Binding Nature of Judgment set aside on a different point

 

S. Shanmugavel Nadar v. State of T.N., (2002) 8 SCC 361 at page 369

15. A situation, near similar to the one posed before us, has been dealt in Salmond's Jurisprudence (12th Edn., at pp. 149-50) under the caption — “Circumstances destroying or weakening the binding force of precedent: (perhaps) affirmation or reversal on a different ground.” It sometimes happens that a decision is affirmed or reversed on appeal on a different point. As an example, suppose that a case is decided in the Court of Appeal on ground A, and then goes on appeal to the House of Lords, which decides it on ground B, nothing being said upon A. What, in such circumstances, is the authority of the decision on ground A in the Court of Appeal? Is the decision binding on the High Court, and on the Court of Appeal itself in subsequent cases? The learned author notes the difficulty in the question being positively answered and then states: (i) The High Court may, for example, shift the ground of its decision because it thinks that this is the easiest way to decide the case, the point decided in the court below being of some complexity. It is certainly possible to find cases in the reports where judgments affirmed on a different point have been regarded as authoritative for what they decided. (ii) The true view is that a decision either affirmed or reversed on another point is deprived of any absolute binding force it might otherwise have had; but it remains an authority which may be followed by a court that thinks that particular point to have been rightly decided.

 

"Second" SLP (by different party) against same impugned order may still be entertained

Delhi Admn. v. Madan Lal Nangia, (2003) 10 SCC 321 at page 326

4. Dr Dhavan submitted that this civil appeal should be dismissed because the Delhi Development Authority had also filed a special leave petition against this portion of the judgment whereby the writ petition of the respondents had been allowed. He pointed out that in that special leave petition the Union of India and the Delhi Administration were Respondents 10 and 13 respectively. He submitted that that special leave petition was dismissed on 18-11-1996. He pointed out that the review filed by the Delhi Development Authority was also dismissed on 7-11-2000. He submitted that in this special leave petition the Union of India and the Delhi Development Authority have not been made parties obviously with an intention of hiding the fact that the Delhi Development Authority's special leave petition had been dismissed. We are unable to accept this submission. We have seen the orders dated 18-11-1996 whereby the Delhi Development Authority's special leave petition was summarily dismissed. It is settled law that if a special leave petition is summarily dismissed such a dismissal does not bar other parties from filing a special leave petition against the same judgment. No authority is required for this proposition but if any is required, then the cases of Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala [(2000) 6 SCC 359] and S. Shanmugavel Nadar v. State of T.N. [(2002) 8 SCC 361] may be looked at. Even otherwise, the order dated 7-11-2000 is very clear. On this date the Delhi Development Authority's review petition was dismissed, but this order specifically delinked this civil appeal along with two other civil appeals. Once this Court has specifically chosen to keep this appeal alive, we do not consider it correct or proper to now dismiss this appeal only on the ground that the special leave petition and the review petition of the Delhi Development Authority have been dismissed.

 

SLP only against review order is not maintainable

 Vinod Kapoor v. State of Goa, (2012) 12 SCC 378 : 2012 SCC OnLine SC 817 at page 382

11. Moreover, on the High Court rejecting the application for review of the appellant, the order rejecting the application for review is not appealable by virtue of the principle in Order 47 Rule 7 CPC. In Shanker Motiram Nale v. Shiolalsing Gannusing Rajput [(1994) 2 SCC 753] , Suseel Finance & Leasing Co. v. M. Lata[(2004) 13 SCC 675] and M.N. Haider v. Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan [(2004) 13 SCC 677] cited by the learned counsel for Respondent 8, this Court has consistently held that an appeal by way of special leave petition under Article 136 of the Constitution is not maintainable against the order rejecting an application for review in view of the provisions of Order 47 Rule 7 CPC.

 

After dismissal of suit (default), writ will not lie

P.R. Murlidharan v. Swami Dharmananda Theertha Padar, (2006) 4 SCC 501 at page 504, para 12.

Two inconsistent sections in the same Act

Govt. of T.N. v. Park View Enterprises, (2001) 1 SCC 742 at page 746

8. The intent of the legislature in the matter of placement of sections also needs to be gone into since a later section will carry its effectiveness in the event of contraintention expressed in an earlier provision of the statute. The law is well settled on this score and we need not dilate thereon any further but the factum of the refusal to register by reason of undervaluation in terms of Section 47-A cannot stand scrutiny of acceptance having regard to the language used therein. The legislative intent as expressed in Section 35 stands clear to the fact that refusal to register is not permissible in terms therewith. Section 35 is a provision to cater for the instruments not being properly stamped and as such being inadmissible in evidence. It is not that the legislature was not aware of the stamp duty but a special power has been conferred on the Registrar in that regard and the Collector has been empowered to impose appropriate fees and stamp duty in terms of provision of Section 38 read with Sections 39 and 40 of the Act. The powers of the Collector as specified therein, stand in an unambiguous situation as the final authority in the matter of assessment of the duty leviable thereon, and that is precisely the reason as to why the State Legislature engrafted Section 47-A and specifically records in the statute that steps are to be taken only after registration of such an instrument. It can thus conclusively be said that there is existing a categorical expression of legislative intent in regard to the registration of the document — the registration is effected subject to the condition as provided in the statute itself with proper safeguard being taken note of by the legislature and contraexpression of opinion would run counter to the legislative intent which is otherwise not permissible in law.

 

Second SLP

In Vinod Kapoor v. State of Goa [(2012) 12 SCC 378 : AIR 2012 SC 3722] , has categorically observed that once the special leave petition is dismissed as withdrawn without obtaining appropriate permission to file a special leave petition once over again after exhausting the remedy of review petition before the High Court, the same is not maintainable.

Thayer Doctrine -