Final order must consider previous and interim orders passed in the same case

2012 2 SCC 294  C Shankuntala

2012 5 SCC 552 Om Prakash Asati

Dismiss in default without going into merit is not res judicata

Collector v. Ajit Jogi, (2011) 10 SCC 357

Transfer Cases

In Pooja Rathod v. Tarun Rathod, (2022) 4 SCC 514, the Hon'ble Supreme Court transferred a case filed by husband (at Chennai) against the wife 600 kms away from where the wife resides (at Hyderabad)

In Anju v. Pramod Kumar, (2005) 11 SCC 186, the Supreme Court transferred the case to a neutral place as both husband and wife expressed apprehension in travelling to each other's native places.

In Deepa Mohan Naik v. Chandra Bhusan Pal, (2022) 2 SCC 54, Supreme Court allowed transfer in favour of the wife and also directed for attempts at mediation to resolve the dispute.

In Eluri Raji Reddy v. State of Delhi, (2004) 4 SCC 479, the Supreme Court allowed transfer in favour of the husband as the husband sought transfer to Andhra Pradesh and the wife had a place of residence in Andhra Pradesh.

In Lalita v. Kulwinder Kumar, (2007) 15 SCC 667, the Supreme Court allowed transfer in favour of the wife and held that the convenience of the wife is to be looked into.

Details needed for job advertisement by Government

The Supreme Court in Renu v. District & Sessions Judge, Tis Hazari, (2014) 14 SCC 50, emphasized the need to specify in the advertisement, number of posts, qualifications and eligibility criteria, schedule of recruitment process, Rules under which selection is to be made or the procedure in the absence of Rules, in the interest of transparency and to avoid arbitrariness and change of criteria of selection. Thus, the appointment letter in so far as it is contrary to or at variance with advertisement will have to give way to the stipulations in the advertisement and the latter part of Clause 2(a) in the appointment letter to the extent it provides for extension of probation period and the requirement of confirmation in writing, shall not bind the Petitioner

Recall - mistake of counsel

He placed reliance upon G.P. Srivastava v. R.K. Raizada & Ors., (2000) 3 SCC 54, wherein the Supreme Court considered the scope of 'sufficient cause' in the context of Order 9 Rule 13 CPC. It was held that unless sufficient cause is shown for non-appearance of the defendant on the date of hearing, the Court would have no power to set aside an ex parte decree and that the words, 'was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing' must be liberally construed to enable the Court to do complete justice between the parties, particularly when no negligence or inaction is imputable to the erring party.

While stressing upon the need to restrain from victimising the petitioners for the fault of their counsel, he cited the observation made by the Apex Court in Smt. Lachi Tewari & Ors. v. Director of Land Records & Ors., 1984 (Supp) SCC 431, wherein the Court relied on its earlier observations in Rafiq and another v. Munshilal & Anr., (1981) 2 SCC 788, that after engaging a lawyer, the party may remain supremely confident that the lawyer would look after his interest and the personal appearance of the party would not only be not required but would hardly be useful.

Further, he relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in N. Balaji v. Virendra Singh & Ors., AIR 2005 SC 1638, wherein it was reiterated that laws of procedure are meant to effectively regulate, assist and aid the object of substantial and real justice and not to foreclose an adjudication on the merits of substantial rights of citizens under personal, property, and other laws.

He, again, referred to the findings in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji & Ors., (1987) 2 SCC 107, where the Supreme Court observed that the power to condone delay has been conferred to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing of matters on merit and the expression 'sufficient cause' employed by the legislature was adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice.

recall ex parte

Robin Thapa v. Rohit Dora, (2019) 7 SCC 359 : (2019) 3 SCC (Civ) 637 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 836 at page 360

7. Ordinarily, a litigation is based on adjudication on the merits of the contentions of the parties. Litigation should not be terminated by default, either of the plaintiff or the defendant. The cause of justice does require that as far as possible, adjudication be done on merits.

Re: Building includes land underneath

 the term 'building' includes the ground on which it stands as has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of D.G. Gose and Co. Vs. State of Kerala reported in (1980) 2 SCC 410, wherein the term 'lands and buildings' was under consideration in the context of Entry 49 of List II Schedule- VII of the Constitution. Paragraphs 21, 22 and 23 of which read as under:-

"21. The word "building" has been defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as follows:

That which is built; a structure, edifice: now a structure of the nature of a house built where it is to stand.

On 08-11-2022 13:50:05, Talha Abdul Rahman <talha@talha.in> wrote:

State of U.P. v. VII ADJ, (1992) 4 SCC 429 at page 432

7. After giving our anxious consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears to us that in the definition of building under Section 3(i) of the Act, there is no express exclusion of the value of the land on which the building stands. In the absence of such express exclusion, the land being intrinsically inseparable from the building standing thereon, the value of the land and the value of the structure or building should be taken into consideration and in our view the land on which the building stands together with the building or structure constitute one composite unit. It may be indicated that the value of two similar buildings or structure standing on similar parcel of land may differ substantially on account of locational advantage of the site in question. The difference of valuation of land because of such locational advantage creeps into the ultimate valuation of the building or structure making one building more valuable than the other although from the structural point of view, both the buildings are identical. In the aforesaid circumstances, the determination of valuation of the building by taking into consideration the value of the land in addition to the value of the structure, does not appear to be illegal and improper. In any case, the definition of 'building' under the Act clearly shows that the building thereunder means roofed structure including the land underneath the said structure. Inclusive part of the definition only relates to the land appurtenant to such building and not to the land underneath the roofed structure.