Chheda Housing Development Corporation v. Bibijan Shaikh Farid and Ors, 2007 (3) Mh.L.J. 402
Vipin Bhimani and Anr. v. Smt. Sunanda Das, AIR 2006 Cal. 209
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Chheda Housing Development Corporation v. Bibijan Shaikh Farid and Ors, 2007 (3) Mh.L.J. 402
Vipin Bhimani and Anr. v. Smt. Sunanda Das, AIR 2006 Cal. 209
Ashok Kumar v. State of Uttarakhand, (2013) 3 SCC 366
Section 146(1), a Magistrate can pass an order of attachment of the subject of dispute if it be a case of emergency, or if he decides that none of the parties was in such possession, or he cannot decide as to which of them was in possession. Sections 145 and 146 of the Criminal Procedure Code together constitute a scheme for the resolution of a situation where there is a likelihood of a breach of the peace and Section 146 cannot be separated from Section 145,Cr.P.C. It can only be read in the context of Section 145, Cr.P.C. If after the enquiry under Section 145 of the Code, the Magistrate is of the opinion that none of the parties was in actual possession of the subject of dispute at the time of the order passed under Section 145(1) or is unable to decide which of the parties was in such possession, he may attach the subject of dispute, until a competent court has determined the right of the parties thereto with regard to the person entitled to possession thereof.
The ingredients necessary for passing an order under Section 145 (1)of the Code would not automatically attract for the attachment of the property. Under Section 146, a Magistrate has to satisfy himself as to whether emergency exists before he passes an order of attachment. A case of emergency, as contemplated under Section 146 of the Code, has to be distinguished from a mere case of apprehension of breach of the peace. The Magistrate, before passing an order under Section 146, must explain the circumstances why he thinks it to be a case of emergency. In other words, to infer a situation of emergency, there must be a material on record before Magistrate when the submission of the parties filed, documents produced or evidence adduced.
Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330
Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.:-
(i) Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the material is of sterling and impeccable quality?
(ii) Step two, whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false.
(iii) Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant?
(iv) Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice?
If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused.
Price Waterhouse Coopers vs. CIT, JT 2012 (10) SC 523
When there was no malafide intention or concealment, then the levy of the penalty is not justifiable in the eye of law.
Multani Hanifbhai Kalubhai v. State of Gujarat, (2013) 3 SCC 240
Buffalo calf is not a prohibited animal under Gujarat/Bombay Animal Preservation Act, and therefore vehicle could not have been seized. Whatever be the situation, it is of no use to keep the seized vehicle in the police station for a long period.
(2013) 4 SCC 340, State of Orissa v. MESCO Steels Limited
Only final decision, not provisional or tentative decision is amendable to judicial review. Inter departmental communication which does not finally decide on the rights of the parties does not give rise to a cause of action.