Extending Benefits to Third parties in Service Law

State of U.P. v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava, (2015) 1 SCC 347, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has held that  "if the judgment of the court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence." 

Representation and Extension of Limitation Period

     State of Tripura v. Arabinda Chakraborty, (2014) 6 SCC 460 : (2014) 3 SCC (Civ) 596 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 300 : 2014 SCC OnLine SC 353 at page 463

15. In our opinion, the suit was hopelessly barred by law of limitation. Simply by making a representation when there is no statutory provision or there is no statutory appeal provided, the period of limitation would not get extended. The law does not permit extension of period of limitation by mere filing of a representation. A person may go on making representations for years and in such an event the period of limitation would not commence from the date on which the last representation is decided. In the instant case, it is a fact that the respondent was given a fresh appointment order on 22-11-1967, which is on record. The said appointment order gave a fresh appointment to the respondent and therefore, there could not have been any question with regard to continuity of service with effect from the first employment of the respondent.

Money Claim in Writ Petition - Scope of 226

 Joshi Technologies International Inc. v. Union of India, (2015) 7 SCC 728 : 2015 SCC OnLine SC 490 at page 766

"69. The position thus summarised in the aforesaid principles has to be understood in the context of discussion that preceded which we have pointed out above. As per this, no doubt, there is no absolute bar to the maintainability of the writ petition even in contractual matters or where there are disputed questions of fact or even when monetary claim is raised. At the same time, discretion lies with the High Court which under certain circumstances, it can refuse to exercise. It also follows that under the following circumstances, "normally", the Court would not exercise such a discretion:

69.1. The Court may not examine the issue unless the action has some public law character attached to it.

69.2. Whenever a particular mode of settlement of dispute is provided in the contract, the High Court would refuse to exercise its discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution and relegate the party to the said mode of settlement, particularly when settlement of disputes is to be resorted to through the means of arbitration.

69.3. If there are very serious disputed questions of fact which are of complex nature and require oral evidence for their determination.

69.4. Money claims per se particularly arising out of contractual obligations are normally not to be entertained except in exceptional circumstances."

Suppression in List of Dates

Union of India v. Shantiranjan Sarkar, (2009) 3 SCC 90 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 575 at page 92

8. Before adverting to the contentions raised before us by the learned counsel for the parties, we may notice that the appellants suppressed a material fact. It appears that the fact that the High Court had recalled its earlier order dated 9-7-2004 by an order dated 30-11-2004 had not been mentioned in the list of dates. This Court, therefore, must have proceeded on the basis that the impugned order was passed on a review application and not in the original writ proceedings. We do not find appropriate words to deprecate such a practice and that too by the Union of India. We should have dismissed the special leave petition on this ground alone. Let us, however, also consider the merit of the matter.

Maintainability is a legal plea jurisdictional plea can be raised anytime

State of Rajasthan v. Rao Raja Kalyan Singh, (1972) 4 SCC 165 at page 167

6. Though this issue is not very specific but undoubtedly it covers the plea taken by the respondent in para 1 of his written statement. That apart the plea of maintainability of the suit is essentially a legal plea. If the suit on the face of it is not maintainable, the fact that no specific pleas were taken or no precise issues were framed are of little consequence.

Civil Suit is barred to challenge steps taken in Land Acquisition

State of Bihar v. Dhirendra Kumar, (1995) 4 SCC 229 at page 230

3. The question is whether a civil suit is maintainable and whether ad interim injunction could be issued where proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act was taken pursuant to the notice issued under Section 9 of the Act and delivered to the beneficiary. The provisions of the Act are designed to acquire the land by the State exercising the power of eminent domain to serve the public purpose. The State is enjoined to comply with statutory requirements contained in Section 4 and Section 6 of the Act by proper publication of notification and declaration within limitation and procedural steps of publication in papers and the local publications envisaged under the Act as amended by Act 68 of 1984. In publication of the notifications and declaration under Section 6, the public purpose gets crystallised and becomes conclusive. Thereafter, the State is entitled to authorise the Land Acquisition Officer to proceed with the acquisition of the land and to make the award. Section 11-A now prescribes limitation to make the award within 2 years from the last date of publication envisaged under Section 6 of the Act. In an appropriate case, where the Government needs possession of the land urgently, it would exercise the power under Section 17(4) of the Act and dispense with the enquiry under Section 5-A. Thereon, the State is entitled to issue notice to the parties under Section 9 and on expiry of 15 days, the State is entitled to take immediate possession even before the award could be made. Otherwise, it would take possession after the award under Section 12. Thus, it could be seen that the Act is a complete code in itself and is meant to serve public purpose. We are, therefore, inclined to think, as presently advised, that by necessary implication the power of the civil court to take cognizance of the case under Section 9 of CPC stands excluded, and a civil court has no jurisdiction to go into the question of the validity or legality of the notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6, except by the High Court in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. So, the civil suit itself was not maintainable. When such is the situation, the finding of the trial court that there is a prima facie triable issue is unsustainable. Moreover, possession was already taken and handed over to the Housing Board. So, the order of injunction was without jurisdiction.


See also
Bangalore Development Authority v. K.S. Narayan, (2006) 8 SCC 336

Laxmi Chand v. Gram Panchayat (1996) 7 SCC 218
State of Punjab v. Amarjit Singh, (2011) 14 SCC 713 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 1012 at page 718

Using contracts where sanctioned post is needed is arbitrary

this Court while recognizing that the creation of a cadre or sanctioning of posts was exclusively within the authority of the State, opined that if the State did  not choose to create a cadre but chose to make appointments of persons creating contractual relationship only, such action would be categorized as arbitrary nature of exercise of power. In this context, it was observed by the Bench, thus: “Sanctioned posts do not fall from heaven. The State has to create them by a conscious choice on the basis of some rational assessment of the need.”

(2013) 14 SCC 65
(2018) 7 SCC 270