Supreme Court passing order without notice to Respondent

State of Rajasthan v. Mahila Mandal, (2011) 15 SCC 499 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 615 at page 499

2. We are quite conscious of the fact that we are passing this order without giving notice to the respondent(s) because the controversy is very limited and giving notice would cause much greater financial hardship for the respondent(s). In this view of the matter, we are passing this order in absence of the respondent(s). In case the respondent(s) is/are still aggrieved then the respondent(s) would be at liberty to approach this Court.

 

Daughters in Family Settlement

Public Interest v. Private Interest

Brij Pal Sharma v. Ghaziabad Development Authority, (2005) 7 SCC 106 at page 109

17. We, however, clarify that dismissal of the appeal should not be construed as approval of the conduct of the statutory authority in the manner in which it is sought to be done. The statutory authority, like GDA, being the State within the ambit of Article 12 of the Constitution, is duty-bound to act in a manner, which would benefit the public interest, overlooking the private interest. It is trite law that when the private interest is pitted against the public interest, the later must prevail over the former. If such instances are brought to the notice of the Court in future, they would be examined on their own merits.

 

Undertaking to pay under threat of arrest

Arrest warrant — Release upon undertaking to deposit Rs. 10 lac — Legality — Undertaking given by appellant while being under constraint of his arrest cannot be termed as voluntary one — Legal liability of appellant is yet to be ascertained — Arrest and release upon undertaking order cannot be legally sustained.
II (2015) BC 155 (DRAT — Delhi)

Filing 32 after 136

Once SLP is dismissed, another SLP from same order can be entertained

Binding Nature of Judgment set aside on a different point

 

S. Shanmugavel Nadar v. State of T.N., (2002) 8 SCC 361 at page 369

15. A situation, near similar to the one posed before us, has been dealt in Salmond's Jurisprudence (12th Edn., at pp. 149-50) under the caption — “Circumstances destroying or weakening the binding force of precedent: (perhaps) affirmation or reversal on a different ground.” It sometimes happens that a decision is affirmed or reversed on appeal on a different point. As an example, suppose that a case is decided in the Court of Appeal on ground A, and then goes on appeal to the House of Lords, which decides it on ground B, nothing being said upon A. What, in such circumstances, is the authority of the decision on ground A in the Court of Appeal? Is the decision binding on the High Court, and on the Court of Appeal itself in subsequent cases? The learned author notes the difficulty in the question being positively answered and then states: (i) The High Court may, for example, shift the ground of its decision because it thinks that this is the easiest way to decide the case, the point decided in the court below being of some complexity. It is certainly possible to find cases in the reports where judgments affirmed on a different point have been regarded as authoritative for what they decided. (ii) The true view is that a decision either affirmed or reversed on another point is deprived of any absolute binding force it might otherwise have had; but it remains an authority which may be followed by a court that thinks that particular point to have been rightly decided.