Issue of Maintainablity to be decided first

AIR 1958 SC 687 In Re: K. Kamraja Nadar Vs. Kunju Thevar and others; (2002) 10 SCC 101; In Re: Arun Agarwal Vs. Nagarika Export (P) Ltd. and another; (2004) 13 SCC 575 In Re: Ceylon Biscuits Ltd. Vs. Bakemens Industries (P) Ltd. and others; (2006) 11 SCC 696 In Re: Union of India and Others Vs. Ranbir Singh Rathaur and others.

 

Administrative Order cannot ordinarily impose penalty

Karnataka Rare Earth & Anr v. Senior Geologist (2004) 2 SCC 783

Option of Appeal is not a bar to Section 482 proceedings

Warehousing Corpn. v. Shree Durga Ji Traders, (2011) 14 SCC 615 at page 620

12. We are convinced that in the instant case, rejection of the appellant's petition under Section 482 of the Code has resulted in miscarriage of justice. Availability of an alternative remedy of filing an appeal is not an absolute bar in entertaining a petition under Section 482 of the Code. As aforesaid, one of the circumstances envisaged in the said section, for exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court is to secure the ends of justice. Undoubtedly, the trial court had dismissed the complaint on a technical ground and therefore, interests of justice required the High Court to exercise its jurisdiction to set aside such an order so that the trial court could proceed with the trial on merits.

 

No anticipatory bail to proclaimed offender

State of M.P. v. Pradeep Sharma, (2014) 2 SCC 171

Article 226 can be resorted in apt cases when Section 438 is not available (UP)

Hema Mishra v. State of U.P., (2014) 4 SCC 453 : (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 363 : 2014 SCC OnLine SC 40 at page 472

36. Thus, such a power has to be exercised very cautiously keeping in view, at the same time, that the provisions of Article 226 are a device to advance justice and not to frustrate it. The powers are, therefore, to be exercised to prevent miscarriage of justice and to prevent abuse of process of law by the authorities indiscriminately making pre-arrest of the accused persons. In entertaining such a petition under Article 226, the High Court is supposed to balance the two interests. On the one hand, the Court is to ensure that such a power under Article 226 is not to be exercised liberally so as to convert it into Section 438 CrPC proceedings, keeping in mind that when this provision is specifically omitted in the State of Uttar Pradesh, it cannot be resorted to as back door entry via Article 226. On the other hand, wherever the High Court finds that in a given case if the protection against pre-arrest is not given, it would amount to gross miscarriage of justice and no case, at all, is made for arrest pending trial, the High Court would be free to grant the relief in the nature of anticipatory bail in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is again clarified that this power has to be exercised sparingly in those cases where it is absolutely warranted and justified

 

Infringement of Patent: Action lies anywhere where infringement takes place

Hindustan Lever v. Lalit Wadhwa, ILR (2008) 1 Del 408.

 

(C) Patents Act — Territorial Jurisdiction — Patents have effect throughout India — Suit can be filed wherever the patentee wants to prevent third parties from offering from sale/selling products which infringe the patent any where in India.

Under Section 24 of the Patents Act, every patent shall have effect throughout India. Under Section 48 of the Patents Act, the patentee of a product has the exclusive right to prevent other parties, who do not have its consent, from making, using, offering for sale, selling or importing for those purposes, the product in India which is the subject matter of patent. Consequently, the patentee is entitled to prevent other parties from offering for sale or selling the products which infringe the patent in any part of India wherever they may be sold. Admittedly, the Defendants are selling their products in Delhi. The infringement of the Plaintiffs rights under Section 48 of the Patents Act has therefore, taken place in Delhi, assuming that the plaintiff has a valid patent and that the defendants product infringes the same.

 

A.P.D. Jain Pathshala v. Shivaji Bhagwat More, (2011) 13 SCC 99 at page 110

29. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the courts shall, subject to the provisions of the Code, have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. The express or implied bar necessarily refers to a bar created by the Code itself or by any statute made by a legislature. Therefore, the High Court in exercise of the power of judicial review, cannot issue a direction that the civil courts shall not entertain any suit or application in regard to a particular type of disputes (in this case, disputes relating to Shikshan Sevaks) nor create exclusive jurisdiction in a quasi-judicial forum like the Grievance Committee will be entitled to deal with them. The High Court, cannot, by a judicial order, nullify, supersede or render ineffectual the express provisions of an enactment.

 

High Court Cannot Direct Governments to Create Tribunal or Claims Commission by executive order

A.P.D. Jain Pathshala v. Shivaji Bhagwat More, (2011) 13 SCC 99 at page 110

 

28. Neither the Constitution nor any statute empowers a High Court to create or constitute quasi-judicial tribunals for adjudicating disputes. It has no legislative powers. Nor can it direct the executive branch of the State Government to create or constitute quasi-judicial tribunals, otherwise than by legislative statutes. Therefore, it is not permissible for the High Court to direct the State Government to constitute judicial authorities or tribunals by executive orders, nor permissible for the State by executive order or resolution to create them for adjudication of rights of parties.

Interim relief to be in aid of final relief

In State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta [AIR 1952 SC 12 : 1952 SCR 28 : 1951 SCJ 764] a Constitution Bench of this Court clearly spelt out the contours within which interim relief can be granted.

Suppression should be that of "material fact"

Arunima Baruah v. Union of India, (2007) 6 SCC 120 at page 125

12. It is trite law that so as to enable the court to refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction suppression must be of material fact. What would be a material fact, suppression whereof would disentitle the appellant to obtain a discretionary relief, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Material fact would mean material for the purpose of determination of the lis, the logical corollary whereof would be that whether the same was material for grant or denial of the relief. If the fact suppressed is not material for determination of the lis between the parties, the court may not refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. It is also trite that a person invoking the discretionary jurisdiction of the court cannot be allowed to approach it with a pair of dirty hands. But even if the said dirt is removed and the hands become clean, whether the relief would still be denied is the question.

 

Floodgates Arguments

N. Kannadasan v. Ajoy Khose, (2009) 7 SCC 1 at page 55

127. Mr Venugopal would submit that such an interpretation would open a floodgate. We do not think so. We even wish no occasion like the present one arises in future before the superior courts for their consideration. Even otherwise, the floodgate argument does not appeal to us. In Coal India Ltd. v.Saroj Kumar Mishra [(2007) 9 SCC 625] this Court held: (SCC p. 632, para 19)

“19. The floodgate argument also does not appeal to us. The same appears to be an argument of desperation. Only because there is a possibility of floodgate litigation, a valuable right of a citizen cannot be permitted to be taken away. This Court is bound to determine the respective rights of the parties. (See Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India[(2005) 4 SCC 649] and Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee v.C.K. Rajan [(2003) 7 SCC 546] .)”

 

Settlement of Insurance Claims on Non Standard Basis

in the case of Amalendu Sahoo vs. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., (2010) 4 SCC 536, has held that in case of any variation from the policy document/any breach of the policy document, the Insurance company cannot repudiate the claim in toto and the claim of the complainant ought to be settled on non-standard basis.

Appeal from dismissal on default

If an application under order 9 rule 13 of CPC for setting aside an exparte decree is dismissed, the aggrieved party can file an appeal against the decree itself on the ground that the material brought on record by the plaintiff was insufficient or the suit was not maintainable (2005) 3 SCC 427

Recall of Ex Parte Order by Labour Court

Hindustan Tobacco Company v. First Labour Court, West Bengal , 1995 1 CHN 398 (Calcutta High Court)

 

An ex parte order passed by the Labour can be recalled by it under inherent powers to adopt its own procedure

 

But power of review is to be expressly conferred (2005) 13 SCC 777.

How should courts consider judgments

In Haryana Financial Corporation v. Jagdamba Oil Mills [ 2002 (46) ALR 717 (SC).] , the Hon'ble Apex Court held that Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits-in with the fact situation of the decision relied upon

Value of CAG Reports

Arun Kumar Agrawal v. Union of India, (2013) 7 SCC 1 at page 24

68. We may, however, point out that since the report is from a constitutional functionary, it commands respect and cannot be brushed aside as such, but it is equally important to examine the comments what respective Ministries have to offer on the CAG's Report. The Ministry can always point out, if there is any mistake in the CAG's report or the CAG has inappropriately appreciated the various issues. For instance, we cannot as such accept the CAG report in the instance case.

 

Judgment becomes binding immediately, no communication from Government is required

AIR 1995 All 152, Para 7  Dr Rohit Gupta v. SN Medical College

 

Difference between locus and right of impleadment

U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Gyan Devi, (1995) 2 SCC 326 at page 358

37…. Between the locus and right of impleadment there is a world of difference. The two cannot be equated. A person having locus may not be denied appearance but a person who is necessary party cannot be denied impleadment. The former is permissive, the latter is mandatory. A local body may have locus to appear for the limited purpose but once it opts to keep out it cannot claim to be necessary party whose non-impleadment renders the proceedings invalid.

 

Complexity of a decision-making process cannot be a defence when a grievance is made before the Court by a citizen that his fundamental right to equality has been violated

C.M. Thri Vikrama Varma v. Avinash Mohanty, (2011) 7 SCC 385 at page 396

26. In our view, complexity of a decision-making process cannot be a defence when a grievance is made before the Court by a citizen that his fundamental right to equality has been violated. When such a grievance is made before the Court, the authorities have to justify their impugned decision by placing the relevant material before the Court.

 

Enquiry Officer can offer his views but cannot make strong recommendation for imposition of a particular Punishment.

State of Uttarnchal & Ors. Vs. Kharak Singh

(2008) 8 SCC 236

Paras- 18-19

Disciplinary authority is bound to record reasons for disagreeing with findings of Enquiry Officer and to supply a copy thereof to delinquent, non furnishing recorded reasons from enquiry report prejudice delinquent and hence consequent order of punishment is vitiated.

S.P. Malhotra Vs. Punjab National Bank & Ors.

(2013) 7 SCC 251

Para- 7 & 13 to 20

Any material which goes into decision making process cannot be denied to employee

‎Oriental Bank of Commerce v. S.S. Sheokand and Anr, 

2014 5 SCC 172

New fact/ New plea cannot be taken in respect of any factual controversy

1. National Textile Corporation Ltd. Vs Nareshkumar Badrikumar Jagad & Ors.

(2011) 12 SCC 695

Para-19

2. Sanghvi Reconditioners Pvt Ltd. Vs. Union of India 

(2010) 3 SCC 733

Para-31 & 32

3. Greater Mohali Area Development Authority & Ors. Vs. Manju Jain & Ors. 

(2010) 9 SCC 157

Para-26 & 27

Creation of forum and transfer of pending matters

Creation of a different or a new appellate forum by itself is not sufficient to accept the argument/contention of an implied transfer. Something more substantial or affirmative is required which is not perceptible from 2003 Act.

 

A right of appeal as well as forum is a vested right unless the said right is taken away by the legislature by an express provision in the statute by necessary intention.

 

(2014) 5 SCC 219

Interim order passed by SC not to be handed out by HC

Jamal Ahmad v. State of UP, 2003 6 AWC5294All

"Here in the instant case, only the interim order has been passed in SLP. We do not know the grounds taken by the Petitioners in that SLP. This Court has no authority to expand or restrict the operation of the interim order passed by the Apex Court."

Proxy Counsel rightly not allowed by NCDRC

Lawyers cannot appearance unless authorized  by AOR or the litigant

Surendra Mohan Arora v. HDFC Ltd & Ors, 

dated April 25, 2014 in CIVIL APPEAL NO.4891 OF2014

Passing an order different from what is pronounced in open court

Kushalbhai Ratanbhai Rohit & Ors. Vs. The State of Gujarat, 

Section 362 Cr.P.C. puts an embargo to call, recall or review any judgment or order passed in criminal case once it has been pronounced and signed. Unless it is pronounced AND signed, the said provision will not trigger.

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.453 of 2014 dt. May 6, 2014

Order 2 Rule 2 : How to Apply

12. The Courts in order to determine whether a suit is barred by Order 2 Rule 2 must examine the cause of action pleaded by the plaintiff in his plaints filed in the relevant suits (See: S. Nazeer Ahmed v. State Bank of Mysore & Ors., (2007) 11 SCC 75). Considering the technicality of the plea of Order 2 Rule 2, both the plaints must be read as a whole to identify the cause of action, which is necessary to establish a claim or necessary for the plaintiff to prove if traversed. Therefore, after identifying the cause of action if it is found that the cause of action pleaded in both the suits is identical and the relief claimed in the subsequent suit could have been pleaded in the earlier suit, then the subsequent suit is barred by Order 2 Rule 2.

Coffee Board Vs. M/s. Ramesh Exports Pvt. Ltd., Judgment dated  May 9, 2014 in CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5527 OF 2014 

Court has no power to condone delay in filing an application challenging arbitration award

M/s Engineer Builder & Associated v. Union of India, (2014) 2 SCALE 278

Benefit of judgment in service law extended also to non-appealing party

Karri Ram Babu v. Chairman, State Level Police Recruitment Board, Hyderabad, (2014) 6 SCALE 24

Judgment dated July 11, 2013 in C.A. No. 11387/2013

 

One of the persons affected has not travelled to this Hon'ble Court. If the same is owing to financial constraint, justice shall not be denied to him on that count. For doing complete justice in this cause, we make it clear that the benefit of this judgment shall be available to the third petitioner also, in case he is interested.

Government allowed to change its policy

MP Mathur & Ors v. OIC & Ors, 2006 (13) SCC 706

 

Once the public interest is accepted as the superior equity which can override individual equity, the principle would be applicable. If there is a supervening public equity, the Government would be allowed to change its stand and has the power to withdraw from representation made by it which induced persons to take certain steps which may have gone adverse to the interest of such persons on account of such withdrawal. Merely because the resolution was announced for a particular period it did not mean that the Government could not amend and change the policy under any circumstances.

 

See also : Rishi Kiran Logistics decided in April, 2014  (by Sikri J)

 

Scope of Letter of Intent

A letter of intent merely indicates a parties intention to enter into a contract with the other party in future. AIR 2006 Supreme Court 871 (Dresser Rand)

 

Also see: Rishi Kiran Logistics P Ltd v. Board of Trustees of Kandla Port Trust, Judgment dated April 21, 2014 in Civil Appeal No. 4655 of 2014 [ 2014 (6) SCALE 4]

Permission to file SLP

Jasbir Singh v. Vipin Kumar Jaggi, (2001) 8 SCC 289 at page 298

Appeal has been preferred from an order passed in proceedings to which the appellant was not a party and the appellant has not challenged the order by which his application for intervention was rejected. The Supreme Court still granted permission to file SLP.

 

Permission to file SLP: When to be granted | Standing

Ram Nandan Singh v. AG Office Employees Coop. House Construction Society Ltd., (2007) 14 SCC 102

 

13. The appellants are members of the Society. They have been pursuing their cause before the High Court. They were impleaded as parties in the letters patent appeal. Not only in the capacity of interveners but also as persons aggrieved, they are, therefore, entitled to file petition for grant of special leave. The preliminary objection in regard to maintainability of the appeal raised by Ms Bagchi is rejected

Same matter pending in SC, HC not to exercise jurisdiction

Chhavi Mehrotra v. Director General, Health Services, 1995 Supp (3) SCC 434:

"It is a clear case where the High Court ought not to have exercised jurisdiction under Article 226 where the matter was clearly seized of by this Court in a petition under Article 32. The petitioner was eo nomine a party to the proceedings before this Court. It is an unhappy situation that the learned Judge of the High Court permitted himself to issue certain directions which, if implemented, would detract from the plenitude of the orders of this Court. The learned Single Judge's perception of justice of the matter might have been different and the abstinence that the observance of judicial propriety, counsels might be unsatisfactory; but judicial discipline would require that in a hierarchical system it is imperative that such conflicting exercise of jurisdiction should strictly be avoided. We restrain ourselves from saying anything more."

When the same dispute is subject matter before the Supreme Court, the High Court cannot entertain writ petition in respect of the same

Union of India v. Jaiswal Coal Co. Ltd., (1999) 5 SCC 733 

Intervention

Ram Nandan Singh v. AG Office Employees Coop. House Construction Society Ltd., (2007) 14 SCC 102 at page 107

12. In Ravi Rao Gaikwad case [(2006) 5 SCC 62] , this Court observed that the purpose of grant of application for intervention is to entitle the interveners to address arguments in support of one or the other side.

 

Solicitor can be restrained from using information gained from one client for being used against him

Rakusen v Ellis, Munday & Clarke,  [1912] 1 Ch. 831 (Court of Appeal)

 

 

Necessity of framing Points of Determination in First Appeal as per Order 41 Rule 31

A.M. Sangappa @ Sangappa v. Sangodeppa, 2013 (14) SCALE 384

See also (2010) 13 SCC 530

Sent from BlackBerry® on Airtel

Adjudication to be confined to the objectors alone

(1993) 4 SCC 255

 

Supreme Court held that High Court erred in quashing the whole Section 6 notification rather than confining such quashing to only the objectors who had approached the court. Matter remanded back to the High Court for individualised justice.

Law as on the date of application to be applicable

Rules which are prevalent as on the date when the application is considered are to be applied and not the date when the application is made. Somdev Kapoor v. State of West Bengal & Ors, 2013 (12) SCALE 434

Leave to appeal is a must from AFT

While filing any appeal to Supreme Court from AFT order, either the applicant has to take leave from AFT itself or must make an application for grant of leave to appeal. 2013 (5) SCALE 258  Naib Subedar Naresh Chand v. Union of India

SBI v. Palak Modi

            SBI v. Palak Modi (2013) 3 SCC 607 – even probationers entitled to natural justice when termination is punitive.

Relief when not be extended to third parties

BSNL v. Ghanshyam Dass (2), (2011) 4 SCC 374 at page 382

 

25. The principle laid down in K.I. Shephard [(1987) 4 SCC 431 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 438] that it is not necessary for every person to approach the court for relief and it is the duty of the authority to extend the benefit of a concluded decision in all similar cases without driving every affected person to court to seek relief would apply only in the following circumstances:

(a) where the order is made in a petition filed in a representative capacity on behalf of all similarly situated employees;

(b) where the relief granted by the court is a declaratory relief which is intended to apply to all employees in a particular category, irrespective of whether they are parties to the litigation or not;

(c) where an order or rule of general application to employees is quashed without any condition or reservation that the relief is restricted to the petitioners before the court; and

(d) where the court expressly directs that the relief granted should be extended to those who have not approached the court.

 

26. On the other hand, where only the affected parties approach the court and relief is given to those parties, the fence-sitters who did not approach the court cannot claim that such relief should have been extended to them thereby upsetting or interfering with the rights which had accrued to others.