R.K. Dalmia v. Delhi Admn., (1963) 1 SCR 253 : AIR 1962 SC 1821 : (1962) 32 Comp Cas 699 : (1962) 2 Cri LJ 805
46. We are of opinion that there is no good reason to restrict the meaning of the word “property” to movable property only when it is used without any qualification in Section 405 or in other sections of the Indian Penal Code. Whether the offence defined in a particular section of the Indian Penal Code can be committed in respect of any particular kind of property will depend not on the interpretation of the word “property” but on the fact whether that particular kind of property can be subject to the acts covered by that section. It is in this sense that it may be said that the word “property” in a particular section covers only that type of property with respect to which the offence contemplated in that section can be committed.
R.K. Dalmia v. Delhi Admn., (1963) 1 SCR 253 : AIR 1962 SC 1821 : (1962) 32 Comp Cas 699 : (1962) 2 Cri LJ 805
ReplyDelete46. We are of opinion that there is no good reason to restrict the meaning of the word “property” to movable property only when it is used without any qualification in Section 405 or in other sections of the Indian Penal Code. Whether the offence defined in a particular section of the Indian Penal Code can be committed in respect of any particular kind of property will depend not on the interpretation of the word “property” but on the fact whether that particular kind of property can be subject to the acts covered by that section. It is in this sense that it may be said that the word “property” in a particular section covers only that type of property with respect to which the offence contemplated in that section can be committed.