HC cannot take away discretion of sanctioning authority by directing to grant sanction

Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat, (1997) 7 SCC 622

Cannot supplement or explain or make submissions contrary to what is recorded in judicial order

In State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak [(1982) 2 SCC 463 : 1982 SCC (Cri) 478 : AIR 1982 SC 1249] this Court observed: (SCC p. 467, para 4)

"4. When we drew the attention of the learned Attorney-General to the concession made before the High Court, Shri A.K. Sen, who appeared for the State of Maharashtra before the High Court and led the arguments for the respondents there and who appeared for Shri Antulay before us intervened and protested that he never made any such concession and invited us to peruse the written submissions made by him in the High Court. We are afraid that we cannot launch into an inquiry as to what transpired in the High Court. It is simply not done. Public policy bars us. Judicial decorum restrains us. Matters of judicial record are unquestionable. They are not open to doubt. Judges cannot be dragged into the arena. 'Judgments cannot be treated as mere counters in the game of litigation.' (Per Lord Atkinson in Somasundaram Chetty v. Subramanian Chetty [AIR 1926 PC 136] .) We are bound to accept the statement of the Judges recorded in their judgment, as to what transpired in court. We cannot allow the statement of the Judges to be contradicted by statements at the Bar or by affidavit and other evidence. If the Judges say in their judgment that something was done, said or admitted before them, that has to be the last word on the subject. The principle is well settled that statements of fact as to what transpired at the hearing, recorded in the judgment of the court, are conclusive of the facts so stated and no one can contradict such statements by affidavit or other evidence. If a party thinks that the happenings in court have been wrongly recorded in a judgment, it is incumbent upon the party, while the matter is still fresh in the minds of the Judges, to call the attention of the very Judges who have made the record to the fact that the statement made with regard to his conduct was a statement that had been made in error (Per Lord Buckmaster in Madhu Sudan Chowdhri v. Chandrabati Chowdhrain [AIR 1917 PC 30 : 21 CWN 897] .) That is the only way to have the record corrected. If no such step is taken, the matter must necessarily end there. Of course a party may resile and an appellate court may permit him in rare and appropriate cases to resile from a concession on the ground that the concession was made on a wrong appreciation of the law and had led to gross injustice; but, he may not call in question the very fact of making the concession as recorded in the judgment."

 

Letter and Spirit both relevant in contempt cases

In Lakshman Prasad Agarwal v. Syed Mohd. Karim, (2020) 17 SCC 826, this Hon'ble Court has held that "The High Court also rejected and, in our view, very correctly the said contention. It is relevant to state here that in a proceeding when an order is passed by the court where the question of compliance or non-compliance of the same arises, not merely the letter of the order but also its spirit is to be understood and the plea of bona fide or genuine belief taken on the part of the contemnor is to be adjudicated on that basis."

 

Where the complaint is time barred, S.319 CrPC cannot be invoked

N. Harihara Krishnan v. J. Thomas, (2018) 13 SCC 663 

Re: FIR lodged to pre-empt Section 138 NI Act Case - quashed

Such cases to be tried together rather than quashing

Pareshbhai Amrutlal Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2020) 12 SCC 569 

FIR lodged to pre-empt Section 138 NI Act Case - quashed

Sunil Kumar v. Escorts Yamaha Motors Ltd., (1999) 8 SCC 468 

Partner continues to be liable after resignation unless he gives publ

Partner continues to be liable after resignation unless he gives public notice

Union Bank of India v. Six Star Hosieries, 2001 SCC OnLine Mad 1000 

2023 SCC OnLine SC 1275 | Burden of Proof - In Section 138 Cases

Judgments cannot be read like a statute

Power of Revision Court in Section 397 CrPC

Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986 : 2012 SCC OnLine SC 724 at page 475

12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which upon the face of it bears a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. (Emphasis Supplied)

Probate court does not decide title or existence of the property itself

Ishwardeo Narain Singh v. Smt Kamta Devi AIR 1954 SC 280 

A court of probate is only concerned with the question as to whether the document put forward as the last will and testament of a deceased person was duly executed and attested in accordance with law and whether at the time of such execution the testator had sound disposing mind. The question whether a particular bequest is good or bad is not within the purview of the probate court. Therefore the only issue in a probate proceedings relates to the genuineness and due execution of the will and the court itself is under duty to determine it and preserve the original will in its custody. The Succession Act is a self-contained code insofar as the question of making an application for probate, grant or refusal of probate or an appeal carried against the decision of the probate court. This is clearly manifested in the fascicule of the provisions of the Act. The probate proceedings shall be conducted by the probate court in the manner prescribed in the Act and in no other ways. The grant of probate with a copy of the will annexed establishes conclusively as to the appointment of the executor and the valid execution of the will. Thus it does no more than establish the factum of the will and the legal character of the executor. Probate court does not decide any question of title or of the existence of the property itself. 

An error of jurisdiction nullifies every act/decision

A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 372 at page 649

36. In Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan [(1955) 1 SCR 117 at 121 : AIR 1954 SC 340] Venkatarama Ayyar, J. observed that the fundamental principle is well established that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its validity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon — even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject-matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties.

bail applications from same FIR before same court

Abhyanand Sharma v. State of Bihar, (2022) 10 SCC 819 

Benefit of Acquittal to non appealing accused

Mohd. Sajjad v. State of W.B., (2017) 11 SCC 150 : (2017) 3 SCC (Cri) 899 : 2017 SCC OnLine SC 27 at page 158

20. Mr Mrinal Kanti Mandal, learned Advocate is right in submitting that in certain cases this Court had granted benefit even to a non-appealing accused. In Bijoy Singh v. State of Bihar [Bijoy Singh v. State of Bihar, (2002) 9 SCC 147 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1093] , this Court observed that if on evaluation of the case, a conclusion is reached that no conviction of any accused was possible the benefit of that decision must be extended to the similarly situated co-accused even though he had not challenged the order by way of the appeal. To similar effect was the dictum of this Court in Suresh Chaudhary v. State of Bihar [Suresh Chaudhary v. State of Bihar, (2003) 4 SCC 128 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 801] and in Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana [Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2003) 11 SCC 241 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 109] and in Mohinder Singh v. State of Punjab [Mohinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2004) 12 SCC 311 : 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp 252] .

Whether a matter can be whether a matter can be remitted back to the Labour Court for a decision afresh

Case:  HIND FILTERS LTD. & ANR.  V. HIND FILTER EMPLOYEES' UNION & ANR., CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8801 OF 2012, DECIDED ON 17.08.2023      

If the material sought to be placed before the labour court is such that it will go to the root of the matter in determining the jurisdiction of the labour court to determine the issue.

Relevant paras 

 21. On the issue as to whether a matter can be remitted back to the Labour Court for a decision afresh, guidance is available from judgment of this Court in Santhosh Bansi Mahajan's case (supra). It was a case where a document on which reliance was placed by the workmen was not placed before the Labour Court when the matter was considered. It was placed on record for the first time before this Court. Liberty was given by this Court to file the said document before the Labour Court and the matter was remitted back to the Labour Court to be decided afresh. Similar issue had come up for decision before this Court in Bundi Zila Petrol Pump Dealers Association's case (supra) wherein an ex-parte Award was passed against the Management. This Court, finding that there were sufficient reasons for the absence of the Page 21 of 22 Management before the Tribunal, set aside the Award and the matter was remanded to the Industrial Tribunal giving liberty to the appellant before this Court to file the written statement and lead evidence.

22. In the case in hand as well on the facts, as noticed above, we find that the matter needs to be re-examined by the Labour Court, as the material permitted to be placed on record will go to the root of the case in determining the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to adjudicate the matter. The material sought to be relied upon by the appellants/Management to substantiate its plea has been briefly referred to in paras 16 and 19 of this order.   

Nullification of a Judgment by the Legislature

Can judgment be nullified by subsequent acts of a legislature?  If so, how and to what extent? In other words, what is the permissibility of abrogation of a thing in order to remove the basis of a judgment?

NHPC LTD. V STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS.  CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3948 OF 2009

11. What follows from the aforesaid judicial precedent is a legislature cannot directly set aside a judicial decision. However, when a competent legislature retrospectively removes the substratum or foundation of a judgment to make the decision ineffective, the same is a valid legislative exercise provided it does not transgress on any other constitutional limitation. Such a legislative device which removes the vice in the previous legislation which has been declared unconstitutional is not considered to be an encroachment on judicial power but an instance of abrogation recognised under the Constitution of India. The decisions referred to above, manifestly show that it is open to the legislature to alter the law retrospectively, provided the alteration is made in such a manner that it would no more be possible for the Court to arrive at the  same verdict. In other words, the very premise of the earlier judgment should be removed, thereby resulting in a fundamental change of the circumstances upon which it was founded.

 12. It would be permissible for the legislature to remove a defect in an earlier legislation, as pointed out by a constitutional court in exercise of its powers by way of judicial review. This defect can be removed both prospectively and retrospectively by a legislative process and previous actions can also be validated. However, where a legislature merely seeks to validate the acts carried out under a previous legislation which has been struck down or rendered inoperative by a Court, by a subsequent legislation without curing the defects in such legislation, the subsequent legislation would also be ultra-vires.   (Emphasis supplied)

What is a continuing wrong for the purposes of limitation?

What is a continuing cause of action?

CWT v. Suresh Seth, (1981) 2 SCC 790

"11. In the instant case the contention is that the wrong or the default in question has been altered into a continuing wrong or default giving rise to a liability de die in diem, that is, from day to day. The distinctive nature of a continuing wrong is that the law that is violated makes the wrongdoer continuously liable for penalty. A wrong or default which is complete but whose effect may continue to be felt even after its completion is, however, not a continuing wrong or default. It is reasonable to take the view that the court should not be eager to hold that an act or omission is a continuing wrong or default unless there are words in the statute concerned which make out that such was the intention of the legislature. In the instant case whenever the question of levying penalty arises what has to be first considered is whether the assessee has failed without reasonable cause of file the return as required by law and if it is held that he has failed to do so then penalty has to be levied in accordance with the measure provided in the Act. When the default is the filing of delayed return the penalty may be correlated to the time-lag between the last day for filing it without penalty and the day on which it is filed and the quantum of tax or wealth involved in the case for purposes of determining the quantum of penalty but the default however is only one which takes place on the expiry of the last day for filing the return without penalty and not a continuing one. The default in question does not, however, give rise to a fresh cause of action every day. Explaining the expression "a continuing cause of action" Lord Lindley in Hole v. Chard Union [(1894) 1 Ch D 293 : 63 LJ Ch 469 : 70 LT 52] observed:

"What is a continuing cause of action? Speaking accurately, there is no such thing; but what is called a continuing cause of action is a cause of action which arises from the repetition of acts or omissions of the same kind as that for which the action was brought."

Balkrishna Savalram Pujari v. Shree Dnyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan [AIR 1959 SC 798], Gajendragadkar, J.:

"It is the very essence of a continuing wrong that it is an act which creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the act responsible and liable for the continuance of the said injury. If the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong, even though the damage resulting from the act may continue. If, however, a wrongful act is of such a character that the injury caused by it itself continues, then the act constitutes a continuing wrong. In this connection it is necessary to draw a distinction between the injury caused by the wrongful act and what may be described as the effect of the said injury. . . ."

Balkrishna Savalram Pujari and Others vs. Shree Dnyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan & Others, [1959] Supp. (2) S.C.R. 476:

"… …. In dealing with this argument it is necessary to bear in mind that s.23 refers not to a continuing right but to a continuing wrong. It is the very essence of a continuing wrong that it is an act  which creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the act responsible and liable for the continuance of the said injury. If the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may continue. If, however, a wrongful act is of such a character that the injury caused by it itself continues then the act constitutes a continuing wrong. In this connection it is necessary to draw a distinction between the injury caused by the wrongful act and what may be described as the effect of the said injury. It is only in regard to acts which can be properly characterised as continuing wrongs that s.23 can be invoked. Thus considered it is difficult to hold that the trustees' act in denying altogether the alleged rights of the Guravs as hereditary worshippers and in claiming and obtaining possession from them by their suit in 1922 was a continuing wrong. The decree obtained by the trustees in the said litigation had injured effectively and completely the appellants' rights though the damage caused by the said decree subsequently continued..." (Page 496)

Hari Singh v Haryana 1993 3 SCC 114 - DISMISSAL OF SLP OF CO ACCUSED IS NOT A BAR

Show Cause Notice - Bias

                in Oryx Fisheries (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, reported in (2010) 13 SCC 427, while quashing a show-cause notice on the aforementioned ground, has held that:

 

"27. It is no doubt true that at the stage of show cause, the person proceeded against must be told the charges against him so that he can take his defence and prove his innocence. It is obvious that at that stage the authority issuing the charge-sheet, cannot, instead of telling him the charges, confront him with definite conclusions of his alleged guilt. If that is done, as has been done in this instant case, the entire proceeding initiated by the show-cause notice gets vitiated by unfairness and bias and the subsequent proceedings become an idle ceremony.

 

28. Justice is rooted in confidence and justice is the goal of a quasi-judicial proceeding also. If the functioning of a quasi-judicial authority has to inspire confidence in the minds of those subjected to its jurisdiction, such authority must act with utmost fairness. Its fairness is obviously to be manifested by the language in which charges are couched and conveyed to the person proceeded against.

…

31. It is of course true that the show-cause notice cannot be read hypertechnically and it is well settled that it is to be read reasonably. But one thing is clear that while reading a show-cause notice the person who is subject to it must get an impression that he will get an effective opportunity to rebut the allegations contained in the show-cause notice and prove his innocence. If on a reasonable reading of a show-cause notice a person of ordinary prudence gets the feeling that his reply to the show-cause notice will be an empty ceremony and he will merely knock his head against the impenetrable wall of prejudged opinion, such a show-cause notice does not commence a fair procedure especially when it is issued in a quasi-judicial proceeding under a statutory regulation which promises to give the person proceeded against a reasonable opportunity of defence.

 

32. Therefore, while issuing a show-cause notice, the authorities must take care to manifestly keep an open mind as they are to act fairly in adjudging the guilt or otherwise of the person proceeded against and specially when he has the power to take a punitive step against the person after giving him a show-cause notice.

 

33. The principle that justice must not only be done but it must eminently appear to be done as well is equally applicable to quasi-judicial proceeding if such a proceeding has to inspire confidence in the mind of those who are subject to it."

(emphasis supplied)

K.I. Shephard v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 431, referred to in the decision abovementioned, it has been held that "… it is common experience that once a decision has been taken, there is a tendency to uphold it and a representation may not really yield any fruitful purpose."

1.                 in Siemens Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2006) 12 SCC 33, it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court:

"9. Although ordinarily a writ court may not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction in entertaining a writ petition questioning a notice to show cause unless the same inter alia appears to have been without jurisdiction as has been held by this Court in some decisions including State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma [(1987) 2 SCC 179 : (1987) 3 ATC 319 : AIR 1987 SC 943] , Special Director v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse [(2004) 3 SCC 440 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 826] and Union of India v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana [(2006) 12 SCC 28 : (2006) 12 Scale 262] , but the question herein has to be considered from a different angle viz. when a notice is issued with premeditation, a writ petition would be maintainable. In such an event, even if the court directs the statutory authority to hear the matter afresh, ordinarily such hearing would not yield any fruitful purpose. (See K.I. Shephard v. Union of India [(1987) 4 SCC 431 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 438 : AIR 1988 SC 686] .) It is evident in the instant case that the respondent has clearly made up its mind. It explicitly said so both in the counter-affidavit as also in its purported show-cause notice."

Probate of a Will: Is it mandatory?

Om Prakash Yadav v. Kanta Yadav
Citation: 2017 SCC OnLine Del 6961
Paragraph 7.
There being a plethora of authorities that in view of Section 57 and Section 213 of the Indian
Succession Act, for Hindus, concerning properties in the Northern part of the country, it is
not necessary to obtain a probate of a will, appellants pleaded that they need not obtain a
probate of the wills and the codicil. As per the respondents Section 34 of the Specific Relief
Act, 1963 which relates to a declaratory decree, did not disentitle the appellants to the
declaration claimed.

See also:

Geeta Tandon v. Sunil Gomber
Citation: 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2067

Kanta Yadav v. Om Prakash Yadav
Citation: (2020) 14 SCC 102

Ravinder Nath Agarwal v. Yogender Nath Agarwal,
Citation: (2021) 15 SCC 282

Misconduct v. Negligence

Misconduct means misconduct arising from ill-motive; acts of negligence, error of judgment or innocent mistake do not constitute such misconduct (Union of India v. J Ahmed, (1979) 2 SCC 286

Courts power if injunction violated or breached

AIR 1975 madras 270

In our opinion, the inherent powers of this court under Section 151 C.P.C. are wide and are not subject to any limitation. Where in violation of a stay order or injunction against a party, something has been done in disobedience, it will be the duty of the court as a policy to set the wrong right and not allow the perpetuation of the wrong doing. In our view, the inherent power will not only be available in such a case, but it is bound to be exercised in that manner in the interests of justice. Even apart from Section 151, we should observe that as a matter of judicial policy, the court should guard against itself being stultified in circumstances like this by holding that it is powerless to undo a wrong done in disobedience of the court's orders. But in this case it is not necessary to so to that extent as we hold that the power is available under Section 151. C.P.C. 

In case of doubt in interpretation of a notification, the interpretation given by the author of the legislation would need to be accepted

NHAI v. Pandarinathan Govindarajulu, (2021) 6 SCC 693

Custody during bail

Manish Jain v. Haryana State Pollution Control Board, (2020) 20 SCC 123 : (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 676 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1101 at page 123

2. A person released on bail is already in the constructive custody of law. If the law requires him to come back to custody for specified reasons, we are afraid that an application for anticipatory bail apprehending arrest will not lie. There cannot be an apprehension of arrest by a person already in the constructive custody of the law. We, therefore, reject the prayer for anticipatory bail.

cognizance against accused qua whom proceeding is quashed

"In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, (1983) 1 SCC 1: (AIR 1983 SC 67: 1983 Cri LJ 159) this Court has struck a note of caution, while considering whether prosecution can produce evidence to satisfy the Court that other accused against whom proceedings have been quashed or those who have not arrayed as accused, have also committed an offence in order to enable the Court to take cognizance against them and try them along with the other accused. This was how learned Judges then cautioned:

'But we would hasten to add that this is really an extraordinary power which is conferred on the Court and should be used very sparingly and only if compelling reasons exist for taking cognizance against the other person against whom action has not been taken.' "

Mutually Destructive and contradictory plea

Gobinda Gupta v. Bedana Das, 1997 SCC OnLine Cal 416 : (1997) 4 ICC 280 at page 283

16. It is well settled that defendant can in his written statement take inconsistent defence. The Code of Civil Procedure does not prohibit inconsistent pleadings and there is nothing to prevent either party from setting up two or more inconsistent sets of material facts and claiming relief thereunder in the alternative. But the litigants who avail himself of the right to press inconsistent cases before the court and endeavours to establish both the alternatives by contradictory oral testimony, plainly places himself in peril and may find himself entangled in extricable difficulty, for evidence adduced in support of two absolutely inconsistent cases, which are mutually destructive could hardly be expected to secure confidence.

 

Arundhati Mishra (Smt) v. Sri Ram Charitra Pandey, (1994) 2 SCC 29 at page 31

3. It is settled law as laid down by this Court in Firm Sriniwas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad[AIR 1951 SC 177 : 1951 SCR 277] that it is open to the parties to raise even mutually inconsistent pleas and if the relief could be founded on the alternative plea it could be granted. If the facts are admitted in the written statement, the relief could be granted to the plaintiff on the basis of the evidence though inconsistent pleas were raised. Amendment to written statement cannot be considered on the same principle as an amendment to the plaint. The pleas in the written statement may be alternative or on additional ground or to substitute the original plea. It is equally settled law that amendment of the pleadings could be made at any stage of the proceedings. Instances are not wanting that pleadings are permitted to be amended even when second appeal is pending. Equally it was refused. It is not necessary to burden the judgment by copious references thereof. But each case depends upon its own facts. The essential requisites are that the delay in making the application; the reason therefor should be given and considered; and there should be no prejudice caused to the other side. Bar of limitation which is available to the parties cannot be permitted to be defeated. It is also settled law that if the relief is found on the same cause of action, though different sets of facts are sought to be brought on record by appropriate pleadings, it cannot be refused. In those circumstances, permission to amend the pleadings could be granted.

This extract is taken from Arundhati Mishra (Smt) v. Sri Ram Charitra Pandey, (1994) 2 SCC 29 at page 32

4. The question in this case is whether the plea of adverse possession sought to be set up by the respondent could be permitted to be raised. The pleas based on title and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent and the latter does not begin to operate until the former is renounced. It is his own case that he came into possession of the suit house in his own right and remained in possession as an owner. The appellant is only benamidar. Therefore, his plea is based on his own title. He never denounced his title nor admitted the title of the appellant. He never renounced his character as an owner asserting adverse possession openly to the knowledge of the appellant and the appellant's acquiescence to it. Thereafter, he remained in open and peaceful possession and enjoyment to the knowledge of the appellant without acknowledging/or acquiescing the right, title and interest of the appellant. The plea of adverse possession, though available to the respondent, was never raised by him. Only on receipt of the first notice he denied title of the appellant and made it known to him for the first time through the reply notice got issued by him. Even then the plea of adverse possession was not raised in the written statement. No explanation for the belated plea was given. Even assuming that the reply dated March 15, 1971 constitutes assertion of adverse possession, the limitation would start running against the appellant only from March 15, 1971 and not earlier. The suit was filed in 1978 within 12 years. Under these circumstances, the High Court is not justified in permitting the respondent to raise the plea of adverse possession. It is made clear that we are not expressing any opinion on merits. The judgment of the High Court is set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court for disposal on merits according to law. The appeal is allowed but without costs.

- child custody matters _ habeas corpus

Constitution of India - Writ of Habeas Corpus in Cases of Child's Custody - in a petition seeking a writ of Habeas Corpus in a matter relating to a claim for custody of a child, the principal issue which should be taken into consideration is as to whether from the facts of the case, it can be stated that the custody of the child is illegal - whether the welfare of the child requires that his present custody should be changed and the child be handed over to the care and custody of any other person - whenever a question arises before a court pertaining to the custody of the minor child, the matter is to be decided not on consideration of the legal rights of the parties but on the sole and predominant criterion of what would best serve the interest and welfare of the child - welfare is an all-encompassing word - It includes material welfare - while material considerations have their place they are secondary matters - more important are the stability and the security, the loving and understanding care and guidance, the warm and compassionate relationships that are essential for the full development of the child's own character, personality and talents - the employment of the writ of Habeas Corpus in child custody cases is not pursuant to, but independent of any statute - the jurisdiction exercised by the court rests in such cases on its inherent equitable powers and exerts the force of the State, as parens patriae, for the protection of its minor ward, and the very nature and scope of the inquiry and the result sought to be accomplished call for the exercise of the jurisdiction of a court of equity - The primary object of a Habeas Corpus petition, as applied to minor children, is to determine in whose custody the best interests of the child will probably be advanced. [Para 75, 80, 81, 86, 88, 89] Rajeswari Chandrasekar Ganesh v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 605

Independent assessment of evidence: commission report not binding

Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952 - In respect of criminal charges, an accused can be tried by a Court of law and not merely on the basis of the report of the Commissioner under the Inquiry Act. Such a report is not conclusive and an independent action has to be taken by the State or by the victims against the Organizers before the competent court of law to prove the criminal offences said to be committed by certain accused. (Para 49) Sanjay Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 368 : (2022) 7 SCC 203

Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952 - The Commission under the Act shall be appointed either by the Executive or by the Legislature but not by the Judiciary in terms of the provisions of Inquiry Act. (Para 46, 50) Sanjay Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 368 : (2022) 7 SCC 203

436-A release

Kamal Vs. State of Haryana, 2004 (13) SCC 526 (for 7 yrs.)

 "2. This is a case in which the appellant has been convicted u/s 304-B of the India Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for 7 years. It appears that so far the appellant has undergone imprisonment for about 2 years and four months. The High Court declined to grant bail pending disposal of the appeal before it. We are of the view that the bail should have been granted by the High Court, especially having regard to the fact that the appellant has already served a substantial period of the sentence. In the circumstances, we direct that the bail be granted to the appellant on conditions as may be imposed by the District and Sessions Judge, Faridabad."

Final order must consider previous and interim orders passed in the same case

2012 2 SCC 294  C Shankuntala

2012 5 SCC 552 Om Prakash Asati

Dismiss in default without going into merit is not res judicata

Collector v. Ajit Jogi, (2011) 10 SCC 357