevant considerations in assessing what is the nature of the interest created by the transaction. In the absence of any formal document the parties' intention must be inferred from the circumstances and the parties' conduct.

  1. Prakash Sao v. BSRTC, AIR 1981 Pat 142

Indicative Facts:
Suit for declaration that Prakash Sao was a tenant, and could not be evicted as such.  Sao ran a refreshment stall for Bihar State RTC.

Similarities
Agreement called “Deed of license for running refreshment rooms
To supply meals and refreshments of the passengers of the respondent.

To maintain and keep necessary equipments, cupboards, drawers and show cases with prior approval of RSRTC.

The licensee had agreed to dismiss any employees if such employee was considered to be undesirable by the licensor;

Licensor had the right to examine the condition of refreshment room by entering at any reasonable time.

Licensee could not effect any change / alteration in the refreshment room premises without prior consent of the licensor;

Clause that no rights / interests are created;

Key Observations/Findings/Ratio:
Held licensee



  1. Kuber Nathu Kandu v. Gorakh Prasad, AIR 1957 All 369

Indicative Facts:
Suit filed by subsequent transferee for possession of land by removing constructions made by Defendants.

Key Observations/Ratio/Findings
The difference between the two legal concepts (lease and license) is that while in the case of a lease an interest in the property is transferred in a license a right to do something is granted which right expressly does not amount to an interest in the property.

If a fee is charged periodically it may have much similarity to what may be called ‘rent’ in the case of a lease. But the fact that a license is granted for a period or that a fee is charged for the grant of a license would not remove the essential difference between a lease and a license which lies in the fact that that in the case of a license no interest in the property as such is transferred to the licensee.

If possession of the premises is clearly defined and is transferred as such and the restrictions on the use are mere impositions, the transaction would be a lease. Exclusive possession over immovable property does indicate apparently that the person in possession has some interest in the property but if the possession is conveyed through an express agreement or grant the exact legal position can be ascertained without placing too much emphasis on the fact of possession alone. Possession is not inconsistent with a license.

  1. Panjabrao Harbaji v. Gajanan Balaji, AIR 1980 Bom 396

Indicative Facts: Suit for possession by owner of land on the premise that the possessor was a mere licensee.

Key Observations/Ratio/Findings:
It is for the person is possession to prove that he had a valid tenancy in his favour, and since the fact of tenancy was neither pleaded nor proved before the trial judge, it could not be said that the person was a lessee, rather than a licensee.

  1. Chandu Lal v. Delhi Municipality, AIR 1978 Del 174

Indicative Facts: Suit for dispossession of defendant in occupation of land.

Key Observations/ Findings/Ratio:
Exclusive possession does not militate against the concept of a license, if the circumstances negative any intention to create tenancy.

The Petitioner’s possession of the premises on the facts and circumstances of the case cannot be held to be conclusive evidence of their being a lessee as the grant was not coupled with an interest in the property.

  1. M/s Quality Cut Pieces v. M/s M. Laxmi , AIR 1986 Bom 359

Indicative Facts:
X set up a departmental store in a lease space and gave spaces to various persons to set up stall.

Question came up whether such persons were licensee or sub-lessees?

Huge investments in furnishing the premises – indicative of lease, but in view of intention of parties, lack of demur etc – held license.

Key Observations/Findings/Ratio:

Stalls in departmental stores – Status – The surrounding circumstances like want of facility to independently lock the stalls, the inability of the stalls, the inability of the stall-holders to enter into the building or the stores at will, the requirement of having to seek permission of the management to change the hours of business or effect a change of merchandise, non-assignability of interest in the stalls, repeated recognition of the agreements to pay a fixed percentage of commission subject to a minimum, the correspondence of the stall holders with fiscal authorities reiterating the commission agreements, the deployment of staff like watchmen; accountants statisticians by the management to monitor the sales, want of statements by the stall-holders asserting rights of tenancy, submission of sales statements by the stall-holders to the management and payment of commission on the turnover higher than the minimum by one the stall holder are relevant factors and unequivocally establish that the stall-holders are merely licensees for reward.[1]

Where two stalls in a departmental store faced the road, the stall-holders were given separate entrance and also given exclusive possession, the fact of exclusive possession coupled with the fact that there were other persons who were recognized to be recognized in the building was pointer to the fact that the stall holder were not mere licensee.[2]


  1. Vithal Sahkari Sakhar v. Assistant Provident, 2008 Vol. 110 (1) Bom. L. T. 0120 : MANU/MH/1048/2007

Indicative Facts:
In terms of Section 17B of the Employee Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, upon transfer of establishment by sale, gift, lease or license or in any other manner whatsoever, the transferor and the transferee are jointly and severally liable to pay the contributions.

In the case, it was alleged by the EPF Department that the conducting agreement for running the sugar mill amounted to ‘transfer’ and thus, the conductor was liable to have its assets attached.

Key Observations/Findings/Ratio:

Held by a conducting agreement no transfer takes place.

“What is effected is an agreement for conducting business to manufacture sugar by crushing sugar cane… The intention of the parties in execution of the said agreement is not transfer of the property or assets …” (para. 11)

III. Action of State, even as a landlord is subject to Article 14, and therefore subject to doctrine of proportionality


  1. Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd v. U.T., Chandigarh (2004) 2 SCC 130
                                                                                                
Indicative Facts:
-

Key Observations/Ratio/Finding:
Doctrine of proportionality applied to town planning authority – requirement to take less drastic steps prior to resorting to extreme steps.


  1. Rakesh Kumar v. Financial Commissioner, Revenue, Punjab, (2009) 3 PLR 790: Manu/PH/1145/2008

Indicative Facts
Property bought in an auction on certain terms and conditions, that included restriction on land use.

Subsequently, the by making certain construction pertaining to another purpose, the land use was changed. Property. Show Cause Notice issued threatening resumption,  and property was resumed.

Drastic step of resumption compared to removal of structures/demolition considered.

Key Observations/Ratio/Finding:
Held, bound by doctrine of proportionality and preference ought to be given to less drastic step.

See Dwarkadas Marfatia v. Board of Trustee of the Port of Bombay, (1989) 3 SCC 293 -  state even as a landlord under a contract cannot behave like a private landlord, and must be subject to considerations under Article 14.



IV. Jurisdiction of Small Causes Court in Conducting Agreement / Alleged Tenancy / BMC as Landlord

  1. Anusuyabai Narayanrao Ghate v. Maktumi S. Nadaf, 1999 (2) Bom CR 374

Indicative Facts:
Eviction proceedings for eviction of a person occupying a shop under a conducting agreement. Whether the court of small causes has jurisdiction in respect of dispute arising out conducting agreement?

Key Observation/Ratio/Findings:
Section 41 of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act, 1882 does not contemplate disputes under conducting agreement

  1. Central Warehousing Corporation v. Fortpoint Automotive Pvt Ltd., 2010 (1) Bom CR 560 (FB).

Indicative Facts:
Arbitrability of disputes between landlord / tenant and licensor/licensee.

Key Observations/Finding/Ratio:
Held, disputes between landlord-tenant and licensor-licensee are not arbitrable, and have to be decided by the Court of Small Causes, in terms of Section 41 of the Presidency Small Causes Act, 1882.

See also: Natraj Studio vs. Navrang Studio (1981) 1 SCC 523.

  1. Mansukhlal Dhanraj Jain, (1995) 2 SCC 665

Facts:
Distinction in the scope of Sections 41(1) and 41(2) of the Presidency Small Causes Act, 1882.

Key Observations/ Ratio/ Finding:
 “However, on the clear language of Section, in our view, it cannot be said that these suits are not relating to the possession of the immovable property. It is pertinent to note that Section 41(1) does not employ the words “suits and proceedings for recovery of possession of immovable property. There is a good deal of difference between the words “relating to the recovery of possession” on the one hand and the terminology “for recovery of possession of any immovable property”. The words “relating to” are of wide import and can take in their sweep any suit in which grievance is made that the defendant is threatening to illegally recover the possession from plaintiff-licensee. Suits for protecting such possession of immovable property against the alleged illegal attempts on the part of the defendants to forcibly recover possession from the plaintiff, can clearly get covered by the wide sweep of the words “relating to recovery of possession” as employed by Section 41(1).”

V. REQUIREMENT OF NOTICE TO OCCUPIERS UNDER SECTION 105B(1)

  1. MCGM v. NA Qureshi, 1986 (2) Bom CR 315;

  1. Khiyashi Kachara Gosar v. BEST, 1999 (1) Bom CR 693.

  1. Ajit v. BEST, AIR 1985 Bom 362.

Issue: Requirement of notice to ‘occupier’ under Section 105B(2) of the MMC Act, 1888.

Finding: Notice to occupiers to be given only when they occupy the premises ‘in their own right’.




[1] Quality  Cut Pieces v. M. Laxmi & Co. AIR 1986 Bom 359 (366,367).
[2] Quality  Cut Pieces v. M. Laxmi & Co. AIR 1986 Bom 359 (367)