Beneficial and Liberal Construction

Pandey Oraon v. Ram Chander Sahu, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 77 at page 80

7. The provision is beneficial and the legislative intention is to extend protection to a class of citizens who are not in a position to keep their property to themselves in the absence of protection. Therefore when the legislature is extending special protection to the named category, the court has to give a liberal construction to the protective mechanism which would work out the protection and enable the sphere of protection to be effective than limit by (sic) the scope. In fact, that exactly is what has been said by a three Judge bench of this Court in almost a similar situation in Manchegowda v. State of Karnataka [(1984) 3 SCC 301 : (1984) 3 SCR 502] and what was said by a three Judge bench followed by a later decision of this Court in Lingappa Pochanna Appelwar v. State of Maharashtra [(1985) 1 SCC 479 : (1985) 2 SCR 224] . To the same effect is the observation of this Court in Gamini Krishnayya v. Guraza Seshachalam [AIR 1965 SC 639] . The House of Lords in D (a minor) v. Bershire County Council [(1987) 1 All ER 20 (HL)] said that broad and liberal construction should be given to give full effect to the legislative purpose. We would, therefore, in the facts and circumstances appearing in this case, hold that the authorities under the Act were justified in extending the provision of Section 71-A of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act to the situation which emerged and the High Court took a wrong view in limiting the concept of transfer to the statutory definition in the T.P. Act and holding that Section 71-A was not applicable in a case of this type. On this basis, it must follow that the action of the statutory authority was justified and the conclusion of the Full Bench must not be sustained. We accordingly allow the appeal and reverse the decision of the High Court.

 

 

National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kirpal Singh, (2014) 5 SCC 189 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 161 : 2014 SCC OnLine SC 29 at page 195

10. The only impediment in adopting that interpretation lies in the use of the word “retirement” in Para 14 of the Pension Scheme, 1995. A restricted meaning to that expression may mean that Para 14 provides only for retirements in terms of Paras (2)(t)(i) to (iii) which includes voluntary retirement in accordance with the provisions contained in Para 30 of the Pension Scheme. There is, however, no reason why the expression “retirement” should receive such a restricted meaning especially when the context in which that expression is being examined by us would justify a more liberal interpretation; not only because the provision for payment of pension is a beneficial provision which ought to be interpreted more liberally to favour grant rather than refusal of the benefit but also because the Voluntary Retirement Scheme itself was intended to reduce surplus manpower by encouraging, if not alluring employees to opt for retirement by offering them benefits like ex gratia payment and pension not otherwise admissible to the employees in the ordinary course. We are, therefore, inclined to hold that the expression “retirement” appearing in Para 14 of the Pension Scheme, 1995 should not only apply to cases which fall under Para 30 of the said Scheme but also to a case falling under the Special Voluntary Retirement Scheme of 2004. So interpreted, those opting for voluntary retirement under the said SVRS of 2004 would also qualify for payment of pension as they had put in the qualifying service of ten years stipulated under Para 14 of the Pension Scheme, 1995.

 

 

Dwarkaprasad v. Niranjan, (2003) 4 SCC 549 at page 556

15. A beneficial provision must be meaningfully construed so as to advance the object of the Act. The term “family” must always be liberally and broadly construed so as to include near relations of the head of the family. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Kanhaiyalal v. Bapurao [(1989) 1 AI RCJ 161] held that the term “family” must always be liberally and broadly construed so as to include near relatives of the head of the family. It would include not only the members of the landlord's family but also those persons who are dependent on him and whose responsibility he has accepted.

 

 

Spring Meadows Hospital v. Harjol Ahluwalia, (1998) 4 SCC 39 at page 45

8. Before we examine the aforesaid questions it would be appropriate to notice the scenario in which Parliament enacted the Consumer Protection Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). The United Nations had passed a resolution in April 1985 indicating certain guidelines under which the Government could make law for better protection of the interest of the consumers. Such laws were necessary more in the developing countries to protect the consumers from hazards to their health and safety and make them available speedier and cheaper redress. Consumerism has been a movement in which the trader and the consumer find each other as adversaries. Till last two decades in many developed and developing countries powerful consumer organisations have come into existence and such organisations have been instrumental in dealing with the consumer protection laws and in expansion of the horizon of such laws. In our country the legislation is of recent origin and its efficacy has not been critically evaluated which has to be done on the basis of experience. Undoubtedly the Act creates a framework for speedy disposal of consumer disputes and an attempt has been made to remove the existing evils of the ordinary court system. The Act gives a comprehensive definition of consumer who is the principal beneficiary of the legislation but at the same time in view of the comprehensive definition of the term “consumer” even a member of the family cannot be denied the status of consumer under the Act and in an action by any such member of the family for any deficiency of service, it will not be open for a trader to take a stand that there is no privity of contract. The Consumer Protection Act confers jurisdiction on the Commission in respect of matters where either there is defect in goods or there is deficiency in service or there has been an unfair and restrictive trade practice or in the matter of charging of excessive price. The Act being a beneficial legislation intended to confer some speedier remedy on a consumer from being exploited by unscrupulous traders, the provisions thereof should receive a liberal construction.

 

 

Alembic Chemical Works Co. Ltd. v. Workmen, reported in AIR 1961 SC 647. In this case it has been held as follows:

“The answer to this question must be in the negative for two reasons; first, having regard to the obvious policy and object of the Act, if section 79(1) is capable of two constructions that construction should be preferred which furthers the policy of the Act and is more beneficial to the employees in whose interest the Act has been passed. It is well-settled that in construing the provisions of a welfare legislation Courts should adopt what is sometimes described as a beneficent rule of construction.”

 

 

Union of India v. Vijay Kumar No. 3989606 P, Ex-Naik, (2015) 10 SCC 460 : (2016) 1 SCC (L&S) 105 : 2015 SCC OnLine SC 760 at page 465

14. The Entitlement Rules for Casualty Pensionary Awards, 1982 are beneficial in nature and ought to be liberally construed. In terms of Rule 12, the disability sustained during the course of an accident which occurs when the personnel of the armed forces is not strictly on duty may also be attributable to service on fulfilling of certain conditions enumerated therein. But there has to be a reasonable causal connection between the injuries resulting in disability and the military service.

 

 

 

Talha Abdul Rahman B.C.L. (Oxon.) B.A.,LL.B. (Hons.)(Nalsar)		Address: D-6, First Floor Nizamuddin West New Delhi 110013   Landline: +91- 11-4100-11-15	w:
Advocate on Record		Phone: +91 -8130-500-766	e: talha@talha.in
Supreme Court of India

 

 

Interpretation and Legislative Function

Ameer Trading Corpn. Ltd. v. Shapoorji Data Processing Ltd., (2004) 1 SCC 702 at page 709

28. In District Mining Officer v. Tata Iron & Steel Co. [(2001) 7 SCC 358 : JT (2001) 6 SC 183] this Court stated: (SCC p. 383, para 18)

"The legislation is primarily directed to the problems before the legislature based on information derived from past and present experience. It may also be designed by use of general words to cover similar problems arising in future. But, from the very nature of things, it is impossible to anticipate fully the varied situations arising in future in which the application of the legislation in hand may be called for and words chosen to communicate such indefinite referents are bound to be in many cases, lacking in clarity and precision and thus giving rise to controversial questions of construction. The process of construction combines both literal and purposive approaches. In other words, the legislative intention i.e. the true or legal meaning of an enactment is derived by considering the meaning of the words used in the enactment in the light of any discernible purpose or object which comprehends the mischief and its remedy to which the enactment is directed."

406-420 - Intention - inception - quashing

Murari Lal Gupta v. Gopi Singh, (2005) 13 SCC 699 : (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 430 at page 700

6. We have perused the pleadings of the parties, the complaint and the orders of the learned Magistrate and the Sessions Judge. Having taken into consideration all the material made available on record by the parties and after hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we are satisfied that the criminal proceedings initiated by the respondent against the petitioner are wholly unwarranted. The complaint is an abuse of the process of the court and the proceedings are, therefore, liable to be quashed. Even if all the averments made in the complaint are taken to be correct, yet the case for prosecution under Section 420 or Section 406 of the Penal Code is not made out. The complaint does not make any averment so as to infer any fraudulent or dishonest inducement having been made by the petitioner pursuant to which the respondent parted with the money. It is not the case of the respondent that the petitioner does not have the property or that the petitioner was not competent to enter into an agreement to sell or could not have transferred title in the property to the respondent. Merely because an agreement to sell was entered into which agreement the petitioner failed to honour, it cannot be said that the petitioner has cheated the respondent. No case for prosecution under Section 420 or Section 406 IPC is made out even prima facie. The complaint filed by the respondent and that too at Madhepura against the petitioner, who is a resident of Delhi, seems to be an attempt to pressurise the petitioner for coming to terms with the respondent.

 

S. 406 - 420 Quashing - Intention to cheat since inception

Hotline Teletubes and Components Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (2005) 10 SCC 261 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1515 at page 262

2. This appeal by special leave has been filed by the appellants against the order passed by the Patna High Court, refusing to quash their prosecution under Sections 406 and 420 of the Penal Code, 1860 (for short “IPC”). In the complaint petition, it has been alleged that the complainant supplied goods to the accused persons, but they failed to pay the price therefor. There is no whisper in the complaint that at the very inception of the contract between the parties, there was any intention to cheat. It appears from a bare perusal of the complaint that it is a case of purely civil liability and no criminal offence is disclosed, much less offences either under Section 406 or 420 IPC. So far as the High Court is concerned, it has not considered this aspect of the matter, but has refused to quash the prosecution observing that it was a fit case where parties should take steps for settlement. In our view, allowing such prosecution to continue would amount to an abuse of the process of court and to prevent the same, it would be just and expedient to quash the same.

 

Privity of Contract Issue

Ircon International Ltd. v. Vinay Heavy Equipments, (2015) 13 SCC 680

 

9. Insofar as the question of primary liability therein is concerned, the law on subcontracts and employer liability is amply clear. In the absence of covenant in the main contract to the contrary, the rules in relation to privity of contract will mean that the jural relationship between the employer and the main contractor on the one hand and between the subcontractor and the main contractor on the other will be quite distinct and separate.

Quashing in Matrimonial Cases

Kailash Chandra Agrawal v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 551 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 536 : 2014 SCC OnLine SC 722 at page 553

8. We have gone through the FIR and the criminal complaint. In the FIR, the appellants have not been named and in the criminal complaint they have been named without attributing any specific role to them. The relationship of the appellants with the husband of the complainant is distant. In Kans Raj v. State of Punjab [Kans Raj v. State of Punjab, (2000) 5 SCC 207 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 935] , it was observed: (SCC p. 215, para 5)

“5. … A tendency has, however, developed for roping in all relations of the in-laws of the deceased wives in the matters of dowry deaths which, if not discouraged, is likely to affect the case of the prosecution even against the real culprits. In their over enthusiasm and anxiety to seek conviction for maximum people, the parents of the deceased have been found to be making efforts for involving other relations which ultimately weaken the case of the prosecution even against the real accused as appears to have happened in the instant case.”

The Court has, thus, to be careful in summoning distant relatives without there being specific material. Only the husband, his parents or at best close family members may be expected to demand dowry or to harass the wife but not distant relations, unless there is tangible material to support allegations made against such distant relations. Mere naming of distant relations is not enough to summon them in absence of any specific role and material to support such role.

 

Clever Drafting and Cause of Action

hge