Judgments cannot be read like a statute

Power of Revision Court in Section 397 CrPC

Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986 : 2012 SCC OnLine SC 724 at page 475

12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which upon the face of it bears a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. (Emphasis Supplied)

Probate court does not decide title or existence of the property itself

Ishwardeo Narain Singh v. Smt Kamta Devi AIR 1954 SC 280 

A court of probate is only concerned with the question as to whether the document put forward as the last will and testament of a deceased person was duly executed and attested in accordance with law and whether at the time of such execution the testator had sound disposing mind. The question whether a particular bequest is good or bad is not within the purview of the probate court. Therefore the only issue in a probate proceedings relates to the genuineness and due execution of the will and the court itself is under duty to determine it and preserve the original will in its custody. The Succession Act is a self-contained code insofar as the question of making an application for probate, grant or refusal of probate or an appeal carried against the decision of the probate court. This is clearly manifested in the fascicule of the provisions of the Act. The probate proceedings shall be conducted by the probate court in the manner prescribed in the Act and in no other ways. The grant of probate with a copy of the will annexed establishes conclusively as to the appointment of the executor and the valid execution of the will. Thus it does no more than establish the factum of the will and the legal character of the executor. Probate court does not decide any question of title or of the existence of the property itself. 

An error of jurisdiction nullifies every act/decision

A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 372 at page 649

36. In Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan [(1955) 1 SCR 117 at 121 : AIR 1954 SC 340] Venkatarama Ayyar, J. observed that the fundamental principle is well established that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its validity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon — even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject-matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties.

bail applications from same FIR before same court

Abhyanand Sharma v. State of Bihar, (2022) 10 SCC 819 

Benefit of Acquittal to non appealing accused

Mohd. Sajjad v. State of W.B., (2017) 11 SCC 150 : (2017) 3 SCC (Cri) 899 : 2017 SCC OnLine SC 27 at page 158

20. Mr Mrinal Kanti Mandal, learned Advocate is right in submitting that in certain cases this Court had granted benefit even to a non-appealing accused. In Bijoy Singh v. State of Bihar [Bijoy Singh v. State of Bihar, (2002) 9 SCC 147 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1093] , this Court observed that if on evaluation of the case, a conclusion is reached that no conviction of any accused was possible the benefit of that decision must be extended to the similarly situated co-accused even though he had not challenged the order by way of the appeal. To similar effect was the dictum of this Court in Suresh Chaudhary v. State of Bihar [Suresh Chaudhary v. State of Bihar, (2003) 4 SCC 128 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 801] and in Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana [Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2003) 11 SCC 241 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 109] and in Mohinder Singh v. State of Punjab [Mohinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2004) 12 SCC 311 : 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp 252] .

Whether a matter can be whether a matter can be remitted back to the Labour Court for a decision afresh

Case:  HIND FILTERS LTD. & ANR.  V. HIND FILTER EMPLOYEES' UNION & ANR., CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8801 OF 2012, DECIDED ON 17.08.2023      

If the material sought to be placed before the labour court is such that it will go to the root of the matter in determining the jurisdiction of the labour court to determine the issue.

Relevant paras 

 21. On the issue as to whether a matter can be remitted back to the Labour Court for a decision afresh, guidance is available from judgment of this Court in Santhosh Bansi Mahajan's case (supra). It was a case where a document on which reliance was placed by the workmen was not placed before the Labour Court when the matter was considered. It was placed on record for the first time before this Court. Liberty was given by this Court to file the said document before the Labour Court and the matter was remitted back to the Labour Court to be decided afresh. Similar issue had come up for decision before this Court in Bundi Zila Petrol Pump Dealers Association's case (supra) wherein an ex-parte Award was passed against the Management. This Court, finding that there were sufficient reasons for the absence of the Page 21 of 22 Management before the Tribunal, set aside the Award and the matter was remanded to the Industrial Tribunal giving liberty to the appellant before this Court to file the written statement and lead evidence.

22. In the case in hand as well on the facts, as noticed above, we find that the matter needs to be re-examined by the Labour Court, as the material permitted to be placed on record will go to the root of the case in determining the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to adjudicate the matter. The material sought to be relied upon by the appellants/Management to substantiate its plea has been briefly referred to in paras 16 and 19 of this order.   

Nullification of a Judgment by the Legislature

Can judgment be nullified by subsequent acts of a legislature?  If so, how and to what extent? In other words, what is the permissibility of abrogation of a thing in order to remove the basis of a judgment?

NHPC LTD. V STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS.  CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3948 OF 2009

11. What follows from the aforesaid judicial precedent is a legislature cannot directly set aside a judicial decision. However, when a competent legislature retrospectively removes the substratum or foundation of a judgment to make the decision ineffective, the same is a valid legislative exercise provided it does not transgress on any other constitutional limitation. Such a legislative device which removes the vice in the previous legislation which has been declared unconstitutional is not considered to be an encroachment on judicial power but an instance of abrogation recognised under the Constitution of India. The decisions referred to above, manifestly show that it is open to the legislature to alter the law retrospectively, provided the alteration is made in such a manner that it would no more be possible for the Court to arrive at the  same verdict. In other words, the very premise of the earlier judgment should be removed, thereby resulting in a fundamental change of the circumstances upon which it was founded.

 12. It would be permissible for the legislature to remove a defect in an earlier legislation, as pointed out by a constitutional court in exercise of its powers by way of judicial review. This defect can be removed both prospectively and retrospectively by a legislative process and previous actions can also be validated. However, where a legislature merely seeks to validate the acts carried out under a previous legislation which has been struck down or rendered inoperative by a Court, by a subsequent legislation without curing the defects in such legislation, the subsequent legislation would also be ultra-vires.   (Emphasis supplied)

What is a continuing wrong for the purposes of limitation?

What is a continuing cause of action?

CWT v. Suresh Seth, (1981) 2 SCC 790

"11. In the instant case the contention is that the wrong or the default in question has been altered into a continuing wrong or default giving rise to a liability de die in diem, that is, from day to day. The distinctive nature of a continuing wrong is that the law that is violated makes the wrongdoer continuously liable for penalty. A wrong or default which is complete but whose effect may continue to be felt even after its completion is, however, not a continuing wrong or default. It is reasonable to take the view that the court should not be eager to hold that an act or omission is a continuing wrong or default unless there are words in the statute concerned which make out that such was the intention of the legislature. In the instant case whenever the question of levying penalty arises what has to be first considered is whether the assessee has failed without reasonable cause of file the return as required by law and if it is held that he has failed to do so then penalty has to be levied in accordance with the measure provided in the Act. When the default is the filing of delayed return the penalty may be correlated to the time-lag between the last day for filing it without penalty and the day on which it is filed and the quantum of tax or wealth involved in the case for purposes of determining the quantum of penalty but the default however is only one which takes place on the expiry of the last day for filing the return without penalty and not a continuing one. The default in question does not, however, give rise to a fresh cause of action every day. Explaining the expression "a continuing cause of action" Lord Lindley in Hole v. Chard Union [(1894) 1 Ch D 293 : 63 LJ Ch 469 : 70 LT 52] observed:

"What is a continuing cause of action? Speaking accurately, there is no such thing; but what is called a continuing cause of action is a cause of action which arises from the repetition of acts or omissions of the same kind as that for which the action was brought."

Balkrishna Savalram Pujari v. Shree Dnyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan [AIR 1959 SC 798], Gajendragadkar, J.:

"It is the very essence of a continuing wrong that it is an act which creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the act responsible and liable for the continuance of the said injury. If the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong, even though the damage resulting from the act may continue. If, however, a wrongful act is of such a character that the injury caused by it itself continues, then the act constitutes a continuing wrong. In this connection it is necessary to draw a distinction between the injury caused by the wrongful act and what may be described as the effect of the said injury. . . ."

Balkrishna Savalram Pujari and Others vs. Shree Dnyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan & Others, [1959] Supp. (2) S.C.R. 476:

"… …. In dealing with this argument it is necessary to bear in mind that s.23 refers not to a continuing right but to a continuing wrong. It is the very essence of a continuing wrong that it is an act  which creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the act responsible and liable for the continuance of the said injury. If the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may continue. If, however, a wrongful act is of such a character that the injury caused by it itself continues then the act constitutes a continuing wrong. In this connection it is necessary to draw a distinction between the injury caused by the wrongful act and what may be described as the effect of the said injury. It is only in regard to acts which can be properly characterised as continuing wrongs that s.23 can be invoked. Thus considered it is difficult to hold that the trustees' act in denying altogether the alleged rights of the Guravs as hereditary worshippers and in claiming and obtaining possession from them by their suit in 1922 was a continuing wrong. The decree obtained by the trustees in the said litigation had injured effectively and completely the appellants' rights though the damage caused by the said decree subsequently continued..." (Page 496)

Hari Singh v Haryana 1993 3 SCC 114 - DISMISSAL OF SLP OF CO ACCUSED IS NOT A BAR