bail applications from same FIR before same court

Abhyanand Sharma v. State of Bihar, (2022) 10 SCC 819 

Benefit of Acquittal to non appealing accused

Mohd. Sajjad v. State of W.B., (2017) 11 SCC 150 : (2017) 3 SCC (Cri) 899 : 2017 SCC OnLine SC 27 at page 158

20. Mr Mrinal Kanti Mandal, learned Advocate is right in submitting that in certain cases this Court had granted benefit even to a non-appealing accused. In Bijoy Singh v. State of Bihar [Bijoy Singh v. State of Bihar, (2002) 9 SCC 147 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1093] , this Court observed that if on evaluation of the case, a conclusion is reached that no conviction of any accused was possible the benefit of that decision must be extended to the similarly situated co-accused even though he had not challenged the order by way of the appeal. To similar effect was the dictum of this Court in Suresh Chaudhary v. State of Bihar [Suresh Chaudhary v. State of Bihar, (2003) 4 SCC 128 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 801] and in Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana [Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2003) 11 SCC 241 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 109] and in Mohinder Singh v. State of Punjab [Mohinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2004) 12 SCC 311 : 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp 252] .

Whether a matter can be whether a matter can be remitted back to the Labour Court for a decision afresh

Case:  HIND FILTERS LTD. & ANR.  V. HIND FILTER EMPLOYEES' UNION & ANR., CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8801 OF 2012, DECIDED ON 17.08.2023      

If the material sought to be placed before the labour court is such that it will go to the root of the matter in determining the jurisdiction of the labour court to determine the issue.

Relevant paras 

 21. On the issue as to whether a matter can be remitted back to the Labour Court for a decision afresh, guidance is available from judgment of this Court in Santhosh Bansi Mahajan's case (supra). It was a case where a document on which reliance was placed by the workmen was not placed before the Labour Court when the matter was considered. It was placed on record for the first time before this Court. Liberty was given by this Court to file the said document before the Labour Court and the matter was remitted back to the Labour Court to be decided afresh. Similar issue had come up for decision before this Court in Bundi Zila Petrol Pump Dealers Association's case (supra) wherein an ex-parte Award was passed against the Management. This Court, finding that there were sufficient reasons for the absence of the Page 21 of 22 Management before the Tribunal, set aside the Award and the matter was remanded to the Industrial Tribunal giving liberty to the appellant before this Court to file the written statement and lead evidence.

22. In the case in hand as well on the facts, as noticed above, we find that the matter needs to be re-examined by the Labour Court, as the material permitted to be placed on record will go to the root of the case in determining the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to adjudicate the matter. The material sought to be relied upon by the appellants/Management to substantiate its plea has been briefly referred to in paras 16 and 19 of this order.   

Nullification of a Judgment by the Legislature

Can judgment be nullified by subsequent acts of a legislature?  If so, how and to what extent? In other words, what is the permissibility of abrogation of a thing in order to remove the basis of a judgment?

NHPC LTD. V STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS.  CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3948 OF 2009

11. What follows from the aforesaid judicial precedent is a legislature cannot directly set aside a judicial decision. However, when a competent legislature retrospectively removes the substratum or foundation of a judgment to make the decision ineffective, the same is a valid legislative exercise provided it does not transgress on any other constitutional limitation. Such a legislative device which removes the vice in the previous legislation which has been declared unconstitutional is not considered to be an encroachment on judicial power but an instance of abrogation recognised under the Constitution of India. The decisions referred to above, manifestly show that it is open to the legislature to alter the law retrospectively, provided the alteration is made in such a manner that it would no more be possible for the Court to arrive at the  same verdict. In other words, the very premise of the earlier judgment should be removed, thereby resulting in a fundamental change of the circumstances upon which it was founded.

 12. It would be permissible for the legislature to remove a defect in an earlier legislation, as pointed out by a constitutional court in exercise of its powers by way of judicial review. This defect can be removed both prospectively and retrospectively by a legislative process and previous actions can also be validated. However, where a legislature merely seeks to validate the acts carried out under a previous legislation which has been struck down or rendered inoperative by a Court, by a subsequent legislation without curing the defects in such legislation, the subsequent legislation would also be ultra-vires.   (Emphasis supplied)

What is a continuing wrong for the purposes of limitation?

What is a continuing cause of action?

CWT v. Suresh Seth, (1981) 2 SCC 790

"11. In the instant case the contention is that the wrong or the default in question has been altered into a continuing wrong or default giving rise to a liability de die in diem, that is, from day to day. The distinctive nature of a continuing wrong is that the law that is violated makes the wrongdoer continuously liable for penalty. A wrong or default which is complete but whose effect may continue to be felt even after its completion is, however, not a continuing wrong or default. It is reasonable to take the view that the court should not be eager to hold that an act or omission is a continuing wrong or default unless there are words in the statute concerned which make out that such was the intention of the legislature. In the instant case whenever the question of levying penalty arises what has to be first considered is whether the assessee has failed without reasonable cause of file the return as required by law and if it is held that he has failed to do so then penalty has to be levied in accordance with the measure provided in the Act. When the default is the filing of delayed return the penalty may be correlated to the time-lag between the last day for filing it without penalty and the day on which it is filed and the quantum of tax or wealth involved in the case for purposes of determining the quantum of penalty but the default however is only one which takes place on the expiry of the last day for filing the return without penalty and not a continuing one. The default in question does not, however, give rise to a fresh cause of action every day. Explaining the expression "a continuing cause of action" Lord Lindley in Hole v. Chard Union [(1894) 1 Ch D 293 : 63 LJ Ch 469 : 70 LT 52] observed:

"What is a continuing cause of action? Speaking accurately, there is no such thing; but what is called a continuing cause of action is a cause of action which arises from the repetition of acts or omissions of the same kind as that for which the action was brought."

Balkrishna Savalram Pujari v. Shree Dnyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan [AIR 1959 SC 798], Gajendragadkar, J.:

"It is the very essence of a continuing wrong that it is an act which creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the act responsible and liable for the continuance of the said injury. If the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong, even though the damage resulting from the act may continue. If, however, a wrongful act is of such a character that the injury caused by it itself continues, then the act constitutes a continuing wrong. In this connection it is necessary to draw a distinction between the injury caused by the wrongful act and what may be described as the effect of the said injury. . . ."

Balkrishna Savalram Pujari and Others vs. Shree Dnyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan & Others, [1959] Supp. (2) S.C.R. 476:

"… …. In dealing with this argument it is necessary to bear in mind that s.23 refers not to a continuing right but to a continuing wrong. It is the very essence of a continuing wrong that it is an act  which creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the act responsible and liable for the continuance of the said injury. If the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may continue. If, however, a wrongful act is of such a character that the injury caused by it itself continues then the act constitutes a continuing wrong. In this connection it is necessary to draw a distinction between the injury caused by the wrongful act and what may be described as the effect of the said injury. It is only in regard to acts which can be properly characterised as continuing wrongs that s.23 can be invoked. Thus considered it is difficult to hold that the trustees' act in denying altogether the alleged rights of the Guravs as hereditary worshippers and in claiming and obtaining possession from them by their suit in 1922 was a continuing wrong. The decree obtained by the trustees in the said litigation had injured effectively and completely the appellants' rights though the damage caused by the said decree subsequently continued..." (Page 496)

Hari Singh v Haryana 1993 3 SCC 114 - DISMISSAL OF SLP OF CO ACCUSED IS NOT A BAR

Show Cause Notice - Bias

                in Oryx Fisheries (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, reported in (2010) 13 SCC 427, while quashing a show-cause notice on the aforementioned ground, has held that:

 

"27. It is no doubt true that at the stage of show cause, the person proceeded against must be told the charges against him so that he can take his defence and prove his innocence. It is obvious that at that stage the authority issuing the charge-sheet, cannot, instead of telling him the charges, confront him with definite conclusions of his alleged guilt. If that is done, as has been done in this instant case, the entire proceeding initiated by the show-cause notice gets vitiated by unfairness and bias and the subsequent proceedings become an idle ceremony.

 

28. Justice is rooted in confidence and justice is the goal of a quasi-judicial proceeding also. If the functioning of a quasi-judicial authority has to inspire confidence in the minds of those subjected to its jurisdiction, such authority must act with utmost fairness. Its fairness is obviously to be manifested by the language in which charges are couched and conveyed to the person proceeded against.

…

31. It is of course true that the show-cause notice cannot be read hypertechnically and it is well settled that it is to be read reasonably. But one thing is clear that while reading a show-cause notice the person who is subject to it must get an impression that he will get an effective opportunity to rebut the allegations contained in the show-cause notice and prove his innocence. If on a reasonable reading of a show-cause notice a person of ordinary prudence gets the feeling that his reply to the show-cause notice will be an empty ceremony and he will merely knock his head against the impenetrable wall of prejudged opinion, such a show-cause notice does not commence a fair procedure especially when it is issued in a quasi-judicial proceeding under a statutory regulation which promises to give the person proceeded against a reasonable opportunity of defence.

 

32. Therefore, while issuing a show-cause notice, the authorities must take care to manifestly keep an open mind as they are to act fairly in adjudging the guilt or otherwise of the person proceeded against and specially when he has the power to take a punitive step against the person after giving him a show-cause notice.

 

33. The principle that justice must not only be done but it must eminently appear to be done as well is equally applicable to quasi-judicial proceeding if such a proceeding has to inspire confidence in the mind of those who are subject to it."

(emphasis supplied)

K.I. Shephard v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 431, referred to in the decision abovementioned, it has been held that "… it is common experience that once a decision has been taken, there is a tendency to uphold it and a representation may not really yield any fruitful purpose."

1.                 in Siemens Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2006) 12 SCC 33, it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court:

"9. Although ordinarily a writ court may not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction in entertaining a writ petition questioning a notice to show cause unless the same inter alia appears to have been without jurisdiction as has been held by this Court in some decisions including State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma [(1987) 2 SCC 179 : (1987) 3 ATC 319 : AIR 1987 SC 943] , Special Director v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse [(2004) 3 SCC 440 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 826] and Union of India v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana [(2006) 12 SCC 28 : (2006) 12 Scale 262] , but the question herein has to be considered from a different angle viz. when a notice is issued with premeditation, a writ petition would be maintainable. In such an event, even if the court directs the statutory authority to hear the matter afresh, ordinarily such hearing would not yield any fruitful purpose. (See K.I. Shephard v. Union of India [(1987) 4 SCC 431 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 438 : AIR 1988 SC 686] .) It is evident in the instant case that the respondent has clearly made up its mind. It explicitly said so both in the counter-affidavit as also in its purported show-cause notice."