7. Ordinarily, a litigation is based on adjudication on the merits of the contentions of the parties. Litigation should not be terminated by default, either of the plaintiff or the defendant. The cause of justice does require that as far as possible, adjudication be done on merits.
On 08-11-2022 13:50:05, Talha Abdul Rahman <talha@talha.in> wrote:
State of U.P. v. VII ADJ, (1992) 4 SCC 429 at page 4327. After giving our anxious consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears to us that in the definition of building under Section 3(i) of the Act, there is no express exclusion of the value of the land on which the building stands. In the absence of such express exclusion, the land being intrinsically inseparable from the building standing thereon, the value of the land and the value of the structure or building should be taken into consideration and in our view the land on which the building stands together with the building or structure constitute one composite unit. It may be indicated that the value of two similar buildings or structure standing on similar parcel of land may differ substantially on account of locational advantage of the site in question. The difference of valuation of land because of such locational advantage creeps into the ultimate valuation of the building or structure making one building more valuable than the other although from the structural point of view, both the buildings are identical. In the aforesaid circumstances, the determination of valuation of the building by taking into consideration the value of the land in addition to the value of the structure, does not appear to be illegal and improper. In any case, the definition of 'building' under the Act clearly shows that the building thereunder means roofed structure including the land underneath the said structure. Inclusive part of the definition only relates to the land appurtenant to such building and not to the land underneath the roofed structure.
7. After giving our anxious consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears to us that in the definition of building under Section 3(i) of the Act, there is no express exclusion of the value of the land on which the building stands. In the absence of such express exclusion, the land being intrinsically inseparable from the building standing thereon, the value of the land and the value of the structure or building should be taken into consideration and in our view the land on which the building stands together with the building or structure constitute one composite unit. It may be indicated that the value of two similar buildings or structure standing on similar parcel of land may differ substantially on account of locational advantage of the site in question. The difference of valuation of land because of such locational advantage creeps into the ultimate valuation of the building or structure making one building more valuable than the other although from the structural point of view, both the buildings are identical. In the aforesaid circumstances, the determination of valuation of the building by taking into consideration the value of the land in addition to the value of the structure, does not appear to be illegal and improper. In any case, the definition of 'building' under the Act clearly shows that the building thereunder means roofed structure including the land underneath the said structure. Inclusive part of the definition only relates to the land appurtenant to such building and not to the land underneath the roofed structure.
COSCO International (P) Ltd. v. Jagat Singh Dugar, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1113
10. The present cases are of un-recorded warning. Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. L.A. Qureshi ((1998) 9 SCC 261) which was a case of censure which is theminor most penalty has not agreed with the submission of the counsel for the "employee that censure is only a recorded warning and does not constitute punishment. They have further held that censure cannot be equated with warning. In this case also, it has been held that warning is not penalty under the Rules. Paras 7 and 8 of the judgment are as follows:
"7. The submission of Shri Khanduja is that "censure" is only a recorded warning and does not constitute punishment and, therefore, the directions contained in the circular in relation to imposition of minor penalty would not apply and the Tribunal was justified in giving the directions for opening of the sealed cover and for giving effect to the recommendations of the DPC.
8. We are unable to accept the said contention of Shri Khanduja. "Censure" cannot be equated with a warning since under Rule 10 of the M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966, "censure" is one of the minor penalties that can be imposed on a Government servant. It cannot, therefore, be said that the penalty of censure which was imposed on the respondent in the departmental proceedings was not a penalty as contemplated in the circular dated 2-5-1990. Once it is held that a minor penalty has been imposed on the respondent in the departmental proceedings, the direction given in the said circular would be applicable and the sealed cover contain-;ing recommendations of the DPC could not be opened and the recommendations of the DPC could not be given effect because the respondent has not been fully exonerated and a minor penalty has been imposed. The respondent can only be considered for pro motion on prospective basis from a date after the conclusion of the departmental pro ceedings."
(Emphasis supplied)
