Article 226 can be resorted in apt cases when Section 438 is not available (UP)

Hema Mishra v. State of U.P., (2014) 4 SCC 453 : (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 363 : 2014 SCC OnLine SC 40 at page 472

36. Thus, such a power has to be exercised very cautiously keeping in view, at the same time, that the provisions of Article 226 are a device to advance justice and not to frustrate it. The powers are, therefore, to be exercised to prevent miscarriage of justice and to prevent abuse of process of law by the authorities indiscriminately making pre-arrest of the accused persons. In entertaining such a petition under Article 226, the High Court is supposed to balance the two interests. On the one hand, the Court is to ensure that such a power under Article 226 is not to be exercised liberally so as to convert it into Section 438 CrPC proceedings, keeping in mind that when this provision is specifically omitted in the State of Uttar Pradesh, it cannot be resorted to as back door entry via Article 226. On the other hand, wherever the High Court finds that in a given case if the protection against pre-arrest is not given, it would amount to gross miscarriage of justice and no case, at all, is made for arrest pending trial, the High Court would be free to grant the relief in the nature of anticipatory bail in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is again clarified that this power has to be exercised sparingly in those cases where it is absolutely warranted and justified

 

Infringement of Patent: Action lies anywhere where infringement takes place

Hindustan Lever v. Lalit Wadhwa, ILR (2008) 1 Del 408.

 

(C) Patents Act — Territorial Jurisdiction — Patents have effect throughout India — Suit can be filed wherever the patentee wants to prevent third parties from offering from sale/selling products which infringe the patent any where in India.

Under Section 24 of the Patents Act, every patent shall have effect throughout India. Under Section 48 of the Patents Act, the patentee of a product has the exclusive right to prevent other parties, who do not have its consent, from making, using, offering for sale, selling or importing for those purposes, the product in India which is the subject matter of patent. Consequently, the patentee is entitled to prevent other parties from offering for sale or selling the products which infringe the patent in any part of India wherever they may be sold. Admittedly, the Defendants are selling their products in Delhi. The infringement of the Plaintiffs rights under Section 48 of the Patents Act has therefore, taken place in Delhi, assuming that the plaintiff has a valid patent and that the defendants product infringes the same.

 

A.P.D. Jain Pathshala v. Shivaji Bhagwat More, (2011) 13 SCC 99 at page 110

29. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the courts shall, subject to the provisions of the Code, have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. The express or implied bar necessarily refers to a bar created by the Code itself or by any statute made by a legislature. Therefore, the High Court in exercise of the power of judicial review, cannot issue a direction that the civil courts shall not entertain any suit or application in regard to a particular type of disputes (in this case, disputes relating to Shikshan Sevaks) nor create exclusive jurisdiction in a quasi-judicial forum like the Grievance Committee will be entitled to deal with them. The High Court, cannot, by a judicial order, nullify, supersede or render ineffectual the express provisions of an enactment.

 

High Court Cannot Direct Governments to Create Tribunal or Claims Commission by executive order

A.P.D. Jain Pathshala v. Shivaji Bhagwat More, (2011) 13 SCC 99 at page 110

 

28. Neither the Constitution nor any statute empowers a High Court to create or constitute quasi-judicial tribunals for adjudicating disputes. It has no legislative powers. Nor can it direct the executive branch of the State Government to create or constitute quasi-judicial tribunals, otherwise than by legislative statutes. Therefore, it is not permissible for the High Court to direct the State Government to constitute judicial authorities or tribunals by executive orders, nor permissible for the State by executive order or resolution to create them for adjudication of rights of parties.

Interim relief to be in aid of final relief

In State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta [AIR 1952 SC 12 : 1952 SCR 28 : 1951 SCJ 764] a Constitution Bench of this Court clearly spelt out the contours within which interim relief can be granted.

Suppression should be that of "material fact"

Arunima Baruah v. Union of India, (2007) 6 SCC 120 at page 125

12. It is trite law that so as to enable the court to refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction suppression must be of material fact. What would be a material fact, suppression whereof would disentitle the appellant to obtain a discretionary relief, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Material fact would mean material for the purpose of determination of the lis, the logical corollary whereof would be that whether the same was material for grant or denial of the relief. If the fact suppressed is not material for determination of the lis between the parties, the court may not refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. It is also trite that a person invoking the discretionary jurisdiction of the court cannot be allowed to approach it with a pair of dirty hands. But even if the said dirt is removed and the hands become clean, whether the relief would still be denied is the question.

 

Floodgates Arguments

N. Kannadasan v. Ajoy Khose, (2009) 7 SCC 1 at page 55

127. Mr Venugopal would submit that such an interpretation would open a floodgate. We do not think so. We even wish no occasion like the present one arises in future before the superior courts for their consideration. Even otherwise, the floodgate argument does not appeal to us. In Coal India Ltd. v.Saroj Kumar Mishra [(2007) 9 SCC 625] this Court held: (SCC p. 632, para 19)

“19. The floodgate argument also does not appeal to us. The same appears to be an argument of desperation. Only because there is a possibility of floodgate litigation, a valuable right of a citizen cannot be permitted to be taken away. This Court is bound to determine the respective rights of the parties. (See Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India[(2005) 4 SCC 649] and Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee v.C.K. Rajan [(2003) 7 SCC 546] .)”