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Monday, July 31, 2023

Courts power if injunction violated or breached

AIR 1975 madras 270

In our opinion, the inherent powers of this court under Section 151 C.P.C. are wide and are not subject to any limitation. Where in violation of a stay order or injunction against a party, something has been done in disobedience, it will be the duty of the court as a policy to set the wrong right and not allow the perpetuation of the wrong doing. In our view, the inherent power will not only be available in such a case, but it is bound to be exercised in that manner in the interests of justice. Even apart from Section 151, we should observe that as a matter of judicial policy, the court should guard against itself being stultified in circumstances like this by holding that it is powerless to undo a wrong done in disobedience of the court's orders. But in this case it is not necessary to so to that extent as we hold that the power is available under Section 151. C.P.C. 

Monday, March 20, 2023

Custody during bail

Manish Jain v. Haryana State Pollution Control Board, (2020) 20 SCC 123 : (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 676 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1101 at page 123

2. A person released on bail is already in the constructive custody of law. If the law requires him to come back to custody for specified reasons, we are afraid that an application for anticipatory bail apprehending arrest will not lie. There cannot be an apprehension of arrest by a person already in the constructive custody of the law. We, therefore, reject the prayer for anticipatory bail.

Saturday, March 11, 2023

cognizance against accused qua whom proceeding is quashed

"In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, (1983) 1 SCC 1: (AIR 1983 SC 67: 1983 Cri LJ 159) this Court has struck a note of caution, while considering whether prosecution can produce evidence to satisfy the Court that other accused against whom proceedings have been quashed or those who have not arrayed as accused, have also committed an offence in order to enable the Court to take cognizance against them and try them along with the other accused. This was how learned Judges then cautioned:

'But we would hasten to add that this is really an extraordinary power which is conferred on the Court and should be used very sparingly and only if compelling reasons exist for taking cognizance against the other person against whom action has not been taken.' "

Tuesday, February 28, 2023

Mutually Destructive and contradictory plea

Gobinda Gupta v. Bedana Das, 1997 SCC OnLine Cal 416 : (1997) 4 ICC 280 at page 283

16. It is well settled that defendant can in his written statement take inconsistent defence. The Code of Civil Procedure does not prohibit inconsistent pleadings and there is nothing to prevent either party from setting up two or more inconsistent sets of material facts and claiming relief thereunder in the alternative. But the litigants who avail himself of the right to press inconsistent cases before the court and endeavours to establish both the alternatives by contradictory oral testimony, plainly places himself in peril and may find himself entangled in extricable difficulty, for evidence adduced in support of two absolutely inconsistent cases, which are mutually destructive could hardly be expected to secure confidence.

 

Arundhati Mishra (Smt) v. Sri Ram Charitra Pandey, (1994) 2 SCC 29 at page 31

3. It is settled law as laid down by this Court in Firm Sriniwas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad[AIR 1951 SC 177 : 1951 SCR 277] that it is open to the parties to raise even mutually inconsistent pleas and if the relief could be founded on the alternative plea it could be granted. If the facts are admitted in the written statement, the relief could be granted to the plaintiff on the basis of the evidence though inconsistent pleas were raised. Amendment to written statement cannot be considered on the same principle as an amendment to the plaint. The pleas in the written statement may be alternative or on additional ground or to substitute the original plea. It is equally settled law that amendment of the pleadings could be made at any stage of the proceedings. Instances are not wanting that pleadings are permitted to be amended even when second appeal is pending. Equally it was refused. It is not necessary to burden the judgment by copious references thereof. But each case depends upon its own facts. The essential requisites are that the delay in making the application; the reason therefor should be given and considered; and there should be no prejudice caused to the other side. Bar of limitation which is available to the parties cannot be permitted to be defeated. It is also settled law that if the relief is found on the same cause of action, though different sets of facts are sought to be brought on record by appropriate pleadings, it cannot be refused. In those circumstances, permission to amend the pleadings could be granted.

This extract is taken from Arundhati Mishra (Smt) v. Sri Ram Charitra Pandey, (1994) 2 SCC 29 at page 32

4. The question in this case is whether the plea of adverse possession sought to be set up by the respondent could be permitted to be raised. The pleas based on title and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent and the latter does not begin to operate until the former is renounced. It is his own case that he came into possession of the suit house in his own right and remained in possession as an owner. The appellant is only benamidar. Therefore, his plea is based on his own title. He never denounced his title nor admitted the title of the appellant. He never renounced his character as an owner asserting adverse possession openly to the knowledge of the appellant and the appellant's acquiescence to it. Thereafter, he remained in open and peaceful possession and enjoyment to the knowledge of the appellant without acknowledging/or acquiescing the right, title and interest of the appellant. The plea of adverse possession, though available to the respondent, was never raised by him. Only on receipt of the first notice he denied title of the appellant and made it known to him for the first time through the reply notice got issued by him. Even then the plea of adverse possession was not raised in the written statement. No explanation for the belated plea was given. Even assuming that the reply dated March 15, 1971 constitutes assertion of adverse possession, the limitation would start running against the appellant only from March 15, 1971 and not earlier. The suit was filed in 1978 within 12 years. Under these circumstances, the High Court is not justified in permitting the respondent to raise the plea of adverse possession. It is made clear that we are not expressing any opinion on merits. The judgment of the High Court is set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court for disposal on merits according to law. The appeal is allowed but without costs.

Wednesday, February 15, 2023

- child custody matters _ habeas corpus

Constitution of India - Writ of Habeas Corpus in Cases of Child's Custody - in a petition seeking a writ of Habeas Corpus in a matter relating to a claim for custody of a child, the principal issue which should be taken into consideration is as to whether from the facts of the case, it can be stated that the custody of the child is illegal - whether the welfare of the child requires that his present custody should be changed and the child be handed over to the care and custody of any other person - whenever a question arises before a court pertaining to the custody of the minor child, the matter is to be decided not on consideration of the legal rights of the parties but on the sole and predominant criterion of what would best serve the interest and welfare of the child - welfare is an all-encompassing word - It includes material welfare - while material considerations have their place they are secondary matters - more important are the stability and the security, the loving and understanding care and guidance, the warm and compassionate relationships that are essential for the full development of the child's own character, personality and talents - the employment of the writ of Habeas Corpus in child custody cases is not pursuant to, but independent of any statute - the jurisdiction exercised by the court rests in such cases on its inherent equitable powers and exerts the force of the State, as parens patriae, for the protection of its minor ward, and the very nature and scope of the inquiry and the result sought to be accomplished call for the exercise of the jurisdiction of a court of equity - The primary object of a Habeas Corpus petition, as applied to minor children, is to determine in whose custody the best interests of the child will probably be advanced. [Para 75, 80, 81, 86, 88, 89] Rajeswari Chandrasekar Ganesh v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 605

Independent assessment of evidence: commission report not binding

Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952 - In respect of criminal charges, an accused can be tried by a Court of law and not merely on the basis of the report of the Commissioner under the Inquiry Act. Such a report is not conclusive and an independent action has to be taken by the State or by the victims against the Organizers before the competent court of law to prove the criminal offences said to be committed by certain accused. (Para 49) Sanjay Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 368 : (2022) 7 SCC 203

Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952 - The Commission under the Act shall be appointed either by the Executive or by the Legislature but not by the Judiciary in terms of the provisions of Inquiry Act. (Para 46, 50) Sanjay Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 368 : (2022) 7 SCC 203