Transfer Cases

In Pooja Rathod v. Tarun Rathod, (2022) 4 SCC 514, the Hon'ble Supreme Court transferred a case filed by husband (at Chennai) against the wife 600 kms away from where the wife resides (at Hyderabad)

In Anju v. Pramod Kumar, (2005) 11 SCC 186, the Supreme Court transferred the case to a neutral place as both husband and wife expressed apprehension in travelling to each other's native places.

In Deepa Mohan Naik v. Chandra Bhusan Pal, (2022) 2 SCC 54, Supreme Court allowed transfer in favour of the wife and also directed for attempts at mediation to resolve the dispute.

In Eluri Raji Reddy v. State of Delhi, (2004) 4 SCC 479, the Supreme Court allowed transfer in favour of the husband as the husband sought transfer to Andhra Pradesh and the wife had a place of residence in Andhra Pradesh.

In Lalita v. Kulwinder Kumar, (2007) 15 SCC 667, the Supreme Court allowed transfer in favour of the wife and held that the convenience of the wife is to be looked into.

Details needed for job advertisement by Government

The Supreme Court in Renu v. District & Sessions Judge, Tis Hazari, (2014) 14 SCC 50, emphasized the need to specify in the advertisement, number of posts, qualifications and eligibility criteria, schedule of recruitment process, Rules under which selection is to be made or the procedure in the absence of Rules, in the interest of transparency and to avoid arbitrariness and change of criteria of selection. Thus, the appointment letter in so far as it is contrary to or at variance with advertisement will have to give way to the stipulations in the advertisement and the latter part of Clause 2(a) in the appointment letter to the extent it provides for extension of probation period and the requirement of confirmation in writing, shall not bind the Petitioner

Recall - mistake of counsel

He placed reliance upon G.P. Srivastava v. R.K. Raizada & Ors., (2000) 3 SCC 54, wherein the Supreme Court considered the scope of 'sufficient cause' in the context of Order 9 Rule 13 CPC. It was held that unless sufficient cause is shown for non-appearance of the defendant on the date of hearing, the Court would have no power to set aside an ex parte decree and that the words, 'was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing' must be liberally construed to enable the Court to do complete justice between the parties, particularly when no negligence or inaction is imputable to the erring party.

While stressing upon the need to restrain from victimising the petitioners for the fault of their counsel, he cited the observation made by the Apex Court in Smt. Lachi Tewari & Ors. v. Director of Land Records & Ors., 1984 (Supp) SCC 431, wherein the Court relied on its earlier observations in Rafiq and another v. Munshilal & Anr., (1981) 2 SCC 788, that after engaging a lawyer, the party may remain supremely confident that the lawyer would look after his interest and the personal appearance of the party would not only be not required but would hardly be useful.

Further, he relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in N. Balaji v. Virendra Singh & Ors., AIR 2005 SC 1638, wherein it was reiterated that laws of procedure are meant to effectively regulate, assist and aid the object of substantial and real justice and not to foreclose an adjudication on the merits of substantial rights of citizens under personal, property, and other laws.

He, again, referred to the findings in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji & Ors., (1987) 2 SCC 107, where the Supreme Court observed that the power to condone delay has been conferred to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing of matters on merit and the expression 'sufficient cause' employed by the legislature was adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice.