| Purshottam Das Tandon v. State of UP Lucknow and Ors." in CMWP Nos. 2293/1969 |
T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, (1997) 2 SCC 267 at page 269, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that
"4. The Forest Conservation Act, 1980 was enacted with a view to check further deforestation which ultimately results in ecological imbalance; and therefore, the provisions made therein for the conservation of forests and for matters connected therewith, must apply to all forests irrespective of the nature of ownership or classification thereof. The word "forest" must be understood according to its dictionary meaning. This description covers all statutorily recognised forests, whether designated as reserved, protected or otherwise for the purpose of Section 2(i) of the Forest Conservation Act. The term "forest land", occurring in Section 2, will not only include "forest" as understood in the dictionary sense, but also any area recorded as forest in the Government record irrespective of the ownership. This is how it has to be understood for the purpose of Section 2 of the Act. The provisions enacted in the Forest Conservation Act, 1980 for the conservation of forests and the matters connected therewith must apply clearly to all forests so understood irrespective of the ownership or classification thereof. This aspect has been made abundantly clear in the decisions of this Court in Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat [(1987) 1 SCC 213] , Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P. [1989 Supp (1) SCC 504] and recently in the order dated 29-11-1996 (Supreme Court Monitoring Committee v. Mussoorie Dehradun Development Authority [ WP (C) No 749 of 1995 decided on 29-11-1996] ). The earlier decision of this Court in State of Bihar v. Banshi Ram Modi [(1985) 3 SCC 643] has, therefore, to be understood in the light of these subsequent decisions. We consider it necessary to reiterate this settled position emerging from the decisions of this Court to dispel the doubt, if any, in the perception of any State Government or authority. This has become necessary also because of the stand taken on behalf of the State of Rajasthan, even at this late stage, relating to permissions granted for mining in such area which is clearly contrary to the decisions of this Court. It is reasonable to assume that any State Government which has failed to appreciate the correct position in law so far, will forthwith correct its stance and take the necessary remedial measures without any further delay.
21. While considering an application for grant of injunction, the court will not only take into consideration the basic elements in relation thereto viz. existence of a prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury, it must also take into consideration the conduct of the parties.
Thus the strict parameters governing an interim injunction do not have full play in matters of custody.
3. It is difficult for us in this habeas corpus petition to take evidence without which the question as to what is in the interest of the child cannot satisfactorily be determined. We, therefore, direct that the learned District Judge, Chandigarh, will make a report to us before the 23rd of this month on the question as to whether the custody of the child should be handed over to the petitioner-mother, taking into consideration the interest of the minor. The learned Judge will give liberty to the parties to adduce evidence on the question in issue. The learned District Judge may either take up the matter himself or assign it to an Additional District Judge, if there is any at Chandigarh.
Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat, 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1189, decided on 04.10.2017
http://www.scconline.com/DocumentLink/qZe7uF78
he Court summarised the elaborate principles laid down by the Supreme Court in various cases. Below is the summary of the principles:
