Power of High Court to cancel bail

Gulabrao Baburao Deokar v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 16 SCC 190 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 232 : 2013 SCC OnLine SC 1116 at page 204

27. Thus it could certainly be said that the order passed by the Sessions Judge was an order passed in breach of the mandatory requirement of the proviso to Section 439(1) CrPC. It is also an order ignoring the material on record, and therefore without any justification and perverse. As held by this Court in Puran v. Rambilas [(2001) 6 SCC 338 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1124] , the High Court does have the power under Section 439(2) CrPC to set aside an unjustified, illegal or perverse order granting bail. This is an independent ground for cancellation as against ground of the accused misconducting himself.

Constitution of India — Art. 129 — Civil contempt — Change in law after inter partes decision has attained finality:Subsequent change in law is not a ground on which obedience/implementation of the final inter partes judgment can be avoided, witheld or refused. Final inter partes order of court must be complied with despite later change in law. [Bhushan Power & Steel Ltd. v. Rajesh Verma] [(2014) 5 SCC 551]

[(2014) 5 SCC 551] 

Mere reference to another contract containing arbitration Clause is not enough to incorporate the arbitration clause itself

2018 4 SCC 281

Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with interim orders

2018 4 SCC 298

Power under Section 21 of General Clauses Act not available for varying quasi judicial orders

(2018) 4 SCC 494

  The general power, under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, to rescind a notification or order has to be understood in the light of the subject matter, context and the effect of the relevant provisions of the statute under which the notification or order is issued and the power is not available after an enforceable right has accrued under the notification or order. Moreover, Section 21 has no application to vary or amend or review a quasi judicial order. A quasi judicial order can be generally varied or reviewed when obtained by fraud or when such power is conferred by the Act or Rules under which it is made. (See Interpretation of Statutes, Ninth Edition by G.P. Singh page 893).  

Domestic inquiry & Labour Court - appreciation of termination order

Kurukshetra University v. Prithvi Singh, (2018) 4 SCC 483

17. If the domestic enquiry was held legal and proper then the next question which arose for consideration was whether the punishment imposed on the respondent(delinquent employee) was proportionate to the gravity of the charge leveled against him or it called for any interference to award any lesser punishment by exercising the powers under Section 11-A of the ID Act.

18. If the domestic inquiry was held illegal and improper then the next question, which arose for consideration, was whether to allow the appellant (employer) to prove the misconduct/charge before the Labour Court on merits by adducing independent evidence against the respondent (employee). The appellant was entitled to do so after praying for an opportunity to allow them to lead evidence and pleading the misconduct in the written statement. (see- also Para 33 at page 1665/66 of Shankar's case(supra) ). 

20. We are constrained to observe that first, the Labour Court committed an error in not framing a "preliminary issue" for deciding the legality of domestic enquiry and second, having found fault in the domestic inquiry committed another error when it did not allow the appellant to lead independent evidence to prove the misconduct/charge on merits and straightaway proceeded to hold that it was a case of illegal retrenchment and hence the respondents' termination is bad in law.

Delay and Laches in Challenging Seniority List