Acknowledgement in writing after limitation amounts to implied promise to pay and give fresh limitation period

Maharashtra Agro-Chemicals and Fertilizers v. Deoram Baburao Gavade, 1993 SCC OnLine Bom 482| (1993) 95 Bom LR 785  (Bombay High Court)

SBI v. Kanahiya Lal 2016 SCC OnLine Del 2639 : (2016) 157 DRJ 403  (Delhi High Court)

Section 50 NDPS not applicable when search is not of a person

Judicial Supervision of Tribunals | Decisional Independence | Autonomy

Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. Union of India, (2016) 5 SCC 1 : 2015 SCC OnLine SC 964 at page 594

714. The independence of the judiciary takes within its fold two broad concepts: (1) Independence of an individual Judge, that is, decisional independence; and (2) Independence of the judiciary as an institution or an organ of the State, that is, functional independence. In a lecture on Judicial Independence, Lord Phillips [ Former President of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom and Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales] said:

“In order to be impartial a Judge must be independent; personally independent, that is free of personal pressures and institutionally independent, that is free of pressure from the State.”

 

This extract is taken from Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. Union of India, (2016) 5 SCC 1 : 2015 SCC OnLine SC 964 at page 595

718. The entire package of rights and protections ensures that a Judge remains independent and is free to take a decision in accordance with law unmindful of the consequences to his/her continuance as a Judge. This does not mean that a Judge may take whatever decision he/she desires to take. The parameters of decision-making and discretion are circumscribed by the Constitution, the statute and the Rule of Law. This is the essence of decisional independence, not that Judges can do as they please.

 

This extract is taken from Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. Union of India, (2016) 5 SCC 1 : 2015 SCC OnLine SC 964 at page 597

724. Similarly, Section 3 of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 provides, inter alia, that no court shall entertain or continue any civil or criminal proceeding against any person who is or was a Judge for any act, thing or word committed, done or spoken by him when, or in the course of, acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official or judicial duty or function. This is in addition to the protection given by Section 77 of the Penal Code, 1860 which provides that:

“77. Act of Judge when acting judicially.—Nothing is an offence which is done by a Judge when acting judicially in the exercise of any power which is, or which in good faith he believes to be, given to him by law.”

This extract is taken from Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. Union of India, (2016) 5 SCC 1 : 2015 SCC OnLine SC 964 at page 598

726. Generally speaking, therefore, the independence of the judiciary is manifested in the ability of a Judge to take a decision independent of any external (or internal) pressure or fear of any external (or internal) pressure and that is “decisional independence”. It is also manifested in the ability of the institution to have “functional independence”. A comprehensive and composite definition of “independence of the judiciary” is elusive but it is easy to perceive.

 

 

Supreme Court in Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim and others, AIR 1984 SC 38 a Coordinate Bench observed as follows:

“6. The petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution was wholly misconceived. An appeal lay from an order under Order XXI, Rule 92 setting aside or refusing to set aside a sale under Order XLIII, Rule 1 (i) to the District Judge. That apart, the application made by the petitioner claiming to be the legal representative of the surety, the judgment-debtor's representative, on the one hand and the auction-purchaser, the decree-holder's representative, on the other alleging that there had been a fraud perpetrated by the decree-holder in causing the sale to be held, with a prayer for recording satisfaction of the decree under Order XXI, Rule 2, raised a question relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree and therefore fell within the purview of Section 47 which prior to February 1, 1977 was appealable because then a decision under Section 47 was deemed to be a decree under Section 2 (2) of the Code, and therefore the petitioner had the remedy of an appeal to the District Judge. Even if no appeal lay against the impugned orders of the learned Subordinate Judge, the petitioner had the remedy of filing a revision before the High Court under Section 115 of the Code. Upon any view of the matter, the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the impugned orders passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, under Art. 227 of the Constitution. A mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227.

 

 

T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, (1955) 1 SCR 250 : AIR 1954 SC 440 : 10 ELR 14 (5 Judges)

10. A tribunal may be competent to enter upon an enquiry but in making the enquiry it may act in flagrant disregard of the rules of procedure or where no particular procedure is prescribed, it may violate the principles of natural justice. A writ of certiorari may be available in such cases. An error in the decision or determination itself may also be amenable to a writ of certiorari but it must be a manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings, e.g. when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In other words, it is a patent error which can be corrected by certiorari but not a mere wrong decision. The essential features of the remedy by way of certiorari have been stated with remarkable brevity and clearness by Morris, L.J. in the recent case of Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appellate Tribunal [(1952) 1 KB 338 at 357] . The Lord Justice says:

“It is plain that certiorari will not issue as the cloak of an appeal in disguise. It does not lie in order to bring up an order or decision for re-hearing of the issue raised in the proceedings. It exists to correct error of law when revealed on the face of an order or decision or irregularity or absence of or excess of jurisdiction when shown.”

 

7. The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited “ to seeing that an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority,” and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less an error of law. In this case there was, in our opinion, no error of law much less an error apparent of the face of the record. There was no failure on the part of the learned Subordinate Judge to exercise jurisdiction nor did he act in disregard of principles of natural justice. Nor was the procedure adopted by him not in consonance with the procedure established by law. In exercising the supervisory power under Art. 227, the High Court does not act as an appellate Court or Tribunal. It will not review or reweigth the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior court or tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of law in the decision.”

 

 

T. Sudhakar Prasad v. Govt. of A.P., (2001) 1 SCC 516 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 263 at page 531

18. Subordination of Tribunals and courts functioning within the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court can be either judicial or administrative or both. The power of superintendence exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is judicial superintendence and not administrative superintendence, such as one which vests in the High Court under Article 235 of the Constitution over subordinate courts. Vide para 96 of L. Chandra Kumar case [(1997) 3 SCC 261 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 577] the Constitution Bench did not agree with the suggestion that the Tribunals be made subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Courts within whose territorial jurisdiction they fall, as our constitutional scheme does not require that all adjudicatory bodies which fall within the territorial jurisdiction of any High Court should be subject to its supervisory jurisdiction. Obviously, the supervisory jurisdiction referred to by the Constitution Bench in para 96 of the judgment is the supervision of the administrative functioning of the Tribunals as is spelt out by discussion made in paras 96 and 97 of the judgment.

 

K’, A Judicial Officer, In re, (2001) 3 SCC 54 at page 64[1]

12. Though the power to make remarks or observations is there but on being questioned, the exercise of power must withstand judicial scrutiny on the touchstone of following tests: (a) whether the party whose conduct is in question is before the court or has an opportunity of explaining or defending himself; (b) whether there is evidence on record bearing on that conduct justifying the remarks; and (c) whether it is necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral part thereof, to animadvert on that conduct. The overall test is that the criticism or observation must be judicial in nature and should not formally depart from sobriety, moderation and reserve (see Mohd. Naim [AIR 1964 SC 703 : (1964) 2 SCR 363 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 549] ).

 

Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Ltd., (2020) 6 SCC 1 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1456 at page 171

215. It is hence clear post L. Chandra Kumar [L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 577] that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 does not limit the powers of High Courts expressly or by implication against military or armed forces disputes. The limited ouster made by Article 227(4) only operates qua administrative supervision by the High Court and not judicial review. Article 136(2) prohibits direct appeals before the Supreme Court from an order of Armed Forces Tribunals, but would not prohibit an appeal to the Supreme Court against the judicial review exercised by the High Court under Article 226.

 

 

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[1] This is for judicial officer of court. But important to see that it contemplates notice etc.

Accused Summoning Call Records of Investigating officer

2018 SCC OnLine P&H 4272 |

J 1

12. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Suresh Kumar v. Union of India; 2015 (3) RCR (Criminal) 340 has observed that the accused can be allowed to summon call record of the mobile telephones of concerned police officers to show that the police were not near the location of recovery but were at some other location. It has been observed in para 8 as under:—

“8. All that we are concerned with is whether call details which the appellant is demanding can be denied to him on the ground that such details are likely to prejudice the case of the prosecution by exposing their activities in relation to similar other cases and individuals. It is not however in dispute that the call details are being summoned only for purposes of determining the exact location of the officers concerned at the time of the alleged arrest of the appellant from Yashica Palace hotel near the bus stand. Ms. Makhijamadea candid concession that any other information contained in the call details will be of no use to the appellant and that the appellant would not insist upon disclosure of such information. That in our opinion simplifies the matter in as much as while the call details demanded by the appellant can be summoned in terms of Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act such details being relevant only to the extent of determining the location of officers concerned need not contain other information concerning such calls received or made from the telephone numbers concerned. In other words if the mobile telephone numbers caller details of the callers are blacked out of the information summoned from the companies concerned it will protect the respondent against any possible prejudice in terms of exposure of sources of information available to the Bureau. Interest of justice would in our opinion be sufficiently served if we direct the Trial Court to summon from the Companies concerned call details of Sim telephone No. 9039520407 and 7415593902 of Tata Docomo company and in regard to Sim No. 9165077714 of Airtel company for the period 24.02.2013 between 4.30 to 8.30 p.m. We further direct that calling numbers and the numbers called from the said mobile phone shall be blacked out by the companies while furnishing such details.”

 

Tribunal or court below not needed to be impleaded in appeal or writs

2015 9 SCC 1

Matrimonial Cases - Jurisdiction - Continuing wrong

Rupali Devi v. State of U.P., (2019) 5 SCC 384 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 558 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 493 at page 390

 

16. We, therefore, hold that the courts at the place where the wife takes shelter after leaving or driven away from the matrimonial home on account of acts of cruelty committed by the husband or his relatives, would, dependent on the factual situation, also have jurisdiction to entertain a complaint alleging commission of offences under Section 498-A of the Penal Code.

Deemed Extension of Time Bound Stay order if not vacated