A.P.D. Jain Pathshala v. Shivaji Bhagwat More, (2011) 13 SCC 99 at page 110

29. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the courts shall, subject to the provisions of the Code, have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. The express or implied bar necessarily refers to a bar created by the Code itself or by any statute made by a legislature. Therefore, the High Court in exercise of the power of judicial review, cannot issue a direction that the civil courts shall not entertain any suit or application in regard to a particular type of disputes (in this case, disputes relating to Shikshan Sevaks) nor create exclusive jurisdiction in a quasi-judicial forum like the Grievance Committee will be entitled to deal with them. The High Court, cannot, by a judicial order, nullify, supersede or render ineffectual the express provisions of an enactment.

 

High Court Cannot Direct Governments to Create Tribunal or Claims Commission by executive order

A.P.D. Jain Pathshala v. Shivaji Bhagwat More, (2011) 13 SCC 99 at page 110

 

28. Neither the Constitution nor any statute empowers a High Court to create or constitute quasi-judicial tribunals for adjudicating disputes. It has no legislative powers. Nor can it direct the executive branch of the State Government to create or constitute quasi-judicial tribunals, otherwise than by legislative statutes. Therefore, it is not permissible for the High Court to direct the State Government to constitute judicial authorities or tribunals by executive orders, nor permissible for the State by executive order or resolution to create them for adjudication of rights of parties.

Interim relief to be in aid of final relief

In State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta [AIR 1952 SC 12 : 1952 SCR 28 : 1951 SCJ 764] a Constitution Bench of this Court clearly spelt out the contours within which interim relief can be granted.

Suppression should be that of "material fact"

Arunima Baruah v. Union of India, (2007) 6 SCC 120 at page 125

12. It is trite law that so as to enable the court to refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction suppression must be of material fact. What would be a material fact, suppression whereof would disentitle the appellant to obtain a discretionary relief, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Material fact would mean material for the purpose of determination of the lis, the logical corollary whereof would be that whether the same was material for grant or denial of the relief. If the fact suppressed is not material for determination of the lis between the parties, the court may not refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. It is also trite that a person invoking the discretionary jurisdiction of the court cannot be allowed to approach it with a pair of dirty hands. But even if the said dirt is removed and the hands become clean, whether the relief would still be denied is the question.

 

Floodgates Arguments

N. Kannadasan v. Ajoy Khose, (2009) 7 SCC 1 at page 55

127. Mr Venugopal would submit that such an interpretation would open a floodgate. We do not think so. We even wish no occasion like the present one arises in future before the superior courts for their consideration. Even otherwise, the floodgate argument does not appeal to us. In Coal India Ltd. v.Saroj Kumar Mishra [(2007) 9 SCC 625] this Court held: (SCC p. 632, para 19)

“19. The floodgate argument also does not appeal to us. The same appears to be an argument of desperation. Only because there is a possibility of floodgate litigation, a valuable right of a citizen cannot be permitted to be taken away. This Court is bound to determine the respective rights of the parties. (See Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India[(2005) 4 SCC 649] and Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee v.C.K. Rajan [(2003) 7 SCC 546] .)”