Transfer Cases

In Pooja Rathod v. Tarun Rathod, (2022) 4 SCC 514, the Hon'ble Supreme Court transferred a case filed by husband (at Chennai) against the wife 600 kms away from where the wife resides (at Hyderabad)

In Anju v. Pramod Kumar, (2005) 11 SCC 186, the Supreme Court transferred the case to a neutral place as both husband and wife expressed apprehension in travelling to each other's native places.

In Deepa Mohan Naik v. Chandra Bhusan Pal, (2022) 2 SCC 54, Supreme Court allowed transfer in favour of the wife and also directed for attempts at mediation to resolve the dispute.

In Eluri Raji Reddy v. State of Delhi, (2004) 4 SCC 479, the Supreme Court allowed transfer in favour of the husband as the husband sought transfer to Andhra Pradesh and the wife had a place of residence in Andhra Pradesh.

In Lalita v. Kulwinder Kumar, (2007) 15 SCC 667, the Supreme Court allowed transfer in favour of the wife and held that the convenience of the wife is to be looked into.

Details needed for job advertisement by Government

The Supreme Court in Renu v. District & Sessions Judge, Tis Hazari, (2014) 14 SCC 50, emphasized the need to specify in the advertisement, number of posts, qualifications and eligibility criteria, schedule of recruitment process, Rules under which selection is to be made or the procedure in the absence of Rules, in the interest of transparency and to avoid arbitrariness and change of criteria of selection. Thus, the appointment letter in so far as it is contrary to or at variance with advertisement will have to give way to the stipulations in the advertisement and the latter part of Clause 2(a) in the appointment letter to the extent it provides for extension of probation period and the requirement of confirmation in writing, shall not bind the Petitioner

Recall - mistake of counsel

He placed reliance upon G.P. Srivastava v. R.K. Raizada & Ors., (2000) 3 SCC 54, wherein the Supreme Court considered the scope of 'sufficient cause' in the context of Order 9 Rule 13 CPC. It was held that unless sufficient cause is shown for non-appearance of the defendant on the date of hearing, the Court would have no power to set aside an ex parte decree and that the words, 'was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing' must be liberally construed to enable the Court to do complete justice between the parties, particularly when no negligence or inaction is imputable to the erring party.

While stressing upon the need to restrain from victimising the petitioners for the fault of their counsel, he cited the observation made by the Apex Court in Smt. Lachi Tewari & Ors. v. Director of Land Records & Ors., 1984 (Supp) SCC 431, wherein the Court relied on its earlier observations in Rafiq and another v. Munshilal & Anr., (1981) 2 SCC 788, that after engaging a lawyer, the party may remain supremely confident that the lawyer would look after his interest and the personal appearance of the party would not only be not required but would hardly be useful.

Further, he relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in N. Balaji v. Virendra Singh & Ors., AIR 2005 SC 1638, wherein it was reiterated that laws of procedure are meant to effectively regulate, assist and aid the object of substantial and real justice and not to foreclose an adjudication on the merits of substantial rights of citizens under personal, property, and other laws.

He, again, referred to the findings in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji & Ors., (1987) 2 SCC 107, where the Supreme Court observed that the power to condone delay has been conferred to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing of matters on merit and the expression 'sufficient cause' employed by the legislature was adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice.

recall ex parte

Robin Thapa v. Rohit Dora, (2019) 7 SCC 359 : (2019) 3 SCC (Civ) 637 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 836 at page 360

7. Ordinarily, a litigation is based on adjudication on the merits of the contentions of the parties. Litigation should not be terminated by default, either of the plaintiff or the defendant. The cause of justice does require that as far as possible, adjudication be done on merits.

Re: Building includes land underneath

 the term 'building' includes the ground on which it stands as has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of D.G. Gose and Co. Vs. State of Kerala reported in (1980) 2 SCC 410, wherein the term 'lands and buildings' was under consideration in the context of Entry 49 of List II Schedule- VII of the Constitution. Paragraphs 21, 22 and 23 of which read as under:-

"21. The word "building" has been defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as follows:

That which is built; a structure, edifice: now a structure of the nature of a house built where it is to stand.

On 08-11-2022 13:50:05, Talha Abdul Rahman <talha@talha.in> wrote:

State of U.P. v. VII ADJ, (1992) 4 SCC 429 at page 432

7. After giving our anxious consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears to us that in the definition of building under Section 3(i) of the Act, there is no express exclusion of the value of the land on which the building stands. In the absence of such express exclusion, the land being intrinsically inseparable from the building standing thereon, the value of the land and the value of the structure or building should be taken into consideration and in our view the land on which the building stands together with the building or structure constitute one composite unit. It may be indicated that the value of two similar buildings or structure standing on similar parcel of land may differ substantially on account of locational advantage of the site in question. The difference of valuation of land because of such locational advantage creeps into the ultimate valuation of the building or structure making one building more valuable than the other although from the structural point of view, both the buildings are identical. In the aforesaid circumstances, the determination of valuation of the building by taking into consideration the value of the land in addition to the value of the structure, does not appear to be illegal and improper. In any case, the definition of 'building' under the Act clearly shows that the building thereunder means roofed structure including the land underneath the said structure. Inclusive part of the definition only relates to the land appurtenant to such building and not to the land underneath the roofed structure.

Building includes land underneath

State of U.P. v. VII ADJ, (1992) 4 SCC 429 at page 432

7. After giving our anxious consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears to us that in the definition of building under Section 3(i) of the Act, there is no express exclusion of the value of the land on which the building stands. In the absence of such express exclusion, the land being intrinsically inseparable from the building standing thereon, the value of the land and the value of the structure or building should be taken into consideration and in our view the land on which the building stands together with the building or structure constitute one composite unit. It may be indicated that the value of two similar buildings or structure standing on similar parcel of land may differ substantially on account of locational advantage of the site in question. The difference of valuation of land because of such locational advantage creeps into the ultimate valuation of the building or structure making one building more valuable than the other although from the structural point of view, both the buildings are identical. In the aforesaid circumstances, the determination of valuation of the building by taking into consideration the value of the land in addition to the value of the structure, does not appear to be illegal and improper. In any case, the definition of 'building' under the Act clearly shows that the building thereunder means roofed structure including the land underneath the said structure. Inclusive part of the definition only relates to the land appurtenant to such building and not to the land underneath the roofed structure.

Admission Denial can be filed after filing Written Statement

 COSCO International (P) Ltd. v. Jagat Singh Dugar, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1113

Re: Warning v. Censure - Service Law

10. The present cases are of un-recorded warning. Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. L.A. Qureshi ((1998) 9 SCC 261) which was a case of censure which is theminor most penalty has not agreed with the submission of the counsel for the "employee that censure is only a recorded warning and does not constitute punishment. They have further held that censure cannot be equated with warning. In this case also, it has been held that warning is not penalty under the Rules. Paras 7 and 8 of the judgment are as follows:

"7. The submission of Shri Khanduja is that "censure" is only a recorded warning and does not constitute punishment and, therefore, the directions contained in the circular in relation to imposition of minor penalty would not apply and the Tribunal was justified in giving the directions for opening of the sealed cover and for giving effect to the recommendations of the DPC.

8. We are unable to accept the said contention of Shri Khanduja. "Censure" cannot be equated with a warning since under Rule 10 of the M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966, "censure" is one of the minor penalties that can be imposed on a Government servant. It cannot, therefore, be said that the penalty of censure which was imposed on the respondent in the departmental proceedings was not a penalty as contemplated in the circular dated 2-5-1990. Once it is held that a minor penalty has been imposed on the respondent in the departmental proceedings, the direction given in the said circular would be applicable and the sealed cover contain-;ing recommendations of the DPC could not be opened and the recommendations of the DPC could not be given effect because the respondent has not been fully exonerated and a minor penalty has been imposed. The respondent can only be considered for pro motion on prospective basis from a date after the conclusion of the departmental pro ceedings."

(Emphasis supplied)

Warning v. Censure - Service Law

in Jagjiwan Chand Bhandari v. Registrar, Rajasthan High Court (RLR 1988 (1) 405) wherein it has been held that censure and recorded warnings are two different things. Former is a penalty whereas latter is not even a penalty. Division Bench of this Court after relying on several dictionary meanings further came to the conclusion that censure and warning have two different connotations but speaking in service parlance the incident is same that incumbent is found 'wanting'. Proper expression for imposing the punishment is censure but none-the-less the incumbent was found wanting in conduct. Therefore, the recorded warning should not be treated as a punishment contemplated in the Service Rules but is definitely an adverse material showing lack of efficiency on the part of the incumbent. The said case is of recorded warning whereas present case is of unrecorded warning. 

Meaning of Forthwith

Gulraj Shroff v. Kaniram Sureka, 1937 SCC OnLine Cal 251

Preliminary Objection to be decided first

Weather accused is to be heard at the stage of pre-summoning by using section 340

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 195, 340 - Whether Section 340 CrPC mandates a preliminary inquiry and an opportunity of hearing to the would-be accused before a complaint is made under Section 195 CrPC by a Court - There is no question of opportunity of hearing in a scenario of this nature - Scope and ambit of such a preliminary inquiry. State of Punjab v. Jasbir Singh, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 776

Impleadment of subsequent purchase are

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Order I Rule 10 - Plaintiffs are the domius litis - Unless the court suo motu directs to join any other person not party to the suit for effective decree and/or for proper adjudication as per Order 1 Rule 10 CPC, nobody can be permitted to be impleaded as defendants against the wish of the plaintiffs - In case the counter-claim is allowed, it will not be open for the plaintiffs to contend that no decree in the counter-claim be passed in absence of the subsequent purchasers - Non-impleading the subsequent purchasers as defendants on the objection raised by the plaintiffs shall be at the risk of the plaintiffs. (Para 5 - 7) Sudhamayee Pattnaik v. Bibhu Prasad Sahoo, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 773

Orality and Written Submissions

 

P.N. Eswara Iyer v. Supreme Court of India, (1980) 4 SCC 680 at page 686

13. We must make it perfectly plain, right at the outset, that audi alteram partem is a basic value of our judicial system. Hearing the party affected is too deeply embedded in the consciousness of our constitutional order. The question is about the quality, content and character of "hearing" in the special "review" situation. Incidentally, we may deal with oral hearing and its importance in the court process, the possibilities of its miniaturisation and, in certain categories its substitution by written submissions.

14. We agree that public hearing is of paramount significance. Justice, in the Indian Republic, is public; and if Judges shun the halls of court, read papers at home, confer in private and issue final fiats without listening to the Bar as the representative of the seekers of justice, the rule of law could well darken into an arcane trick and back-door diktats issued from "robed" adjudicators stain the escutcheon of justice. We also agree that oral advocacy has a non-fungible importance in the forensic process which the most brilliant brief cannot match and the most alert Judge cannot go without. The intellectual jallywork of intricate legal reasoning and impassioned sculpture of delicate factual emphasis may often be beyond the craftsmanship of pen and paper. There is no controversy that disposal by circulation, Secretariat fashion, cannot become a general judicial technique nor silent notings replace Bench-Bar dialogues. We must clarify one point. "Circulation", in the judicial context, merely means, not in court through oral arguments but by discussion at judicial conference. Judges, even under the amended rule, must meet, collectively cerebrate and reach conclusions. Movement of files with notings cannot make do. Otherwise, mutual persuasion, reasoned dissent and joint judgment will be defeated and machinisation of opinion and assertions of views in absentia will deprive judicial noetics of that mental cross-fertilisation essential for a Bench decision. The learned Solicitor General strongly urged that he was at one with counsel opposite on this point. We agree.

 

P.N. Eswara Iyer v. Supreme Court of India, (1980) 4 SCC 680 at page 688

19. This Court, as Sri Garg rightly emphasised, has assigned special value to public hearing, and courts are not caves nor cloisters but shrines of justice accessible for public prayer to all the people. Rulings need not be cited for this basic proposition. But every judicial exercise need not be a public show. When Judges meet in conference to discuss it need not be televised on the nation's network. The right to be heard is of the essence but hearing does not mean more than fair opportunity to present one's point on a dispute, followed by a fair consideration thereof by fair minded Judges. Let us not romanticise this process nor stretch it to snap it. Presentation can be written or oral, depending on the justice of the situation. Where oral persuasiveness is necessary it is unfair to exclude it and, therefore, arbitrary too. But where oral presentation is not that essential, its exclusion is not obnoxious. What is crucial is the guarantee of the application of an instructed, intelligent, impartial and open mind to the points presented. A blank Judge wearied by oral aggression is prone to slumber while an alert mind probing the "papered" argument may land on vital aspects. To swear by orality or to swear at manuscript advocacy is as wrong as judicial allergy to arguments in court. Often-times, it is the Judge who will ask for oral argument as it aids him much. To be left helpless among ponderous paper books without the oral highlights of counsel, is counterproductive. Extremism fails in law and life.

What business can be transacted under the head "any other item"

The decision in M.I. Builders (P) Ltd. v. Radhey Shyam Sahu [M.I. Builders (P) Ltd. v. Radhey Shyam Sahu, (1999) 6 SCC 464] , to the effect that an important issue cannot be decided under the residuary agenda item "any other item", will not also go to the rescue of the complainant companies, since the matter in M.I. Builders [M.I. Builders (P) Ltd. v. Radhey Shyam Sahu, (1999) 6 SCC 464] concerned the permission granted by the Municipal Corporation to a builder to construct an underground shopping complex in a park. The Court found the decision taken by the Mahapalika to be in clear breach of Sections 91 and 119 of the U.P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1959.

Company does not suffer mental agony & temporary injunctions are regulated by CPC alone, not by Specific Relief Act

Best Sellers Retail (India) (P) Ltd. v. Aditya Birla Nuvo Ltd., (2012) 6 SCC 792

[Order 39, Rule 1/2]

Right to Form Association and State's Dictates

 As per Damyanti Naranga v. Union of India, (1971) 1 SCC 678 [5 Judges], the right to form association includes the right to its continuance and any law altering the composition of the association compulsorily will be breach of the right to form association guaranteed under the constitution.

Article 19(1)(c)

also in 2019 18 SCC 287 Maharashtra Archery Assn. v. Rahul Mehra, (2019) 18 SCC 287

Performance of an impossible act deserves to be excused

K.S. Muthu v. T. Govindarajulu, (2009) 17 SCC 353 

Gift Deed - when exigible to stamp duty

Kale v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, (1976) 3 SCC 119 at page 126.

10. In other words to put the binding effect and the essentials of a family settlement in a concretised form, the matter may be reduced into the form of the following propositions:

"(1) The family settlement must be a bona fide one so as to resolve family disputes and rival claims by a fair and equitable division or allotment of properties between the various members of the family.

(2) The said settlement must be voluntary and should not be induced by fraud, coercion or undue influence.

(3) The family arrangement may be even oral in which case no registration is necessary.

(4) It is well settled that registration would be necessary only if the terms of the family arrangement are reduced into writing. Here also, a distinction should be made between a document containing the terms and recitals of a family arrangement made under the document and a mere memorandum prepared after the family arrangement had already been made either for the purpose of the record or for information of the court for making necessary mutation. In such a case the memorandum itself does not create or extinguish any rights in immovable properties and therefore does not fall within the mischief of Section 17(2) of the Registration Act and is, therefore, not compulsorily registrable.

(5) The members who may be parties to the family arrangement must have some antecedent title, claim or interest even a possible claim in the property which is acknowledged by the parties to the settlement. Even if one of the parties to the settlement has no title but under the arrangement the other party relinquishes all its claims or titles in favour of such a person and acknowledges him to be the sole owner, then the antecedent title must be assumed, and the family arrangement will be upheld and the courts will find no difficulty in giving assent to the same.

(6) Even if bona fide disputes, present or possible, which may not involve legal claims are settled by a bona fide family arrangement which is fair and equitable the family arrangement is final and binding on the parties to the settlement."

Combining Arbitration - Multiparty

Acknowledgement in writing after limitation amounts to implied promise to pay and give fresh limitation period

Maharashtra Agro-Chemicals and Fertilizers v. Deoram Baburao Gavade, 1993 SCC OnLine Bom 482| (1993) 95 Bom LR 785  (Bombay High Court)

SBI v. Kanahiya Lal 2016 SCC OnLine Del 2639 : (2016) 157 DRJ 403  (Delhi High Court)

Section 50 NDPS not applicable when search is not of a person

Judicial Supervision of Tribunals | Decisional Independence | Autonomy

Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. Union of India, (2016) 5 SCC 1 : 2015 SCC OnLine SC 964 at page 594

714. The independence of the judiciary takes within its fold two broad concepts: (1) Independence of an individual Judge, that is, decisional independence; and (2) Independence of the judiciary as an institution or an organ of the State, that is, functional independence. In a lecture on Judicial Independence, Lord Phillips [ Former President of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom and Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales] said:

“In order to be impartial a Judge must be independent; personally independent, that is free of personal pressures and institutionally independent, that is free of pressure from the State.”

 

This extract is taken from Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. Union of India, (2016) 5 SCC 1 : 2015 SCC OnLine SC 964 at page 595

718. The entire package of rights and protections ensures that a Judge remains independent and is free to take a decision in accordance with law unmindful of the consequences to his/her continuance as a Judge. This does not mean that a Judge may take whatever decision he/she desires to take. The parameters of decision-making and discretion are circumscribed by the Constitution, the statute and the Rule of Law. This is the essence of decisional independence, not that Judges can do as they please.

 

This extract is taken from Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. Union of India, (2016) 5 SCC 1 : 2015 SCC OnLine SC 964 at page 597

724. Similarly, Section 3 of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 provides, inter alia, that no court shall entertain or continue any civil or criminal proceeding against any person who is or was a Judge for any act, thing or word committed, done or spoken by him when, or in the course of, acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official or judicial duty or function. This is in addition to the protection given by Section 77 of the Penal Code, 1860 which provides that:

“77. Act of Judge when acting judicially.—Nothing is an offence which is done by a Judge when acting judicially in the exercise of any power which is, or which in good faith he believes to be, given to him by law.”

This extract is taken from Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. Union of India, (2016) 5 SCC 1 : 2015 SCC OnLine SC 964 at page 598

726. Generally speaking, therefore, the independence of the judiciary is manifested in the ability of a Judge to take a decision independent of any external (or internal) pressure or fear of any external (or internal) pressure and that is “decisional independence”. It is also manifested in the ability of the institution to have “functional independence”. A comprehensive and composite definition of “independence of the judiciary” is elusive but it is easy to perceive.

 

 

Supreme Court in Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim and others, AIR 1984 SC 38 a Coordinate Bench observed as follows:

“6. The petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution was wholly misconceived. An appeal lay from an order under Order XXI, Rule 92 setting aside or refusing to set aside a sale under Order XLIII, Rule 1 (i) to the District Judge. That apart, the application made by the petitioner claiming to be the legal representative of the surety, the judgment-debtor's representative, on the one hand and the auction-purchaser, the decree-holder's representative, on the other alleging that there had been a fraud perpetrated by the decree-holder in causing the sale to be held, with a prayer for recording satisfaction of the decree under Order XXI, Rule 2, raised a question relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree and therefore fell within the purview of Section 47 which prior to February 1, 1977 was appealable because then a decision under Section 47 was deemed to be a decree under Section 2 (2) of the Code, and therefore the petitioner had the remedy of an appeal to the District Judge. Even if no appeal lay against the impugned orders of the learned Subordinate Judge, the petitioner had the remedy of filing a revision before the High Court under Section 115 of the Code. Upon any view of the matter, the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the impugned orders passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, under Art. 227 of the Constitution. A mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227.

 

 

T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, (1955) 1 SCR 250 : AIR 1954 SC 440 : 10 ELR 14 (5 Judges)

10. A tribunal may be competent to enter upon an enquiry but in making the enquiry it may act in flagrant disregard of the rules of procedure or where no particular procedure is prescribed, it may violate the principles of natural justice. A writ of certiorari may be available in such cases. An error in the decision or determination itself may also be amenable to a writ of certiorari but it must be a manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings, e.g. when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In other words, it is a patent error which can be corrected by certiorari but not a mere wrong decision. The essential features of the remedy by way of certiorari have been stated with remarkable brevity and clearness by Morris, L.J. in the recent case of Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appellate Tribunal [(1952) 1 KB 338 at 357] . The Lord Justice says:

“It is plain that certiorari will not issue as the cloak of an appeal in disguise. It does not lie in order to bring up an order or decision for re-hearing of the issue raised in the proceedings. It exists to correct error of law when revealed on the face of an order or decision or irregularity or absence of or excess of jurisdiction when shown.”

 

7. The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited “ to seeing that an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority,” and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less an error of law. In this case there was, in our opinion, no error of law much less an error apparent of the face of the record. There was no failure on the part of the learned Subordinate Judge to exercise jurisdiction nor did he act in disregard of principles of natural justice. Nor was the procedure adopted by him not in consonance with the procedure established by law. In exercising the supervisory power under Art. 227, the High Court does not act as an appellate Court or Tribunal. It will not review or reweigth the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior court or tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of law in the decision.”

 

 

T. Sudhakar Prasad v. Govt. of A.P., (2001) 1 SCC 516 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 263 at page 531

18. Subordination of Tribunals and courts functioning within the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court can be either judicial or administrative or both. The power of superintendence exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is judicial superintendence and not administrative superintendence, such as one which vests in the High Court under Article 235 of the Constitution over subordinate courts. Vide para 96 of L. Chandra Kumar case [(1997) 3 SCC 261 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 577] the Constitution Bench did not agree with the suggestion that the Tribunals be made subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Courts within whose territorial jurisdiction they fall, as our constitutional scheme does not require that all adjudicatory bodies which fall within the territorial jurisdiction of any High Court should be subject to its supervisory jurisdiction. Obviously, the supervisory jurisdiction referred to by the Constitution Bench in para 96 of the judgment is the supervision of the administrative functioning of the Tribunals as is spelt out by discussion made in paras 96 and 97 of the judgment.

 

K’, A Judicial Officer, In re, (2001) 3 SCC 54 at page 64[1]

12. Though the power to make remarks or observations is there but on being questioned, the exercise of power must withstand judicial scrutiny on the touchstone of following tests: (a) whether the party whose conduct is in question is before the court or has an opportunity of explaining or defending himself; (b) whether there is evidence on record bearing on that conduct justifying the remarks; and (c) whether it is necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral part thereof, to animadvert on that conduct. The overall test is that the criticism or observation must be judicial in nature and should not formally depart from sobriety, moderation and reserve (see Mohd. Naim [AIR 1964 SC 703 : (1964) 2 SCR 363 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 549] ).

 

Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Ltd., (2020) 6 SCC 1 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1456 at page 171

215. It is hence clear post L. Chandra Kumar [L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 577] that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 does not limit the powers of High Courts expressly or by implication against military or armed forces disputes. The limited ouster made by Article 227(4) only operates qua administrative supervision by the High Court and not judicial review. Article 136(2) prohibits direct appeals before the Supreme Court from an order of Armed Forces Tribunals, but would not prohibit an appeal to the Supreme Court against the judicial review exercised by the High Court under Article 226.

 

 

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[1] This is for judicial officer of court. But important to see that it contemplates notice etc.

Accused Summoning Call Records of Investigating officer

2018 SCC OnLine P&H 4272 |

J 1

12. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Suresh Kumar v. Union of India; 2015 (3) RCR (Criminal) 340 has observed that the accused can be allowed to summon call record of the mobile telephones of concerned police officers to show that the police were not near the location of recovery but were at some other location. It has been observed in para 8 as under:—

“8. All that we are concerned with is whether call details which the appellant is demanding can be denied to him on the ground that such details are likely to prejudice the case of the prosecution by exposing their activities in relation to similar other cases and individuals. It is not however in dispute that the call details are being summoned only for purposes of determining the exact location of the officers concerned at the time of the alleged arrest of the appellant from Yashica Palace hotel near the bus stand. Ms. Makhijamadea candid concession that any other information contained in the call details will be of no use to the appellant and that the appellant would not insist upon disclosure of such information. That in our opinion simplifies the matter in as much as while the call details demanded by the appellant can be summoned in terms of Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act such details being relevant only to the extent of determining the location of officers concerned need not contain other information concerning such calls received or made from the telephone numbers concerned. In other words if the mobile telephone numbers caller details of the callers are blacked out of the information summoned from the companies concerned it will protect the respondent against any possible prejudice in terms of exposure of sources of information available to the Bureau. Interest of justice would in our opinion be sufficiently served if we direct the Trial Court to summon from the Companies concerned call details of Sim telephone No. 9039520407 and 7415593902 of Tata Docomo company and in regard to Sim No. 9165077714 of Airtel company for the period 24.02.2013 between 4.30 to 8.30 p.m. We further direct that calling numbers and the numbers called from the said mobile phone shall be blacked out by the companies while furnishing such details.”

 

Tribunal or court below not needed to be impleaded in appeal or writs

2015 9 SCC 1

Matrimonial Cases - Jurisdiction - Continuing wrong

Rupali Devi v. State of U.P., (2019) 5 SCC 384 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 558 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 493 at page 390

 

16. We, therefore, hold that the courts at the place where the wife takes shelter after leaving or driven away from the matrimonial home on account of acts of cruelty committed by the husband or his relatives, would, dependent on the factual situation, also have jurisdiction to entertain a complaint alleging commission of offences under Section 498-A of the Penal Code.

Deemed Extension of Time Bound Stay order if not vacated