Suppression should be that of "material fact"

Arunima Baruah v. Union of India, (2007) 6 SCC 120 at page 125

12. It is trite law that so as to enable the court to refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction suppression must be of material fact. What would be a material fact, suppression whereof would disentitle the appellant to obtain a discretionary relief, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Material fact would mean material for the purpose of determination of the lis, the logical corollary whereof would be that whether the same was material for grant or denial of the relief. If the fact suppressed is not material for determination of the lis between the parties, the court may not refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. It is also trite that a person invoking the discretionary jurisdiction of the court cannot be allowed to approach it with a pair of dirty hands. But even if the said dirt is removed and the hands become clean, whether the relief would still be denied is the question.

 

Floodgates Arguments

N. Kannadasan v. Ajoy Khose, (2009) 7 SCC 1 at page 55

127. Mr Venugopal would submit that such an interpretation would open a floodgate. We do not think so. We even wish no occasion like the present one arises in future before the superior courts for their consideration. Even otherwise, the floodgate argument does not appeal to us. In Coal India Ltd. v.Saroj Kumar Mishra [(2007) 9 SCC 625] this Court held: (SCC p. 632, para 19)

“19. The floodgate argument also does not appeal to us. The same appears to be an argument of desperation. Only because there is a possibility of floodgate litigation, a valuable right of a citizen cannot be permitted to be taken away. This Court is bound to determine the respective rights of the parties. (See Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India[(2005) 4 SCC 649] and Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee v.C.K. Rajan [(2003) 7 SCC 546] .)”

 

Settlement of Insurance Claims on Non Standard Basis

in the case of Amalendu Sahoo vs. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., (2010) 4 SCC 536, has held that in case of any variation from the policy document/any breach of the policy document, the Insurance company cannot repudiate the claim in toto and the claim of the complainant ought to be settled on non-standard basis.

Appeal from dismissal on default

If an application under order 9 rule 13 of CPC for setting aside an exparte decree is dismissed, the aggrieved party can file an appeal against the decree itself on the ground that the material brought on record by the plaintiff was insufficient or the suit was not maintainable (2005) 3 SCC 427

Recall of Ex Parte Order by Labour Court

Hindustan Tobacco Company v. First Labour Court, West Bengal , 1995 1 CHN 398 (Calcutta High Court)

 

An ex parte order passed by the Labour can be recalled by it under inherent powers to adopt its own procedure

 

But power of review is to be expressly conferred (2005) 13 SCC 777.

How should courts consider judgments

In Haryana Financial Corporation v. Jagdamba Oil Mills [ 2002 (46) ALR 717 (SC).] , the Hon'ble Apex Court held that Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits-in with the fact situation of the decision relied upon

Value of CAG Reports

Arun Kumar Agrawal v. Union of India, (2013) 7 SCC 1 at page 24

68. We may, however, point out that since the report is from a constitutional functionary, it commands respect and cannot be brushed aside as such, but it is equally important to examine the comments what respective Ministries have to offer on the CAG's Report. The Ministry can always point out, if there is any mistake in the CAG's report or the CAG has inappropriately appreciated the various issues. For instance, we cannot as such accept the CAG report in the instance case.

 

Judgment becomes binding immediately, no communication from Government is required

AIR 1995 All 152, Para 7  Dr Rohit Gupta v. SN Medical College

 

Difference between locus and right of impleadment

U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Gyan Devi, (1995) 2 SCC 326 at page 358

37…. Between the locus and right of impleadment there is a world of difference. The two cannot be equated. A person having locus may not be denied appearance but a person who is necessary party cannot be denied impleadment. The former is permissive, the latter is mandatory. A local body may have locus to appear for the limited purpose but once it opts to keep out it cannot claim to be necessary party whose non-impleadment renders the proceedings invalid.

 

Complexity of a decision-making process cannot be a defence when a grievance is made before the Court by a citizen that his fundamental right to equality has been violated

C.M. Thri Vikrama Varma v. Avinash Mohanty, (2011) 7 SCC 385 at page 396

26. In our view, complexity of a decision-making process cannot be a defence when a grievance is made before the Court by a citizen that his fundamental right to equality has been violated. When such a grievance is made before the Court, the authorities have to justify their impugned decision by placing the relevant material before the Court.