Search The Civil Litigator

Friday, September 18, 2020

Tuesday, September 15, 2020

Court Fees on Memorandum of Objection.

In Damodar Prasad v. Masudan Singh [A.I.R., 1928 Pat., 85.] a single Judge of the Patna High Court has expressly held that no court fee is chargeable upon a memorandum of objections filed under order XLI, rule 26. I agree to his reasoning and conclusion. No authority to the contrary has been shown to me.

Sunday, July 26, 2020

DV - maintenance orders not to be interfered with easily

 

Talha Abdul Rahman

B.C.L. (Oxon.)

B.A.,LL.B. (Hons.)(Nalsar)

Address: D-6, First Floor

H. Nizamuddin West

New Delhi 110013

 

Landline: +91- 11-4100-11-15

w:

Advocate on Record

Phone: +91 -8130-500-766

e: talha@talha.in

Supreme Court of India

 

 

Second Criminal Revision is barred

Kailash Verma v. Punjab State Civil Supplies Corpn., (2005) 2 SCC 571 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 538 at page 574

5. It may also be noticed that this Court in Rajathi v. C. Ganesan [(1999) 6 SCC 326 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1118] said that the power under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code has to be exercised sparingly and such power shall not be utilised as a substitute for second revision. Ordinarily, when a revision has been barred under Section 397(3) of the Code, the complainant or the accused cannot be allowed to take recourse to revision before the High Court under Section 397(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code as it is prohibited under Section 397(3) thereof. However, the High Court can entertain a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code when there is serious miscarriage of justice and abuse of the process of the court or when mandatory provisions of law are not complied with and when the High Court feels that the inherent jurisdiction is to be exercised to correct the mistake committed by the revisional court.

 

Scope of Art 227 in Criminal Matters

State (NCT of Delhi) v. Shiv Kumar Yadav, (2016) 2 SCC 402 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 510 : 2015 SCC OnLine SC 799 at page 425

28. It will also be pertinent to mention that power of judicial superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution and under Section 482 CrPC has to be exercised sparingly when there is patent error or gross injustice in the view taken by a subordinate court [Jasbir Singh v. State of Punjab, (2006) 8 SCC 294 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 470, paras 10 to 14] . A finding to this effect has to be supported by reasons. In the present case, the High Court has allowed the prayer of the accused, even while finding no error in the view taken by the trial court, merely by saying that exercise of power was required for granting fair and proper opportunity to the accused. No reasons have been recorded in support of this observation. On the contrary, the view taken by the trial court rejecting the stand of the accused has been affirmed. Thus, the conclusion appears to be inconsistent with the reasons in the impugned order.

 

Monday, June 15, 2020

Adulterer - a party to proceedings in divorce cases

In the following cases the adulterer was not made a party to the case:

Sanjay Khanderao Bodake v. Ashwini Sanjay Bodake

Relevant para 4 and 5

The learned trial Judge rejected the application principally on the ground that at the time of filing H.M.P, the petitioner did not seek permission as required under Rule-5 of Bombay High Court Hindu Marriage and Divorce Rules 1955 (for short ‘Rules’). If the petitioner was not aware of the name of such person at the time of filing of the Petition etc, he should have sought permission to dispense with joinder of such person. The learned trial judge observed that in the present case, neither that person is made party nor such permission was sought. Here the petitioner did not implead him as party at the time of filing of the Petition and also no permission was sought for dispensing with the joinder of adulterer. Therefore he cannot be made a party to the case.

 

Ayyapan v. Vasanta, A.I.R. 1988 Kerala 314, Relevant para 3 and 4

The question that arises for consideration is as to whether the failure to implead the alleged adulterer is fatal to the petition. It has also to be considered whether he could be impleaded at a later stage. Rule 11(a) envisages that in every petition for divorce on the ground that the respondent is living in adultery or has, after the solemnisation of the marriage, had sexual intercourse with any person, the petitioner shall make such person as co-respondent. This is a mandatory Rule. Rule 11(d) reads:—

“The petitioner may, however, apply to the Court by an application supported by an affidavit for leave to dispense with the joinder of the co-respondent in cases covered by sub-rule (a) above on any of the following grounds:—

(i) that the name of such person is unknown to the petitioner although he has made due efforts for discovery.

(ii) that such person is dead.

(iii) that the respondent being the wife is leading the life of a prostitute and the petitioner knows of no person with whom she has committed adultery or has had sexual intercourse.

(iv) for any other reason that the Court may deem fit and sufficient to consider.”

Thus the position admits no doubt that in cases not covered by R. 11(d) it is incumbent upon the petitioner to implead the adulterer as co-respondent, Having not done so when the original petition was filed before the Court and having not filed a petition supported by the affidavit under R. 11(d), the petitioner cannot at a later stage implead the adulterer as co-respondent.

Gajanan s/o Prabhakar Deshpande Versus Smita Gajanan Deshpande: (2011) 5 Mah LJ 936 , Relevant para 6 and 7

Rule 5 of the Bombay High Court Special Marriage Rules, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as “the Rules of 1954”) has not been complied with in the instant case by the appellant-husband inasmuch as the alleged adulterer was not added as co-respondent nor the appellant was excused by the trial Court from doing so and, therefore, the petition was bad for non-joinder of the necessary party. In short, she prayed for dismissal of Appeal with costs.