Forgery - Fraud on court and 340 or contempt

 

Re: whether presenting a false document amounts to Fraud on court and same should be decided at threshold or preliminary stage ?  

 

Case Title	Issue	Relevant Observations
Ramrameshwari Devi v. Nirmala Devi, (2011) 8 SCC 249	Although there are complex facts involved in the case and issues does not pertain to our research. However, the SC made same significant observation. The brief case pertains to wherein the appellant was claiming certain reliefs in respect of suit property. The Court Highlighted the issue of frivolous, and uncalled litigation wherein parties deliberately institute the case to frustrate and create obstacles to prolong the course of proceedings of lower courts.	Relevant portion is Highlighted The main question which arises for our consideration is whether the prevailing delay in civil litigation can be curbed? In our considered opinion the existing system can be drastically changed or improved if the following steps are taken by the trial courts while dealing with the civil trials: A. Pleadings are the foundation of the claims of parties. Civil litigation is largely based on documents. It is the bounden duty and obligation of the trial Judge to carefully scrutinise, check and verify the pleadings and the documents filed by the parties. This must be done immediately after civil suits are filed. B. The court should resort to discovery and production of documents and interrogatories at the earliest according to the object of the Act. If this exercise is carefully carried out, it would focus the controversies involved in the case and help the court in arriving at the truth of the matter and doing substantial justice. C. Imposition of actual, realistic or proper costs and/or ordering prosecution would go a long way in controlling the tendency of introducing false pleadings and forged and fabricated documents by the litigants. Imposition of heavy costs would also control unnecessary adjournments by the parties. In appropriate cases the courts may consider ordering prosecution otherwise it may not be possible to maintain purity and sanctity of judicial proceedings. D. The court must adopt realistic and pragmatic approach in granting mesne profits. The court must carefully keep in view the ground realities while granting mesne profits. E. The courts should be extremely careful and cautious in granting ex parte ad interim injunctions or stay orders. Ordinarily short notice should be issued to the defendants or respondents and only after hearing the parties concerned appropriate orders should be passed.
Chandra Shashi v. Anil Kumar Verma, (1995) 1 SCC 421	The issue addressed in this was whether the filing of forged or fabricated document in the court of laws amounts to interference in the administration of Justice and thus punishable by Criminal contempt of Court. The brief case was the Respondent husband presented a false and fabricated document to oppose the prayer of wife seeking the transfer of matrimonial proceedings.   On finding the documents to be forged the SC initiated Suo moto Contempt case.	Relevant Observations Para 14 14. The legal position thus is that if the publication be with intent to deceive the court or one made with an intention to defraud, the same would be contempt, as it would interfere with administration of justice. It would, in any case, tend to interfere with the same. This would definitely be so if a fabricated document is filed with the aforesaid mens rea. In the case at hand the fabricated document was apparently to deceive the court; the intention to defraud is writ large. Anil Kumar is, therefore, guilty of contempt.
Meghmala v. G. Narasimha Reddy, (2010) 8 SCC 383	The controversy in the case is not related to our research but the court the SC made some crucial observations regarding Fraud and suppression of material facts. The Brief facts was that there was land grabbing dispute under A.P. Land Grabbing Act b/w appellant -Respondent. Though there are several issues involved, one of the issues were the non-disclosure or suppression sale deed while obtaining court order.   The court explained the Fraud on Court by Non-disclosure of facts necessary for adjudication and its effects	Relevant Observations Para 32, 33, 34, 36   36. From the above, it is evident that even in judicial proceedings, once a fraud is proved, all advantages gained by playing fraud can be taken away. In such an eventuality the questions of non-executing of the statutory remedies or statutory bars like doctrine of res judicata are not attracted. Suppression of any material fact/document amounts to a fraud on the court. Every court has an inherent power to recall its own order obtained by fraud as the order so obtained is non est.   34. An act of fraud on court is always viewed seriously. A collusion or conspiracy with a view to deprive the rights of the others in relation to a property would render the transaction void ab initio. Fraud and deception are synonymous. Although in a given case a deception may not amount to fraud, fraud is anathema to all equitable principles and any affair tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or saved by the application of any equitable doctrine including res judicata. Fraud is proved when it is shown that a false representation has been made (i) knowingly, or (ii) without belief in its truth, or (iii) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false. Suppression of a material document would also amount to a fraud on the court. (Vide S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu [(1994) 1 SCC 1 : AIR 1994 SC 853] , Gowrishankar v. Joshi Amba Shankar Family Trust [(1996) 3 SCC 310 : AIR 1996 SC 2202] , Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi [(2003) 8 SCC 319] , Roshan Deen v. Preeti Lal [(2002) 1 SCC 100 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 97 : AIR 2002 SC 33] , Ram Preeti Yadav v. U.P. Board of High School & Intermediate Education [(2003) 8 SCC 311 : AIR 2003 SC 4268] and Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of T.N. [(2004) 3 SCC 1 : AIR 2004 SC 2836] )   32. The ratio laid down by this Court in various cases is that dishonesty should not be permitted to bear the fruit and benefit to the persons who played fraud or made misrepresentation and in such circumstances the Court should not perpetuate the fraud. (See Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society v. M. Tripura Sundari Devi [(1990) 3 SCC 655 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 520 : (1990) 14 ATC 766] , Union of India v. M. Bhaskaran [1995 Supp (4) SCC 100 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 162 : (1996) 32 ATC 94] , Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. Girdharilal Yadav [(2004) 6 SCC 325 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 785] , State of Maharashtra v. Ravi Prakash Babulalsing Parmar [(2007) 1 SCC 80 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 5] , Himadri Chemicals Industries Ltd. v. Coal Tar Refining Co. [(2007) 8 SCC 110 : AIR 2007 SC 2798] and Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar [(2009) 8 SCC 751 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 929] .)   33. Fraud is an intrinsic, collateral act, and fraud of an egregious nature would vitiate the most solemn proceedings of courts of justice. Fraud is an act of deliberate deception with a design to secure something, which is otherwise not due. The expression "fraud" involves two elements, deceit and injury to the person deceived. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage. [Vide Vimla (Dr.) v. Delhi Admn. [AIR 1963 SC 1572 : (1963) 2 Cri LJ 434] , Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) (P) Ltd. [(1996) 5 SCC 550] , State of A.P. v. T. Suryachandra Rao [(2005) 6 SCC 149 : AIR 2005 SC 3110] , K.D. Sharma v. SAIL [(2008) 12 SCC 481] and Central Bank of India v. Madhulika Guruprasad Dahir [(2008) 13 SCC 170 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 272] .]
S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath, (1994) 1 SCC 1	The issue involved in this case was obtaining of decree on the basis of   non-disclosure of material and relevant facts werein the Appellant prayed for partition without disclosing that the deed of release relinquishing his right in respect of said suit property.   The court traced the meaning of Fraud	5. The High Court, in our view, fell into patent error. The short question before the High Court was whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the court. The High Court, however, went haywire and made observations which are wholly perverse. We do not agree with the High Court that "there is no legal duty cast upon the plaintiff to come to court with a true case and prove it by true evidence". The principle of "finality of litigation" cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court-process a convenient lever to retain the illegal gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, who's case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation.

 

 

Burden of Proof

 

Re: Burden of Proof and Onus of Proof

 

Case Title	Issue	Relevant Observations
Phoenix Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, 2004 SCC OnLine Bom 33		Read Para 17 ……..The burden always lies on the person who asserts that the particular goods are excisable. It lies at first on the party who would be unsuccessful if no evidence at all was given on either side. There is essential distinction between burden of proof and onus of proof. The burden of proof lies upon the person who has to prove a fact and it never shifts, but the onus of proof shifts. Onus means the duty of adducing evidence. Assuming that onus has shifted on the petitioner, then, the evidence produced by the petitioners has substantially established the link between the material supplied and used by the petitioners.
Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 1 SCC 133		Read para 19, 20, 21, 22, 23   19. "Proof", which is the effect of evidence led, is defined by the provisions of Section 3 of the Evidence Act. The effect of evidence has to be distinguished from the duty or burden of showing to the court what conclusions it should reach. This duty is called the "onus probandi", which is placed upon one of the parties, in accordance with appropriate provisions of law applicable to various situations; but, the effect of the evidence led is a matter of inference or a conclusion to be arrived at by the Court.   20. The total effect of evidence is determined at the end of a proceeding not merely by considering the general duties imposed by Sections 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act but also the special or particular ones imposed by other provisions such as Sections 103 and 106 of the Evidence Act. Section 103 enacts: "103. The burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the Court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person." And, Section 106 lays down: "106. When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him." 21. In judging whether a general or a particular or special onus has been discharged, the court will not only consider the direct effect of the oral and documentary evidence led but also what may be indirectly inferred because certain facts have been proved or not proved though easily capable of proof if they existed at all which raise either a presumption of law or of fact. Section 114 of the Evidence Act covers a wide range of presumptions of fact which can be used by courts in the course of administration of justice to remove lacunae in the chain of direct evidence before it. It is, therefore, said that the function of a presumption often is to "fill a gap" in evidence.   22. True presumptions, whether of law or of fact, are always rebuttable. In other words, the party against which a presumption may operate can and must lead evidence to show why the presumption should not be given effect to. If, for example, the party which initiates a proceeding or comes with a case to court offers no evidence to support it, the presumption is that such evidence does not exist. And, if some evidence is shown to exist on a question in issue, but the party which has it within its power to produce it, does not, despite notice to it to do so, produce it, the natural presumption is that it would, if produced, have gone against it. Similarly, a presumption arises from failure to discharge a special or particular onus.   23. The result of a trial or proceeding is determined by a weighing of the totality of facts and circumstances and presumptions operating in favour of one party as against those which may tilt the balance in favour of another. Such weighment always takes place at the end of a trial or proceeding which cannot, for purposes of this final weighment, be split up into disjointed and disconnected parts simply because the requirements of procedural regularity and logic, embodied in procedural law, prescribe a sequence, a stage, and a mode of proof for each party tendering its evidence. What is weighed at the end is one totality against another and not selected bits or scraps of evidence against each other.
Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189		27. Every accused is presumed to be innocent unless the guilt is proved. The presumption of innocence is a human right. However, subject to the statutory exceptions, the said principle forms the basis of criminal jurisprudence. For this purpose, the nature of the offence, its seriousness and gravity thereof has to be taken into consideration. The courts must be on guard to see that merely on the application of the presumption, the same may not lead to any injustice or mistaken conviction. Statutes like the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; and the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, provide for presumption of guilt if the circumstances provided in those statutes are found to be fulfilled and shift the burden of proof of innocence on the accused. However, such a presumption can also be raised only when certain foundational facts are established by the prosecution. There may be difficulty in proving a negative fact.   28. However, in cases where the statute does not provide for the burden of proof on the accused, it always lies on the prosecution. It is only in exceptional circumstances, such as those of statutes as referred to hereinabove, that the burden of proof is on the accused. The statutory provision even for a presumption of guilt of the accused under a particular statute must meet the tests of reasonableness and liberty enshrined in Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution
Ishar Das v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, 1975 SCC OnLine Del 60	.	15. Subba Rao, J. (as he then was), speaking for the Supreme Court in Raghavamma v. A. Chenchamma (A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 136 at p. 143) (7) referring to sections 101 to 103 explained the distinction between burden of proof and onus of proof in the following terms: "There is an essential distinction between Burden of proof and onus of proof: burden of proof lies upon the person who has to prove a fact and it never shifts, but the onus of proof shifts. The burden of proof in the present case undoubtedly lies upon the plaintiff to establish the factum of adoption and that of partition. The said circumstances do not alter the incidence of the burden of proof. Such considerations, having regard to the circumstances of a particular case, may shift the onus of proof. Such a shifting of onus is a continuous process in the evaluation of evidence.   16. The burden of proof that lies under Section 101 and that under Section 102 of the Evidence Act is distinguishable: the former has been described as a "legal" or "persuasive burden" and the latter as the evidential burden or as the "burden of adducing evidence" (Phipson). It is easy enough to say concerning the legal or persuasive burden that it lies on whichever party would fail if no evidence were given on either side or if the allegation to be proved is struck out of the record. But, as Rupert Cross points out "A moment's reflection should suffice to show that these tests are only applicable to the evidential burden; they cannot apply to the legal burden in all cases." "As a matter of commonsense", "the legal burden of proving all facts essential to their claims normally rests upon the plaintiff in a civil suit or that prosecutor in criminal proceedings"; it would go to such length as the burden of proof of the assertion still resting upon the plaintiff even "if the assertion of a negative is an essential part of the plaintiff's case." (Vide Bowen, L.J. in Abrath v. North Eastern Rail, Co., 1883 11 Q.B.D. 440 at p. (457) (8) a decision which was affirmed by the House of Lords in (1886) 11 A.C. 247). Cross explains the difficulty which may sometimes arise with regard to the question whether an assertion is essential to a party's case or that of the adversary by referring to the decision of the House of Lords in Joseph Constantine Steamship Line, Ltd. v. Imperial Smelting Corporation, Ltd. (1942 A.C. 154) (9). In that case the charterer of the ship claimed damages from the owners for failure to load; the owners pleaded frustration of the contract by reason of the destruction of the ship owing to an explosion. The question of fact for determination was whether the explosion had been caused by the fault of the owner, but the evidence was scanty on this question. The House of Lords held that the plaintiff had the legal burden of proving default when frustration of the contract was pleaded. In some cases, as Cross explains, it becomes necessary to ascertain the "legal burden of proof" even after consulting the precedents concerned with the various branches of substantive law. Even greater difficulty arises when the existence or non-existence of any fact in issue may be known for certain by one of the parties and this is often said to have an important bearing on the incident of burden of proof of that fact. Reference in this connection is made by him to R. v. Turner, (1816) 5 m. & S. 206) where the accused was prosecuted for having pheasants and hares in his possession without the necessary qualification or authorisation; ten possible qualifications had been mentioned in the relevant statute. The King's Bench held that it was unnecessary for the Crown to prove that these qualifications did not apply to the case. In R. v. Spurge, (1961) 2 Q.B. 205 it was held that "there was no rule of law that where the facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused the burden of establishing any defence based on these facts shifts to the accused"   18. Reference has been made to some of these aspects in an endeavour to comprehend the amplitude of the concept of the "shifting" of onus as a "continuous process in the evaluation of evidence" as explained by Subba Rao J. The above passages from Cross and the legal literature on the subject cited by him clearly show that in some cases at least it may not be enough to start at the point where the onus shifts from the landlord to the tenant and to let it stay with him for ever, unless by what he has done or failed to show, in other words, by his failure to play the ball back to the other, the legal burden which has been placed on the landlord, under this piece of substantive law has been discharged. It cannot, for instance, be said that once the landlord gives a version of the tenant's means, however fanciful it may be the onus shifts to the tenant, it stays permanently with him thereafter and that the landlord has nothing further to do with it. To say so would obviously be to throw the burden on the tenant despite Section 19 laying the legal burden, in terms of section 101 of the Evidence Act, on the landlord. It is, therefore, crucial to understand the distinction what Subba Rao, J. explained as the distinction between "burden of proof" and "onus of proof and the "onus of proof" being "continuously shifting in the appreciation of evidence". It would be an easy enough situation where the tenant does not let in any evidence at all or is seen to be guilty of fraudulent conduct and suppresses such evidence as may be in his possession or power and such suppression may in the circumstances of the case give rise to an adverse inference being properly drawn against him. The difficulty in appreciating the evidence in a situation of "shifting of onus as a continuous process", cannot be overcome by reliance on crutches like "unclean hands", an expression

 

Limitation to challenge Award S. 34 Arbitration

 Limitation for filing S. 17 application under Arbitration Act, 1940 begins from awareness of award's availability, not receipt of copy

[Krishna Devi v. Union of India, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 24]